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Abstract 
 
Albanian identity is contested. Albanians have developed an idiosyncratic and syncretic 
‘identity’ over the centuries, reflecting the layered elements of the nation’s past. Of the 
Byzantine, Roman, Ottoman and Communist periods, it is the long centuries of Ottoman rule 
that inevitably left the greatest impact on Albanian culture and society. Communist dictator, 
Enver Hoxha attempted to shift Albanian identity dramatically to another path, but the short-
term impact of communism pale in comparison to the long-term, deep-seated effects of the 
Ottoman Empire. Debates about Albanian identity and its belonging to the Ottoman heritage 
are far from resolved and in the current Albanian environment, scholars and writers, politicians 
and media commentators, are divided in their perceptions of the national identity. Many 
support prominent Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare’s argument in favour of a still-extant 
European identity underpinning Albanian culture. For Kadare this “frozen” identity survived  
the Ottoman centuries and must be freed from the remnants of the Ottoman heritage still 
clinging to it. Others position themselves with Rexhep Qosja—the leader of the opposing camp 
who argues that Albanian identity is different from that of Europe, that Albanian civilisation 
draws on both East and West, in particular, that Albanians lost their Christian origins, 
becoming deeply influenced by Muslim culture during the past centuries, and hence belong to 
the East rather than the West. Thus, in the twenty-first century, Albanian society is divided, 
and perceptions of identity mirror these two dominant lines of thought.  
Tensions remain high in the Western Balkans, Turkey is now a powerful state, and 
Turkish influence has been strongly directed towards the Albanian, Kosovar and Bosnian 
governments, as well as to local Muslim populations, many of whom are Albanians. Turkish 
foreign policy has been aggressively promoted in Albania and Kosovo, on the basis that deep-
seated cultural similarities, geo-political, economic, regional and energy security matters bind 
their futures together. This influence, and present-day Albania’s engagement with Turkey, will 
have important consequences for Albanians in the future.  
The aim of this thesis is to shed new light on the nuances of the expression of Albanian 
identity in relation to the Ottoman heritage, and to gauge the extent to which Ottoman heritage, 
Turkish influence and Albanian identity and self-understanding are linked at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century. It is hoped that scholars, policy makers, educators, and academics will 
use the findings detailed in this thesis to better inform themselves regarding the ways Albanians 
identify themselves in terms of both East and West.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
Since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, and with the collapse of Communism in Europe and 
the Balkans by the early 1990s, Albanians have wrestled with questions of identity, heritage 
and belonging in cultural, ethnic, economic and political terms. Communist rule which lasted 
from 1944 until the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985, imposed a distinctive brand of nationalism 
on Albania. Moreover, Albania’s pre-communist history and its post-communist reality have 
rendered Hoxha’s vision of Albanian identity obsolete. Questions from the pre-communist past 
have re-emerged as the new state struggles to establish a new, post-communist identity. The 
issues of Kosovars and ethnic Albanians in the adjacent Balkan states of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia have reappeared with the break-up of the former Yugoslav Republic, 
which have further complicated issues of Albanian identity. 
Foreign interests were quick to begin penetrating the once-closed Albanian state soon after 
the end of the communist regime. European and American business interests began to arrive as 
did Saudi and Kuwaiti money which was channelled into the country to assist the re-
establishment of Albanian Islam.1 Albanians themselves looked to both East and West, as well 
as to the European Union and the newly powerful regional state, Turkey, to both ascertain their 
new identity and build links with appropriate partners in the context of post-communist 
democracy and globalization.2 
Turkey has emerged as a powerful player over the past decade in contemporary discussions 
of Albanian existence and its identity. The reasons for this may be historical as the Ottoman 
Turks occupied parts of the Albanian Balkans from the late fourteenth century onward, 
imposing their culture, language, beliefs and more, and drawing the Albanians into the cultural 
and civil sphere of the Orient, of Islam and Ottoman rule. 
The issue of the ‘Ottoman identity’ of Albania has been hotly debated in the wake of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. The recent revival of Neo-Ottomanism is but one example of the 
                                                 
1 Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West, 
Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2007, 30-1. 
2 Miranda Vickers and James Pettifer, Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity New York: New York 
University Press, 1997, 105. 
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ongoing debate in the region.3 While Turkish power in the Eastern Mediterranean generally is 
not to be underestimated, the significance of Turkish engagement in Albania and Kosovo has 
deeper roots in the culture, history and regional-area relations of the region. 
 
1.2 The research question  
 
This thesis will explore specifically whether Albania is bidding farewell to its Ottoman 
heritage and whether and to what extent Turkish influence is influencing Albanian strategic 
alignment with the East in the twenty-first century. This research question is a response to 
ubiquitous discussions over the past two decades of Albanian national identity as newly 
“European,” and aiming to join the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ family of the West, thereby farewelling its 
historical legacy of Ottomanism. According to the Albanian government and policy makers, 
Albania’s post-Cold War foreign policy is based on two pillars: the USA and the European 
Union (EU).4 It is assumed by leaders on both sides of Albanian domestic politics that only the 
‘Euro-Atlantic Orientation’ will guarantee Albania’s survival and prosperity in the 
international arena.5  
However, as an old Italian proverb states: tra il dire e il fare c'è di mezzo il mare [there is 
many a slip 'twixt the cup and the lip].  Albanian politicians may assert that Albania is going 
                                                 
3 In the twenty-first century, the Turkish government is under ‘considerable domestic pressure for greater 
military aid to beleaguered Muslim and Turkic communities’ in the Balkans. At the same time a tendency to 
Neo-Ottomanism is present in Turkey. According to Hakan Yavuz, Neo-Ottomanists hope to construct a new 
Turkey that is based on the Ottoman values, and thus Islam. See for instance Sabri Sayari, "Turkish foreign 
policy in the post-Cold War era: The challenges of multi-regionalism", Journal of International Affairs, 54, no. 
1, 170; M. Hakan Yavuz, "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo‐Ottomanism", Critique: 
Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 7, no. 12, 1998, 24. 
4 "Shqipëria dhe Këshilli i Partneritetit Euroatlantik (EAPC) [Albania and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council]", author’s translation, Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 3 March 2011, accessed 23 March 2013, 
http://arkiva.mfa.gov.al/index.php?option=com_multicategories&view=article&id=7555%3Ashqiperia-dhe-
keshilli-i-partneritetit-euroatlantik-eapc&format=pdf&Itemid=65&lang=en. 
5 "Topalli mbështet Kadarenë: Kemi Identitet Evropian [Topalli’s support for Kadare: We have European 
Identity]", author’s translation, Shekulli Online, 31 May 2006, accessed 11 January 2011, 
http://www.shekulli.com.al/shekulli/?s=%E2%80%98Topalli+mbeshtet+Kadarene%3A+Kemi+Identitet+Evrop
ian%E2%80%99; Bamir Topi, "Albania's Domestic and Foreign Policy 2008 Agenda", AIIS, 7 February 2008, 
accessed 23 February 2011, http://www.aiis-albania.org/; Mustafa Nano, "Kultura Perëndimore dhe Qytetërimi 
Lindor i Shqiptarëve [The Western Culture and Albania’s Oriental Civilization] ", author’s translation, Shqip, 22 
May 2006, accessed 17 July 2015, http://albanur.eu/showthread.php?t=282; Fatos Nano, "Nuk u Globalizua 
Terrorizmi, por Lufta kunder tij [No globalisation of terrorism, but the war against it]", author’s translation, 
Shekulli Online, 12 September 2002, accessed 11 September 2011, 
http://www.shekulli.com.al/shekulli/?s=Nano%3A+Nuk+u+Globalizua+Terrorizmi%2C+por+Lufta+kunder+tij. 
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West, but the reality seems to contradict this. One might merely mention the strong historical-
cultural bridge that links Albanians in the twenty-first century with five million Turks, who 
according to Genci Muçaj, the Albanian former Ambassador in Turkey, are conscious of and 
proud to mention their Albanian heritage.6 The political statements in the direction of the West 
may well be reversed. A more aggressive Turkish foreign policy to get closer to Albania is 
already using historical-cultural links between Albania and Turkey in their favour, to bring 
about Albania’s alignment with the East. Turkey may also use Albania’s economic, geo-
political and security concerns, which remain high for Albanians in the twenty-first century. 
Albanians continue to be the most scattered people in the Western Balkans, and the refusal by 
Greece and Serbia to recognise the independence of Kosovo in 2008, without mentioning the 
ghost of ‘Greater Albania’ that seems to be still alive7, are some concerns that might affect 
Albanian’s decision to re-align with East and thus, Turkey.  
The reluctance of both Albanian and Kosovar governments to clearly specify whether 
Albanian identity will be distanced by that of the Ottoman-Turks creates confusion for 
Albanian society. Recent arguments between Kadare’s thesis and Qosja’s opposing position 
with regards to the Albanian national identity have divided Albanian politicians, scholars, 
media and the entire society. This debate is the best example of Albanian identity contestation. 
However, while governments, scholars and media can be instrumental, they cannot stop 
Albanian people to imagine their identity as belonging to the Western-Christian-European or 
Eastern-Muslim-Turkish civilisations, but also part of both Eastern and Western civilizations.   
 
 
                                                 
6 "Ambasadori i Shqipërisë në Turqi: Feja e shqiptarit është shqiptaria, në Turqi janë pesë milionë shqiptarë 
[The Albanian Ambassador in Turkey: The Albanian religion is Albanianism, in Turkey live five million 
Albanians]", author’s translation, Telegrafi, 2 August 2015, accessed 17 November 2015, 
http://m.telegrafi.com/lajme/ambasadori-i-shqiperise-ne-turqi-feja-e-shqiptarit-eshte-shqiptaria-ne-turqi-jane-
pese-milione-shqiptare-2-67961.html. 
7 The paranoia of a ‘Greater Albania’ seems to have not come to an end. While for First Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivica Dačić, the danger of Albanian expansionism seems to be everywhere – ‘in 
the drone flying over the now infamous Albania-Serbia football match; at Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama’s 
residence, where a light display projected the map of Greater Albania for New Year’s; and in the West’s 
silence’, Greek defence minister condemned and punished seven Greek soldiers of the Albanian origins that 
formed the Albanian double eagle symbol with their hands. See "Two years of SYRIZA ruling Greece - The 
Albanian eagle in the Greek army!", SBS Australia, Greek language podcast, 26 January 2017, accessed 12 
February 2017, http://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/greek/en/content/two-years-syriza-ruling-greece-albanian-
eagle-greek-army; Sidita Kushi and Odeta Kushi, The Paranoia over ‘Greater Albania’ Returns, New Eastern 
Europe (21 January, 2015). 
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1.3 Lack of existing scholarly literature in the field 
 
Albanian Studies remains largely an internal affair, bounded by a language that few specialists 
outside Albania have mastered. The current shortage of informed scholarly literature (ie with 
access to the language) on Albania will be discussed in more detail in the second chapter. This 
shortage prompted me to undertake this research and offer my contribution in the field. Only 
small amounts of Albanian literature have been translated into English, and much of my 
argument depends on working with original language sources and making relevant sections 
available to the English reader. The well-known contemporary Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare 
remains one of the most influential Albanian writers and public intellectuals whose position 
regarding the Albanian national identity in context of the Ottoman Turks has been powerful, 
but also provocative as shown through his debate with the Kosovar scholar Rexhep Qosja. This 
debate has polarised Albanian politicians, scholars, media and society, and this thesis will be 
part of these analyses in bringing these authoritative voices to the English reader through a 
direct translation from Albanian. Kadare’s recent non-fictional works, and much of his fiction, 
which together comes to twenty volumes in the Albanian complete works edition, have been 
little translated into English. In March 2018, the Albanian media Mapo revealed that for the 
first time, Kadare’s Essays On World Literature: Aeschylus - Dante-Shakespeare, were 
translated directly from Albanian to English by Ani Kokobobo in 2018.8 These are unsupported 
claims as John Hodgson has become the leading translator of Kadare’s work directly from 
Albanian to English.9 Others such as Robert Elsie, Peter Constantine and Arshi Pipa have 
translated various shorter writings, and several works were published in communist Albania, 
including The Wedding (trans. Ali Cungu) and The Castle (trans. Pavli Qesku).10 However, 
most of Robert Elsie’s translations of Kadare’s works into English, have taken place via the 
French translations of Jusuf Vrioni and Tedi Papavrami. Therefore, many of those which have 
appeared in English have been based on French translations, rather than the Albanian originals, 
thus bringing to the English reader a doubly mediated version. David Bellos who has also 
                                                 
8 "Tri esetë në anglisht: Bota e Kadaresë, drama e pamundur e Shqipërisë [Three essays in English: Kadare’s 
world, Albania’s impossible drama]", author’s translation, Mapo, 13 March 2018, accessed 29 August 2018, 
http://www.mapo.al/tri-esete-ne-anglisht-bota-e-kadarese-drama-e-pamundur-e-shqiperise/. 
9 Peter Morgan, The Three Worlds of Ismail Kadare (Unpublished manuscript authorised by Professor Morgan: 
20 October 2018). 
10 Ibid. 
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translated in English from French: The Pyramid, The File on H, Spring Flowers, Spring Frost, 
The Successor, Agamemnon's Daughter, The Siege and Twilight of the Eastern Gods, has 
recognised difficulties of translation in English from French—“a language with extensive, 
elaborate, and extremely rigid rules about verbal tense and mood”—to the less rigid and 
“sturdy, verb system of English”.11 For Bellos, both French and English “have only one tense 
for the doubly remote past” used in Kadare’s writings.12 As a result, there are enormous 
difficulties when translating from Albanian (which has 36 alphabet letters) to French (with 26 
letters) due to differences in grammar, tense and structure. Although Bellos does not know 
Albanian, through translation of Kadare’s works, and speaking directly to him, he has 
appreciated the difficulties of translating from Albanian to English via the French. While Bellos 
is challenged by these translations, he arguably “…can’t rule out that that language of 
ambiguity and manipulation is Albanian”.13 In addition, Kadare’s master crafts in such a 
difficult language, and his purportedly invention of universal time in his narratives, makes his 
powerful imagination and conscious artistry unique, whilst adding more to the difficulties of 
translation. Although Jusuf Vrioni is considered the best translator of Kadare’s works in 
French14, according to Bellos, his translations were “apparently not perfect”.15 Indeed, the title 
of Eskili, ky humbes i madh, contains a mistake when translated in French as Eschyle ou le 
grand perdant. The use of ‘ky’ by Kadare is a determinative and clearly does not allow room 
for speculation—Aeschylus is a great loser. In short, the direct translation from Albanian to 
English would have been: Aeschylus, this great loser, or more accurately, Aeschylus, the great 
loser. However, the use of ‘ou’ in French, which means ‘or’ in English, may complicate the 
reader’s perception of Aeschylus being a great loser. 
Furthermore, lack of scholarly literature on Albania, not only opens the way for the 
ongoing propagation of stereotypes, but also means that crucial concepts have remained 
uncomprehended outside their Albanian context. One of these has been the role of religion and 
                                                 
11 David Bellos, "On Translating  Ismail Kadare", TRANSLATION REVIEW, vol. 1, no. 76, 21 August 2012, 19-
20. 
12 Ibid., 22. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Peter Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship 1957-1990, Oxon and NY: Modern 
Humanities Research Association and Routledge, 2010, 29. 
15 Bellos, 18. 
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its relationship with nationalism in crafting the nation. This thesis will engage with the debate 
on Albanian religion; testing also theories of prominent scholars such as Hastings, Weber and 
Smith, who all believe in the power of religion and its role in shaping nationalisms. It will be 
informative to explore religion role in Albania and the way it shaped the Albanian nationalism 
and national identity. 
 
1.4 Personal reasons for conducting this study  
 
Another reason to conduct this research is its reflection on my personal life. Various scholars 
have recognised the importance of personal reflections while conducting qualitative research. 
According to Marshall and Rossman (2011), and Strauss and Corbin (1990), personal 
motivation and interests are important and valuable sources of insights about the phenomenon 
analysed in the study.16 For this reason, this section discusses the personal motivation and 
interest of the author for conducting this study. 
I have a long-standing interest in the perception of the Albanian identity by the world 
outside Albania. A year after the Albanian communist regime ended, I found myself as a 
migrant in Europe where I struggled to express my Albanian identity, which evidently was not 
compatible with the Italian-European identity of those around me. Moreover, I was not familiar 
with the Italian language as well as the traditions of Catholicism, of Sunday mass and the 
religious celebrations, of the gestures while speaking and the expectations of social intercourse. 
Despite my best attempts to learn and communicate in Italian, difficulties abounded. Living as 
an ‘undocumented’ migrant was challenging. However, I realised that my customs and 
traditions, while different from those of Northern Italy, did not prevent me from integrating 
into this new society. I also realised that while some elements of my culture and tradition, such 
as songs, ceremonies and the ‘Albanian way of life’ were slipping away from me, I started to 
absorb elements of the Italian culture and identity. While I never doubted Italy’s hospitality to 
millions of migrants across the region, the settlement and integration remained a constant 
challenge. Mascitelli and De Lazzari argue that “multiculturalism did not fail in Italy…it 
                                                 
16 See for instance, Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, Basics of qualitative research, vol. 15, Newbury Park, CA 
Sage, 1990; Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing qualitative research, 5th ed., Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2011. 
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simply never existed”.17 In fact, for some Italians, I remained an ‘Albanese’, a term that meant 
thieves, criminal gangs, rough and backward people.18 Notwithstanding the fact that, alongside 
Greece, Italy provided shelter for nearly one million Albanians after the Cold War, feelings 
towards Albanians are influenced by stereotypes. These sentiments are exemplified in the lyrics 
of a piece, published online, under the title: “Spara All’ Albanese”19, which states: 
gli albanesi sono quasi tutti negri 
e se non sono negri sono musi gialli 
sono tutti ladri e contrabbandieri 
prima o poi bisognera' eliminarli 
 
Albanians are quasi all Negros 
and if they are not Negros they are yellow perils 
they are all thieves and smugglers 
sooner or later they need to be exterminated.  
 
These racist sentiments on social media are complemented by the Italian media which 
has played a pivotal role in painting Albanians as thieves and smugglers, for instance in the 
television series Commissario Montalbano. Thus, my personal experience, representing a 
generic post-Cold War Albanian migrant experience, fleeing political persecution, food 
shortages and economic instability, in the search of a better life, may also be useful to 
understand contemporary Albanian national identity and the way it may develop in the future. 
I, as a researcher, am inside this story, and my own experience colours my interpretation. 
As outlined above, my history can be seen as representative of a common Albanian 
history: born in Albania, I lived in Italy for twelve years, and am now a citizen of Australia. 
Therefore, I brought to Australia a sort of an ‘Albanian identity’ that in reality was mixed with 
an ‘Italian identity’, which then amalgamated again with the ‘Australian way of life’. While 
this might be a common contemporary story, the identity of my ancestors evolved and 
                                                 
17 Bruno Mascitelli and Chiara De Lazzari, "Interculturalism, multiculturalism and Italianess: the case of Italy", 
Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, 8, no. 2, 2016, 61. 
18 Giuseppe Caliceti, Italiani per esempio: L’Italia vista dai bambini immigrati [Italians for example: the Italy 
viewed from immigrant’s children], Milano, Bergamo: Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore Milano, 2010, 103-4. 
19 "Spara All’albanese [Shoot the Albanians]", author’s translation, Lyrics Box-Cetomedio Lyrics, accessed 25 
August 2017, https://www.lyricsbox.com/cetomedio-spara-all-albanese-lyrics-4bcdfrl.html. 
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transformed in a way similar to my own, although they did not leave the place where they were 
born. While my family is Albanian, our family name changed during the Ottoman occupation; 
but there is no knowledge of how, when and why, and the original name is still unknown.  
In other ways Klein emphasises that integration of ethnic minority groups who arrive 
and settle in another place “…always presents opportunities and challenges to host 
countries”.20 However, the Ottoman colonial history of Albania was a different reality, as the 
distinct difference between a minority group settling somewhere and the Ottoman conquerors 
settling in Albania and imposing their rule is obvious. At the end of the fourteenth century, not 
only Ottomans conquered Albanian speaking lands, they imposed their language, culture, 
religion and traditions.  
Albanian identity is contested on many levels. In the domestic sphere, Albanians are 
still wrestling with poverty issues and meeting basic economic needs. Arguably, poverty and 
globalisation have had an impact on domestic Albanian cultural norms and behaviours. 
However, in the international arena, Albanians are still paying for their close alliance with the 
Ottoman Turks. 
 
1.5 Methodological considerations 
 
The methodological approach for this study will be a cultural studies framework. According to 
Saukko, “The methodological project of cultural studies is structured around a three-
dimensional interest in lived experiences, discourses or texts and the social context”.21 For 
Marshall and Rossman the domain of cultural studies includes a broad range of evaluations and 
analyses of culture, which includes the entire social mosaic such as our identities, language, 
text and power.22 Albanian national identity construction will be analysed against some 
theoretical concepts such as ethnicity, nationalism, religion, nation, civilisation and political 
                                                 
20 Maren Klein, "Managing diversity: is Australia bucking the post-multiculturalist trend or on its way to 
embrace interculturalism?", Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, vol. 8, no. 2, 2016, 65. 
21 Paula Saukko, Doing Research in Cultural Studies: An introduction to classical and new methodological 
approaches, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, 33. 
22 Marshall and Rossman, 23-4. 
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influence. A brief scrutiny of nation building theories will follow, to then conclude with 
Todorova’s reflection on ‘Balkanism’.  
McNabb discusses the two main methodological research approaches in political 
science, namely positivist and post-positivist traditions.23 According to this author, while the 
positivist approach is based on quantification and statistical analyses, post-positivist research 
is based on qualitative approaches such as explanatory, critical and post-modern research. This 
thesis will make use of quantitative data as evidence for specific lines of investigation. The 
quantitative research will be based on primary sources, namely Albanian, European Union and 
Turkish government archives, their foreign ministry websites and other research institutions 
such as the Eurostat and the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT). The quantitative data 
will not, however, tell us the entire story and must be supported with qualitative and theoretical 
material, as there are also invisible aspects of Albania’s behaviour rooted in the Albanian 
heritage which exerts a strong influence on Albanian politicians and policy makers. In addition, 
Albania’s attempt to join European Union (EU), which appears to be never ending, due to its 
limited progress on democratic reforms is a case in point. Thus, a qualitative analysis will help 
for example to pinpoint whether Albania’s corruption has roots in its colonial past, and if so, 
whether this may further delay Albania’s dream to join European Union.  
In their Handbook of Qualitative Research (2005), Denzin and Lincoln (et al) trace the 
rich history of qualitative research in its many and varied forms. These authors emphasise the 
plethora of approaches and orthodoxies within and across disciplines and the vast compendium 
of techniques available for collecting, analysing and presenting data. They argue that current 
methodological techniques used by scholars are more sophisticated than in previous eras, while 
causing a backlash with the approach of governments that are still more interested in 
quantitative research.24 However, despite the ruptures and changes, the qualitative research and 
its central principle of researcher engagement within the researched field remain strong. Patton 
highlights the importance of qualitative research as “an effort to understand situations in their 
uniqueness as part of a particular context…”25  
                                                 
23 David E. McNabb, Research approaches for political science: Quantitative and qualitative approaches, 2 ed., 
London and New York: Routledge, 2015, 27. 
24 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Handbook of Qualitative Research Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage 
Publications, 2005, 1-26. 
25 Michael Quinn Patton, Quality in qualitative research: Methodological principles and recent developments, 
Chicago: Invited address to Division J of the American Educational Research Association 1985, 1. 
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Qualitative research can give us more information about Albania’s identity and its self-
perception. The qualitative sources include primary interviews published by the Albanian 
media and secondary sources such as the media, literature from scholars, government reports 
etc. This thesis seeks to cast new light on the issue by drawing on English, through Albanian 
language sources, and drawing on little known economic and military secondary data.  
The first post-communist Albanian military attaché in Ankara, Hajro Limaj, who served 
for the period from 1990-2000 has published in book form a diary called Midis Ankarasë dhe 
Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between Ankara and Tirana: 1990-
2000. From the diary of a military attaché]. This book published in Albanian, in 2012, contains 
valuable data regarding the political, economic and military relations between Turkey and 
Albania especially after the Cold War and will be part of analyses in chapter five. Therefore, 
throughout this thesis, a large amount of relevant and hitherto inaccessible data primarily from 
Albanian is translated into English and is used for the re-interpretation of the narrative in this 
research.  
 
1.6 Some limitations of this research  
 
It has to be noted that there are some limitations to this research. Firstly, all government 
sources, be they Turkish or Albanian, are likely to display a certain level of bias, raising 
concerns regarding accuracy. Turkey and Albania claim to be liberal democracies, however, 
the European Union in the review of the two countries’ membership applications has raised 
concerns about their slow path to democratisation. Analysing documents from Turkish 
government sources needs to be read in light of its poor record on human rights within its own 
country and thus, not only government documents, but also the media can be politically 
manipulated. Attention is also required when analysing the often-politicised Albanian media 
and government data, as the government and its opposition parties are still far from being free 
of bias. However, in this thesis, media articles from both Albania and Turkey are only used to 
retrieve concrete facts and not as a source of analyses. 
Secondly, there is an issue with accessibility of some secondary sources as these keep 
disappearing after a certain period of time from some Turkish and Albanian media websites. 
Although throughout my research I have accessed Albanian media sites on daily basis, I have 
noticed that articles from Panorama on line and Top Channel for example seem to vanish after 
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a period of approximately six months from the access date. In addition, since the last Turkish 
coup d’état in 2016, the Turkish government closed down a number of Turkish newspapers 
and media sites; removing all material and data from those websites.26 Zaman was a reputable 
Turkish media, used in this thesis. 
Ultimately, the lack of Albanian literature and documentation prior and during the 
Ottoman period, creates more challenges to address claims such as the ethnic origins of 
Albanians and the time when Albanian speaking people populated the Balkan Peninsula. An 
exception is the period of Skenderbeg which is largely covered by Albanian and European 
literature.27 However, in general, Albanian literature is essentially absent from more than five 
centuries of the Ottoman rule. The analysis of the interaction between Albanians and the 
Ottoman Turks are often based on Ottoman documentation archived in Turkey and frequently 
inaccessible to researchers. Although rilindja writings at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century are valuable secondary sources, the absence of Albanian 
literature from the Ottoman period is extensive and problematical. Furthermore, the communist 
regime of Hoxha set Albanian identity on a different path, which raises questions about 
research outcomes of some Albanian writers in this period.   
 
1.7 Terminology 
 
To facilitate a better understanding, it is important to discuss some of the key terms used in this 
field of research. The section that follows will discuss the meanings of the terms to guide the 
reader through the study as well as to describe the terminological choices made by the author.  
Firstly, Albanian identity is the overarching concept of this thesis and one that goes to 
the heart of this research. Discussing Albanian identity is not only complex but can also be 
controversial. The first question to be clarified is whether ‘Albanian identity’ encompasses all 
ethnic Albanians that live in Albania and elsewhere, or whether it relates only to those 
                                                 
26 "Turkey coup attempt: More than 130 media outlets shut", BBC News, 28 July 2016, accessed 21 September 
2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36910556. 
27 Naim Frashëri, Historia e Skënderbeut [The History of Skenderbeg], author’s translation, Tiranë: Instituti i 
Historisë dhe Gjuhësisë, 1967; Marin Barleti, The Siege of Shkodra: Albania's Courageous Stand Against 
Ottoman Conquest, 1478. Originally published as “De obsidione Scodrensi, 1504”, Tirana: Onufri, 2012; Harry 
Hodgkinson, ed. Scanderbeg, ed. Bejtullah D. Destani and Westrow Cooper (Centre for Albanian Studies, 
1999); Nelo Drizari, Scanderbeg; His Life, Correspondence, Orations, Victories, and Philosophy, The 
University of Michigan and National Press, 2008; Oliver Jens Schmitt, Skanderbeg: der neue Alexander auf 
dem Balkan, Pustet, 2009; Ismail Kadare, The Siege, Canada: Doubleday, 2010. 
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Albanians in Albania. This thesis will conceptualise ‘Albanian identity’ as a whole, including 
the identity of those Albanians who live in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Kosovo and 
Albania. However, this thesis is mindful about similarities and differences of identity between 
Albanians. An example is the development of a new Kosovar identity. This identity, while 
according to Mehmeti, still possibly imaginary, may emerge in the future, thus challenging 
Albanian identity.28 Differences between Albanians in terms of religion, culture, language and 
identity will be briefly highlighted in order to provide a deeper understanding of what is 
considered as Albanian identity.  
Greater Albania is linked to the concept of Great Powers, and the decline of the 
Ottoman Empire. While for Albanian nationalists the unification of all those territories into the 
so called ‘Greater Albania’ would end centuries of humiliation and injustice, Western Balkan 
nationalists view this as merely an irredentist idea trying to destabilise the region. Greater 
Albania is not the only concept of ‘greater nation-states’ in the Western Balkans, however, in 
the twenty-first century, it seems to be of great concern. None of the Balkan countries was 
happy with the way the Great Powers drew the Balkan borders in 1913. However, in the twenty-
first century, it seems that projects of Greater Serbia (Nacertanie), Greater Croatia, and Greater 
Greece (Megali-Idea)—all older than ‘Greater Albania’—have been put to rest29, while, as 
Tanner mentioned, the ghost of Greater Albania is yet to disappear.30 
In relation to the previous concept of Greater Albania, Kosovo, or Kosova needs further 
explanation. Following the Ottoman downfall in 1911, Western Kosovo (Metohija) was 
integrated into the Kingdom of Montenegro and Eastern Kosovo into the Kingdom of Serbia.31 
Various administrative reorganizations of the territory took place during the 1920s and, in 
1929, Kosovo was included32 as part of the new formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.33 
                                                 
28 Leandrit I. Mehmeti, "Kosovar Identity: Challenging Albanian National Identity", Australia and New Zeland 
Journal of European Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 25. 
29 Mirela Bogdani and John Loughlin, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey Towards 
Integration and Accession, London, New York: I.B. Tauris , Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, 233. 
30 Marcus Tanner, "The Ghost of Greater Albania Won’t go Away", BalkanInsight, 27 March 2015, accessed 14 
July 2015, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/the-ghost-of-greater-albania-won-t-go-away. 
31 Peter Morgan, ‘Strange commerce of memory and forgetting’: Albania, Kosovo and Europe in Ismail 
Kadare’s File on H… (Manuscript, authorised by the author: 2015). 
32 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, London: Harper Perennial/HarperCollins, 1999, 251-63. 
33  The Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed ‘Yugoslavia’. 
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After WWII, Hoxha subscribed to the long-term Moscow policy of merging Albania with 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to create  a so-called ‘Balkan Federation’.34 Kosovar Albanians were 
threatened by discriminatory policies in the areas of language and education, and government 
policies of relocation of Serbs into Kosovo led to further population movements of ethnic 
Albanians.35 It was only under Yugoslav leader Josip Broz (Marshal Tito) that Kosovo was 
recognised as an ‘autonomous region’ and as a result after 1966, the situation for Albanians 
improved.36 However, Stalin became suspicious of Tito’s intentions, expelling Yugoslavia 
from the Comintern in 1948. Hoxha continued to remain loyal to Stalin and thereby ending the 
relationship with Tito and Yugoslavia. As a result, Tito developed a distrust of Hoxha and the 
Kosovar Albanians.37 The end of the Cold War coincided with the disintegration of the 
Yugoslav Federation although Kosovo only separated from Serbia in 1999, through NATO 
military intervention. In 2008, a country with 90 per cent ethnic Albanian population, 
proclaimed its independence to then become the Republic of Kosovo but this did not stop five 
European member states: Spain, Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus and Romania, from refusing to 
recognise its existence because, according to Abazi, it would “… impact on relations between 
regional actors, including the EU, Russia, NATO and Turkey”.38 In citing the Turkish former 
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, Abazi emphasises that Turkey perceives Kosovo, “as a debt it 
owes to its own history”.39 While an important issue, an examination of the  Kosovar nation-
state or state identity is outside the scope of this thesis, though. This thesis will consider the 
identity of Kosovar-Albanians who live in Kosovo or Kosova as part of the Albanian national 
identity.  
The Western Balkans is a region that comprises Albania and the former Yugoslav 
states of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. 
                                                 
34 Malcolm, 319. 
35 Morgan, "Strange commerce of memory and forgetting: Albania, Kosovo and Europe in Ismail Kadare’s File 
on H…". 
36 Edwin E Jacques, The Albanians: An Ethnic History from Prehistoric Times to the Present, vol. 1, Jefferson, 
North Carolina and London: McFarland & Company, Inc.,, 2009, 43; Malcolm, 316. 
37 Morgan, "Strange commerce of memory and forgetting: Albania, Kosovo and Europe in Ismail Kadare’s File 
on H…". 
38 Enika Abazi, "Kosovo Independence: An Albanian Perspective", Seta, Policy Brief, 11, April 2008, 2. 
39 Ibid., 3. 
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According to Bego, two and a half decades after the end of communism, “Western Balkan 
countries have become halfway democracies and the region struggles with ethnic, religious and 
nationalistic tensions”.40 Although Croatia is the only EU member state, Bego argues that three 
are challenges for the Western Balkans: the failure of democracy to deliver healthy political 
competition, Russian interference in the Slavic-majority nations in recent years, which has 
further complicated the political landscape, and the reluctance of Europe to accept Western 
Balkan states as EU members. Nevertheless, the reluctance of the EU to include Western 
Balkans may create a perfect environment for Turkey to get closer to the region, and Albanians 
might be their best supporters to achieve this. 
Ultimately, there is indeed much scholarship on the issue of the East-West dichotomy. 
The following is only a very brief overview in order to contextualise this paper and elucidate 
the complexity of Albanian identity orientation. Western European countries are considered 
‘Eurocentric’ at the core of the West (usually together with North America); marginalising the 
periphery of the Eastern countries.41 A more rigorous definition of the East-West dichotomy is 
problematic, as it is unclear whether it relates to geography, history, culture, politics, identity 
or religion.42 In the global era of interconnectedness where the West has more links with the 
East and vice versa, some believe that the concept of West and East is losing importance. A 
small country such as Albania displays the complexity of emerging relations between West 
and East. At present, Albania is seeking to re-imagine itself and bolster its links with the West, 
while expanding concurrent links with Turkey (which would like to portray itself as “a bridge 
between East and West”43) as part of the Eastern world.  
 
 
                                                 
40 Ingrid Bego, "Why are the Western Balkans in crisis? These are the three primary tensions", The Washington 
Post, 26 June 2017, accessed 10 October 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/06/26/why-are-the-western-balkans-in-crisis-these-are-the-three-primary-
tensions/?utm_term=.a52a7f984eb5. 
41 Alison Stenning, "Out there and in here: studying Eastern Europe in the West", Royal Geographical Society, 
37, no. 4, 13 December 2005, 381. Edward W Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered", Cultural Critique, no. 1, 
autumn 1985, 89-107.  
42 James Gow, Defending the West, Cambridge: Polity, 2005, 7. Stenning, 378-83. 
43 Metin Heper, "Turkey between East and West", Working Paper AY0405-16, Institute of European Studies, 
University of California Berkeley, 16 May 2004. 
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1.8 The structure of the thesis  
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters. This introductory chapter aims to introduce and 
explain the journey of this research, its importance, the research questions, methodological 
considerations, limitations, some key terms used and a brief explanation of the contents. 
The second chapter, which can be considered a literary review, will draw on the existing 
literature to provide a short background of the contested arguments that surround Albanian 
identity and contemporary Albanian-Turkish relations. The objective of this chapter is to 
highlight the main debates that have affected Albanian identity, the origins of the Albanian 
nation concept and its struggle for survival in relation to Turkish influence and legacy. These 
debates will then be part of discussion and analyses in later chapters. However, the aim of this 
literature review is to highlight gaps on the existing scholarly literature, and thus to fit this 
research as a possible contribution to the literature. 
The third chapter covers the theoretical terrain, providing a theoretical foundation, that 
will be relevant to explain Albanian identity. Drawing on a number of scholars who offered 
different nation-building approaches such as primordialism, perennialism, modernism, ‘ethno-
symbolism’ and post-modernism, the study seeks to explore Albanian identity. It will be 
interesting to investigate how currently two Albanian nation-states: Albania and Kosovo, but 
also other Albanians who live within other nation-state borders such as Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia comply with nation building theories. Furthermore, the chapter will 
shift its focus to issues such as ethnicity, nations, nationalism, religion, civilization, influence 
and legacy. It will briefly discuss Todorova’s ‘Balkanism’ in order to build the theoretical 
foundation for exploring the main theme of the research question: to what extent and how 
Turkey’s influence is creating ramifications for Albanian identity in the twenty-first century.  
Drawing back in the history, since the Ottoman arrival in 1385, chapter four will discuss 
major implications of the Ottoman influence in Albanian-speaking lands until the declaration 
of the Albanian Independence in 1912. This chapter aims to discuss how the Porte affected 
Albanian nationalism and the creation of the Albanian entity. It will explore the Ottomans 
influence in the Albanian speaking lands, in areas such as social organisation, infrastructure, 
written language, the system of education and the role of religion. The Ottoman impact on 
Albanian nation and identity, ethnicity, nationalism, religion will be part of this debate. 
The fifth and the sixth chapters will go to the heart of the research question. The fifth 
chapter will analyse two main controversies in the twenty-first century that surround Albanian 
identity in relation to the Ottoman heritage and culture. The first one is an attempt to understand 
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whether Albanian identity has in its composition elements of the Ottoman heritage, and thus 
belongs to Eastern civilization, or rather reflects elements of the Western civilization. This will 
be through a direct engagement with thesis proposed by the Albanian prominent writer, Ismail 
Kadare, who has written extensively regarding the Ottoman culture and its influence over the 
Albanian identity. It will also explore Kadare’s main opposing voice, Rexhep Qosja, through 
discussions that while contradicting Kadare’s thesis, also shows how debated these arguments 
are. The second myth discussed in this chapter is the current quest of the Albanian nation in 
the twenty-first century: the question of a ‘Greater Albania’. For Albanians, this is ‘unfinished 
business’ even though its origins can be found at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning 
of the twentieth century, a time when the Ottoman Empire was on the verge of collapsing and 
boundaries of the Porte were redesigned by the Great Powers. 
The sixth chapter will then discuss relations between Turkey and Albania since the 
creation of both nation-states at the beginning of the twentieth century. The research and 
analyses on this matter are minimal, if not non-existent. The political influence of Turkey in 
fields such as economy, foreign policy, geopolitical alignments and security, which may affect 
the Albanian ‘Euro-Atlantic’ orientation will be the focus of this chapter.  
The seventh chapter will provide findings of this research and develop some 
recommendations. This chapter analyses how and if Albania can escape from the Ottoman 
heritage; what and why Albanians are doing this, and what this might look like in reality. The 
chapter will focus on regional and energy security areas, politics, and traditional 
understandings of historical, cultural, religious and linguistic identity factors. 
The final chapter will conclude with a confirmation of the approach, methodology, 
findings and some remarks to better understand Albanian identity in the twenty-first century 
and challenges that its historical past and the Ottoman legacy pose to Albania’s political 
orientation towards the Euro-Atlantic ‘family’. The twenty-first century is already offering 
surprises: ‘Brexit’ may have a domino effect, but perhaps for the Albanian nation, the decision 
of Turkey to whether abandon the idea of joining Europe and the West is crucial. In the 
conclusion of this section, the study will offer further reflections and recommendations for 
future research.  
  
 
 
 
 24 
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
 
2.1 Debates that surround Albanian and Turkish national-identities  
2.1.1 Introduction  
 
Drawing on the existing literature, this chapter will identify a number of themes that are 
covered with a focus on both Albanian and Turkish national-identities. The chapter will 
scrutinise existing and unknown literature to scholarly and non-scholarly audiences in original 
Albanian hitherto unsourced and sighted. These themes are not in any particular or 
chronological order, and the aim of the chapter is to highlight these arguments in order to set 
up the scene for an in-depth analysis of the research question, establish the literature gap and 
the contribution to knowledge. 
 
2.1.2 The gap in the literature 
 
Since the mid nineteenth century, literature on many aspects of Albania have flourished. Along 
with rilindja writings, other scholarly literature on Albania has covered much of the process of 
nation building since the Albanian National Awakening in 187844. Much literature has also 
addressed the creation and consolidation of the Albanian state45, the communist era46, and the 
                                                 
44 Stavro Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912 Princetown, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1967. 
45 Owen Pearson, Albania and King Zog: Independence, Republic and Monarchy, 1908-1939, vol. I, III vols., 
Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History, London: The Centre for Albanian Studies in Association with I. B. 
Tauris, 2004; Owen Pearson, Albania in Occupation and War: From Fascism to Communism, 1940-1945, vol. 
II, III vols., Albania in the Twentieth Century: A History, London: The Centre for Albanian Studies in 
Association with I. B. Tauris, 2005; Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912–1913: Prelude to the First World 
War, London&New York: Routledge, 2000; Bernd Jürgen Fischer, King Zog and the Struggle for Stability in 
Albania, New York: Columbia University Press, 1984; Renzo Falaschi, "Ismail Qemal Bey Vlora and the 
making of Albania in 1912", in Perspectives on Albania, ed. T. Winnifirth, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992; 
Bejtullah Destani and Robert Elsie, eds., The Balkan wars: British Consular Reports from Macedonia in the 
Final Years of the Ottoman Empire (London&New York: I.B.Tauris in association with the Centre for Albanian 
Studies, 2014). 
46 Elez Biberaj, Albania: A Socialist Maverick, Boulder: Westview Press, 1990; Elez Biberaj, Albania and 
China: A Study of an Unequal Alliance, Boulder: Westview Press, 1986; Mario I. Bléjer et al., "Albania: from 
isolation towards reform", Occasional paper (International Monetary Fund), 1992; William E Griffith, Albania 
and the Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963; Harry Hamm, Albania-China's Beachhead in 
Europe, New York: Frederick A Praeger, 1963; Stephen F. Larrabee, "Whither Albania?", The World Today, 34, 
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post-Cold War period.47 A common theme throughout much of this literature has been the 
constant struggle of the Albanian nation to survive in the international arena. However, little 
research has been conducted on the historical relationship between Ottoman Turks and 
Albanian speaking populations. Exceptions are the periods of Skenderbeg (1443-1468), and to 
some extent, Ali Pasha’s upheaval (1790-1822), which focused on the analyses and context of 
Albania’s resistance. There is need for further scholarship that examines the relationship 
between Albanian speaking people and the Ottoman Turks, and this study is seeking to 
contribute to this scholarship. 
Equally, there has been scholarly engagement, with analysis of the Turkish new 
activism during the post-Cold War period in the Balkans and the continuous evolution of 
Turkish foreign policy.48 Yet, the analyses of bilateral relations between Albania and Turkey 
after the creation of both nation states at the beginning of the twentieth century are almost non-
existent.49 Therefore, this research will engage with discussions and analyses of the 
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contemporary bilateral relations between Albania and Turkey. The aim is to investigate 
whether Turkey’s influence over Albania in the twenty-first century is still present. The 
relationships between externally constructed representations of Albania and the ways in which 
Albanians construct their own identities in relation to similarities or differences with Turkish 
identity will be at the core of this analyses.  
After the fall of communism in 1990, Albanians have struggled to address questions 
regarding their identity, heritage and belonging in cultural, ethnic, religious, economic and 
political terms. Since then, debates within the Albanian society have overtaken taboos created 
by the communist regime of Enver Hoxha with regard to the ‘new person’—the invented 
socialist identity that was crafted in a way to serve the communist regime. Who are Albanians? 
 
2.1.3 Complexities in contextualising Albanian identity: ignorance, speculation and 
stereotypes 
 
Since the Middle Ages, Albanian people have been perceived as “mysterious” and subject to 
other poorly informed perceptions. Morgan points out that Albania entered the “European 
imagination as a place of adventure, romance, and exoticism”.50 Information about Albania 
emerged from reports from a small number of Western travellers, who visited Albanian villages 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and who conveyed their subjective impressions about 
the Albanian lands to the West. Schwandner-Sievers informs us of the different interpretations 
of Albanian identity by German and British travellers at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
While German “Schmidt-Neke has shown that ideal-type descriptions of Albanian customary 
law, noble masculinity and warrior’s honour underpin German Wehrmacht autobiographies”, 
the British view as expressed by Durham concentrated on the Ottoman occupation and 
displayed a “measure of sympathy with the emerging insurgencies against the ‘Ottoman 
Yoke’”.51 In 1928, Durham requested the British King and government to send troops to 
                                                 
Sülkü, "Political Relations between Turkey and Albania in the post Cold War period" (Middle East Technical 
University, 2010); Ali Pajaziti, "Turk and Turkey perception at Albanians in the beginning of 21st century", 
Past, Present and Future of Turkish-Albanian-Macedonian Relations, 27-29 May 2011, International 
Symposium, Skopje, Macedonia-Prishtinë, Kosovo. Ankara Center For Thought And Research and International 
Balkan University. 
50 Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship 1957-1990, 5. 
51 Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, "Albanians, Albanianism and the strategic subversion of stereotypes", 
Slovene Anthropological Society, vol. 14, no. 2, 2008, 57. 
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Albania, as she felt sympathy for local Albanians who were externally “threatened by Slav, 
‘Teuton’ and Greek ambitions”. On the other hand, she emphasised that Albanians were subject 
to “the fierce violence of local customary laws”.52 Other artwork reflected subjective opinions 
of travellers about the Balkans and Albanians. An example is the description by Karl 
Krumbacher, an archaeologist, philologist and founder of the German Byzantine studies, who 
visited the Balkans in the late nineteenth century; reporting that “Albanians [were] street 
sweepers”.53 A further example includes Ami Boue’s nineteenth century description of the 
Ottomans as “serious and good-natured”, Greeks as “refined”, Serbs as “militant”, Bosnians as 
“rough” people, Herzegovinians as “cheerful”, whereas Albanians as “witty”.54 Those 
narratives presented at best superficial descriptions of the Balkan people that poorly reflected 
the spectrum of Albanian culture.  
Although stereotypes are common on the Balkan Peninsula55, Albanians suffered more 
from them than other Balkan nations. Both externally and within the Balkans, Albanians were 
portrayed to be the ‘worst of the Balkans’. In 1913, Serbian Prime Minister Vladan Djordjevic 
(1844-1930) created and distributed pamphlets (‘as part of anti-Albanian nationalist 
propaganda’) portraying Albanians “as inferior and thus, little capable of nation-building 
themselves”, to the point that Albanians were seen as ‘primeval’, ‘gypsy like’ and also the only 
‘tailed’ devil-like people; still quite undeveloped.56 Before and after the collapse of the Porte57, 
along with being labelled ‘primitive’, Albanians were considered to be Turks and thus, enemies 
to their neighbours. Being portrayed as a weak and frail existence Muslim in a sea of 
Christianity is the way the stereotype sought to be vindictive, provocative and demeaning. The 
Albanian support for the Ottomans was, and still is, used as the reason Albanians are portrayed 
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as ‘Muslims’ in the middle of the Balkans. The attempt to stigmatize Albania in this way is at 
best a misunderstanding of the facts in their historical context, and at worst, a systematic 
attempt to craft Albanianism as an association with Said’s concept of “Orientalism”58. The 
overarching theme of Said’s Orientalism is that of “Western hegemony over the Orient”59, but 
applying this approach to Albania is problematic as it was not the West’s but rather the Oriental 
Ottoman’s domination which had more influence in re-shaping Albanian identity. However, 
the Western scholarship as part of the Western hegemony, have portrayed Balkans as the 
backward region, where Albanians were more damaged in the overall context.   
Josef Stalin, in a display of his ignorance and disregard for Albanians and Albanian 
culture, upon meeting Hoxha in Moscow on 14 July 1947, stated that Albanians “can be as 
faithful as a dog, that is one of the traits of the primitive”.60 These stereotypes have remained 
powerful and unchanged to the present throughout the Balkans and the West.  
Hence, the current Western perception of Albania and Albanians has also been 
coloured. It remains a “space for imaging, the dark, evil and dangerous” 61 world, as is 
portrayed in JK Rowling’s Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire or in the movie Taken. Over 
the past decades various scholars have noted these stereotypes as Schwandner-Sievers reminds 
us: 
The power of such imagery cannot be ignored, not least because it supports the arguments of 
particular, often violent Albanian interest groups, while effectively forcing the average, non-
violent Albanian, faced with the outside world, into everyday mimicry, self-denial or apology, 
to mention just a few of the symptoms of Albanianism at work.62 
 
Schwandner-Sievers agrees with Todorova’s suggestion that only during the decline of 
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the Ottoman Empire, “the Balkan people entered the Western European imagination as 
potential nation-states”, while this area was “colored by romanticism and/or ‘Realpolitik’, 
resulting in polarized advocacy or demonization of these populations”.63 Pettifer mentions that, 
even today, “racial and religious” stereotypes depict Albanians as “dangerous, Muslim and 
criminal; and Serbs as democratic, Christian and European”, which continues to “make 
[Albanians] a convenient scapegoat”.64 It can be argued that this judgment for Albanians did 
not change, even after Serbian atrocities in Kosovo came to an end with the collapse of 
Yugoslavia in the early 1990s.  Judah argues that the Albanian insurgency in 2001, witnessed 
through the adventurism of a few Albanians in the Presevo Valley and Macedonia, rather 
confirmed more stereotypes: “Serbs are good, Albanians bad”.65 The danger is that this stigma 
is not only reinforcing the Albanian perception of ‘humiliation’, but it  may also have “very 
negative consequences for European Union political decisions”.66 Casting the ‘Muslim’ 
Albanian people as the lowest ethnic group in the Balkans customises the Balkan’s version of 
Orientalism, and indeed, makes Albanians feel marginalised and excluded. In fact, what these 
stereotypes have shown most clearly is a cohesive Albanian identity with which academics and 
social commentators may engage. Portraying Albanians as ‘Muslims’, if not Turks, 
‘dangerous’ people who are situated at the bottom of the European civilization, can only create 
more stereotypes, whilst the Albanian identity continues to be illusive.
 
One reason for conducting this research is to explore the multifaceted Albanian identity, 
which at best is poorly understood, and at worst, crafted purposely to misinterpret one of the 
oldest cultures of the Balkans. The lack of research on Albanian culture and the 
misunderstanding of its links with the Ottoman-Turkish heritage prompted me to undertake 
this research as an insider and outsider and thus to make this contribution to knowledge. My 
research can be considered as contributing analysis from an ‘outsider’ who has deep knowledge 
about the Albanian language and culture to the field. 
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2.1.4 Albania: location, demography and population 
 
Albania has a total area of 28,748 square kilometres and shares its borders with Montenegro to 
its North and North-West, Kosovo to the North and North-East, the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia (FYROM) to the North-East and East, and with Greece to the South and South-
East. To the West, Albania’s coastline along the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea is located close to 
Italy—the distance between Vlorë and the Strait of Otranto in Italy is less than 75 kilometres. 
Although both Greeks and Albanians live on both sides of the South-Eastern Albanian border 
neither67 are satisfied with borders drawn by the Great Powers at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. Nor are Albanians happy with borders (shown in the map below) that see Albanian 
speaking people and territories included within Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia, which 
according to Pettifer, are a reason for instability in the Western Balkans.68  
 
Source: Raymond E. Zickel & Walter R. Iwaskiw, Albania: A Country Study, p. 70 
 
Albanians continue to be the poorest country in the Western Balkans69, with 25% of the 
population living on less than 2 US dollars per day.70 After the end of the Cold War, internal 
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migration to cities at the expense of rural areas71 took place, the large number of Albanians left 
their country and are now living abroad. Based on Albanian Government data from 2005, 
Vullnetari lists the following countries as those with sizeable Albanian migrant populations: 
Greece 600,000, Italy 250,000, USA,150 000, UK 50,000, Germany 15,000, Canada 11,500, 
Belgium 5,000, Turkey 5,000, France 2,000, Austria 2,000, Switzerland 1,500 and the 
Netherlands 1,000.72 In 2005, the number of Albanian migrants was estimated to be 1,093,000; 
that is approximately one third of the Albanian population of 3.3 million. The outward 
migration of Albanians is an unstoppable phenomenon and seemingly another challenge for 
Albania in the twenty-first century.73 Other data from the Albanian Institute of Statistics 
(INSTAT) shows that from 2006 to 2015, the number of young people in the country has 
steadily decreased while net emigration is still on the rise.74 Even though this data is from 
government official sources, its veracity is questionable:  accurately calculating undocumented 
migrations is a challenge as my own migration illustrates. I was one of those migrants who left 
Albania and lived in Italy for some time without informing either the Italian and Albanian 
authorities.  
  
2.1.5 Albanian identity – a contested space 
 
Albanian identity is contested and multifaceted. Complexities start with the ethnic origins of 
Albanians. Scholars claim that modern Albanians are descendants of Pelazgo-Illyrians.75 
Albanian nationalist writers of the nineteenth and twentieth century, in search of Albania’s 
origins, replaced the Pelasgian theory with that of Illyrian belonging, which became the 
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principal pillar of Albanian nationalism as it served to protect Albania from Serbian and Greek 
land claims.76 Some scholars have agreed that Illyrians were the inhabitants of Illyria during 
the seventh century BC77, as shown on the map below. 
 
Illyria under Roman Rule, First Century B. C  
Source: Raymond E. Zickel & Walter R. Iwaskiw, Albania: A Country Study, p. 6.  
 
Illyrians lived within tribal communities of blood relations such as Liburni, Ardaei, 
Dalmatae, Albani, Dardani, Taulanti, Orestes, Labeati, Molossi, Chaones and Thesproti and 
conducted their political and social affairs based on the tribal system.78 Socioeconomic 
patterns, such as “clan or tribe living in hilltop towns fortified with walls of huge roughly hewn 
stones”, “burial rites” and ceramic potteries founded in Albania, are three factors that, 
according to Edwin Jacques, “indicate the cultural unity of this entire Illyrian region”.79   
Complexities has also arisen in determining the exact age of Albania. Although 
different archaeological sites in Albania such as Dyrrahu (Durrës), Rozafa (near Shkodër), 
Apollonia (near Fier) and Butrinti (near Sarandë) are clear examples of Albania’s ancient past, 
an agreement in the field is missing. Stocker and Davis argue that Apollonia (an important 
Illyrian maritime port) was founded in 588 B.C. and not in the seventh century B.C. as claimed 
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by the Albanian archaeologist Neritan Ceka.80 If anything is clear, it is the fact that the 
inhabitants of Illyria spoke a different language from ancient Greeks—the Illyrian language, 
which according to Stocker and Davis, formed part of the old Indo-European family of 
languages.81  
Drawing on the scholarly historiography of Albania, Morgan posits that Illyria was 
“situated between East and West” and, unlike Greece, it suffered at the hands of the Romans, 
Byzantines and Ottomans, in “one of the major fault-lines of global civilization over the 
following millennia”.82 Greek influence was superseded by Latin civilization after the third 
century BC. The Illyrian Wars against the Romans started in 229 BC and ended in 168 BC, 
after the Romans defeated Gentius, the last Illyrian king. As a result, the Illyricum Peninsula 
“were forced to submit to increased Romanization”.83 The huge crises of the Roman Empire in 
the fourth century, and a slow collapse in the fifth century, transformed the Illyrian lands into 
a battleground, attacked and invaded by Huns, Visigoths and Ostrogoths. Slavs expanded into 
the South; and the unsuccessful siege of Thessaloniki in 586 did not stop them conquering and 
settling next to the Shkumbin River. These invasions weakened the Byzantine Empire until the 
beginning of the ninth century when the Byzantine Empire expanded again into the present-
day Albanian territory and almost the entire Balkan Peninsula. Therefore, the invasion of the 
Albanian speaking lands did not come to an end as described by Malcom in his essay “Myths 
of Albanian National Identity” where he cites an earlier Albanian writer, Kostandin Cekrezi, 
who in 1919 considered the pre-Ottoman invasion of the Albanian-speaking lands by “…the 
Gauls, the Romans, the Goths, the Slavs, the Normans, the Venetians, and, finally the Turks” 
as continuous and never ending.84 
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In the fourteenth century, when the Ottomans arrived, the Albanian-speaking people 
were organised in small groups or clans, that had blood relations in which Albanians identify 
as fise.85 Hodgkinson describes these tribes as formed by “kinship [that] remained in principle”, 
while organised in groups that in “later times, if not earlier”, had a strong and capable military, 
which, as a unit, fought together.86 The main two ethno-linguistic groups divided by the 
Shkumbin River—gegs (in the North) and tosks (in the South) are unique groupings that had 
Albanian language in common, whereas folk and cultural elements were different across the 
region.  
The nature of the Albanian fise could not conform to the notion of ‘civilized society’ 
which according to Crone required a society to be gradually transformed through agrarianism 
and industrialisation,87 but rather, as Jenkins discuses, they formed “primitive” organisations 
of people, grouped together in order to defend themselves from other groups88. This is in line 
with Ernest Gellner’s idea that only civilised societies created their own polities.89 The question 
then becomes how to understand those common bonds that at the end of the nineteenth century, 
forged the concept of the Albanian nation. Answering this question will help examine the 
Albanian nation and the origins of its existence, a concept which Bismarck to the detriment of 
the region was unable to grasp in 1878.90 
It is argued that Albanian tribes’ rules and legislations, such as the famous Kanun i 
vjetër [Old Kanun], which is known as Kanuni i Lekë Dukagjinit [The Kanun of Lekë 
Dukagjini], date back to ancient times. According to Fox who translated Kanuni i Lekë 
Dukagjinit [The Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini], writen in Albanian by Shtjefën Gjeçov, this 
jurisdiction was widely used as “customary law” for the Dukagjin region and later, at the 
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beginning of the fifteenth century, expanded to other Albanian principates.91 Although Roman 
occupation and its iron rule forced a temporary abandonment of the kanun, Fox argues, they 
could not stop this unwritten law from being “transmitted orally to succeeding generations”92 
of Albanians. Neither were the Byzantines successful in abolishing it. As Hodgkinson posits:  
 
The old laws of the mountains, though they endured longer than any other system of authority 
in Europe (and probably still command the loyalty of the older Albanian highlanders) remained 
essentially the law that great Greek tragedians grappled with and transformed: a law whose 
sanctions come into operation mechanically, like a natural phenomenon, without regard for the 
motive of the offender or the gravity or triviality of the offence.93 
 
According to Fox,  while in North, the old kanun served as a control mechanism, 
regulating social and political life as “the only code of customary law used in Albania”, the 
centre and South Albania had their own customised legal codes, or different versions of 
kanun.94 The influence of the Byzantine Empire in the South of the Albanian speaking lands 
was evident in a number of ways: the manner its legislation was implemented to resolve family 
disputes; Orthodox religion; music; myths; dresses; paintings; architecture; and the influence 
of the Greek language.  
 
2.1.6 The origins of the concept of the Albanian unity under the Ottoman Empire 
 
The existence of Albanians is not a surprise anymore, however their major support for the 
Ottoman-Turks is debatable. It can be argued that Albanians implemented strategies of 
resistance against the sometimes-perceived invincible enemy. This is shown in the ways 
Albanians resisted the Ottomans during different periods of their occupation. Although the 
concept of the Albanian nation itself is post-colonial, the League of Lezhë, or Alessio (known 
in Albanian as Besëlidhja e Lezhës), met on 2 March 1444 at the castle of Lezhë, which 
according to Hodgkinson, was in effect “the first national effort of military and political union” 
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of Albanian speaking people against the Ottomans.95 Gjergj Kastrioti, known as Skenderbeg, 
or Lord Alexander, was “a genius in waging guerrilla cavalry operations”, and under his 
leadership he kept the Ottomans (described as ‘the mightiest army of the world’) at bay for a 
quarter of a century.96 The secessionist movement under Skenderbeg aroused the vigilance and 
mistrust of the Porte, as did Ali Pasha’s uprising at the beginning of the nineteenth century.97 
Following the assassination of Ali Pasha in 1822, the mistrust of Sultan for Albanians 
increased; punishing harshly those Albanians who continued to resist the Porte. In August 
1830, he sent the Ottoman general Reshid Pasha to Bitola who invited 1,000 Albanian beys 
(landowners) in a military celebration-parade against Greek resistance. Reshid Pasha killed 
500 of them98, indicating a tightening of the control of the Porte. In the short term, this strategy 
succeeded in forcing further conversions to Islam and in a sense delaying an Albanian 
resistance against the Porte. However, according to Vickers, in the longer term, it paved the 
way for the beginning of the Albanian national movement.99  
 Only in the second half of the nineteenth century, did Albanian nationalism increase.100 
As Vickers argues, that Albanians suffered severe punishment by the crisis of the Porte.101 
During the second half of the nineteenth century, failed attempts at modernizing and re-
organizing the Ottoman Empire102 coincided with a further weakening of the Porte due to their 
defeat in the war against Russia. The victorious Russians forced the Ottomans to sign the Treaty 
of San Stefano in March 1878. This Treaty forced the Ottomans to cede part of their Balkan 
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territory to be distributed between Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. Some scholars 
agree that this “fuelled the rise of Albanian nationalism”, as there were fears that the “lands 
they inhabited would be partitioned”.103 Therefore, Charles and Jelavich believe “Albanians 
were forced to act” against their neighbours and not the Ottoman government.104 Once again, 
Albania suffered at the hands of more powerful nations. While the Treaty of San Stefano 
“created a large independent Bulgarian state and enlarged Serbia and Montenegro” at the 
Ottoman expense, Hall argues that none of emerging Balkan states were happy with the new 
borders created by the Treaty of San Stefano.105 Less happy were Albanian speaking people 
who suffered from both, the Porte and their neighbors. 
Six months later, the Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who offered to chair as 
an “honest broker”, initiated the Treaty of Berlin.106 However, this Treaty further fractured 
already tense relationships and alliances in the region. One example was the fact that the Treaty 
of Berlin failed to recognise ethnic Albanians and reversed the recognition of Macedonia 
within the larger Bulgaria, returning its territory to the Ottoman Empire.107 Bulgaria, Greece, 
Montenegro, and Serbia “perceived in the Treaty of Berlin a barrier to their national 
aspirations”, therefore, after 1878, “all the Balkan states strove to overcome the Berlin 
settlement and realize national unity”.108  
Bismarck’s famous proclamation in 1878 “that an Albanian nation did not exist”109 
terrified Albanians, who had been taught by bitter experience not to trust Russia in their plans 
of how to end the Ottoman rule and ‘aggrandize’ themselves with territories of Macedonia, 
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Epirus, Thrace and Albania.110 At best, there was a real danger that Russia was going to 
encourage Albania’s neighbors, Serbia and Greece to partition all Albanian-speaking 
territories, considered Ottoman domains at the time. As Wasti discuses, the Albanians 
understood this danger only too well once they realised “the beginning of the end of the Empire, 
at least in its European territories”.111 
 
2.1.7 Stages the Albanian speaking lands were occupied by the Ottomans  
 
The Ottomans occupied Albania for a period of more than five centuries and their influence is 
undeniably profound. There are conflicting opinions regarding the occupation of Albanian-
speaking territories by the Ottomans. The majority of Turks believe that the Ottoman 
occupation was welcomed and thus, beneficial to the Albanians, whereas other scholars think 
that Albanians consider their country to have been oppressed and held back during the time of 
this occupation.112 The particular nuances of the relationship changed with the different stages 
of the Ottoman Empire. Through these stages the Porte changed policies based on the will of 
the Sultan, internal and external developments, the influence of the Great Powers, a number of 
wars and the dynamics of Balkan nationalism. Analysing the Ottoman policy shifts is not the 
objective of this thesis, rather the way in which the Ottoman Turks affected people’s lives in 
the Albanian speaking lands during various stages of the Empire may still have existing effects 
over Albanian identity.  
The main contribution to the Albanian literacy regarding the Ottoman period has been 
that of rilindja writers. One of the main Rilindja figures, Sami Frashëri identifies three major 
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periods in which the co-existence of Albanians in the Ottoman Empire significantly differed.113
 
In his book titled Shqipëria – Ç’ka qënë, ç’është e ç’do të bëhetë? (Albania – What it was, what 
it is and what it will become), first published in 1899, Frashëri considers the permanent return 
of Skenderbeg to Albania in 1443 until his death in 1468 as the first period. Frashëri views this 
period as a time when Albanians ‘protected Europe’ from the advance of the Ottomans: “All 
European governments of that time had hope on Skanderbeg and expected to be rescued by the 
Albanians”.114
 
The second period, according to Frashëri, lasted from Skenderbeg’s death until 
the middle of the nineteenth century. During this lengthy period Albanians became more 
integrated into the Ottoman Empire–progressing into the high ranks of the Ottoman 
government, which included “more than 25 Albanians who served as great viziers” (prime 
ministers of the Sultan).115
 
Along with the pre-Ottoman period, this is the longest and less well 
researched by scholars and historians. The third period of the Albanian speaking people under 
the Ottoman Empire is known as the Albanian Awakening (or Rilindja); it began in the second 
half of the nineteenth century and lasted up until the declaration of the Albanian Independence 
in 1912. For Frashëri, this period was characterized by a deep crisis in the entire Ottoman 
Empire, but this time “the dearest price was paid by Albanians”.116
  
He states: 
 
the Albanians long were comrades of the Turks and not their slaves, but now they are suffering 
under great oppression and are being beaten and trampled underfoot more than the rest. If this 
be the case, why are the other nations endeavouring to throw off the heavy burden, while the 
Albanians are struggling to maintain it? Do they not see that they are leaning against a wall 
which is collapsing, and which will crush and bury them?117
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While Frashëri’s question of lateness of the Albanian nationalism is astute, what is 
missing from first stage is the period when the Ottomans entered Albania until the return of 
Skenderbeg in 1443. This period is also lacking from Albanian historiography, and history 
textbooks of Hoxha have merely depicted the Ottomans as conquerors; entering Albania to 
their own decision.  
 
2.1.8 What do we know about the Ottoman occupation of the Albanian speaking lands? 
 
As Winnifrith argues, it has been proposed and seems historically accurate that the feudal lord 
of Durrës, Karl Topia, invited the Ottoman Turks into what constitutes today’s Albania, to 
assist him in his conflict with the Balsha family.118 After five years of attacks from troops led 
by Karl Topia, in 1367, the Duchess of Durrës, Joanna of Anjou and her first husband, Louis 
of Navarre, stepped down. Jacques argues, Topia, who claimed the title of Princeps Albaniae, 
ruled the regions of Durrës, Elbasan, Peqin, Krujë, Mokra and Gora, as far as the Lake Ohrid, 
which today represents central Albania, located on both sides of Via Egnatia.119  In 1370, Topia 
attacked the powerful family of Muzaka in the South and conquered their plain lands situated 
between the Shkumbin and Seman rivers. This forced Muzaka to ally with another powerful 
family, Balsha, whose army was led by Balsha II. In 1385, the troops of Muzaka and Balsha II 
captured the city of Durrës in a surprise attack. Topia immediately called for help. The 
Ottomans first entered the Albanian speaking lands through Via Egnatia and crushed the Balsha 
army at the battle of Savra on 18 September 1385. Balsha II was killed and this defeat 
introduced a new era for the Albanian speaking lands, as the fifteenth century historian and 
priest Marin Barleti write:  
 
Upon his death, the barbarians set off to tread upon Epirus for the first time and plunder it. 
From that moment, they [the Ottomans] took over Kastoria, Berat and Kruja…120 
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Other Albanian lords and powerful families soon became vassals of the victorious Ottomans, 
as did local Serbs after the defeat at the Battle of Kosovo (Polje) in 1389. Although Balkan 
forces led by King Lazar of Serbia united in the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389, the Ottomans 
crushed the united Balkan army, resulting in the loss of their leader, King Lazar of Serbia. The 
same night the battle ended, Sultan Murat I was also assassinated. For Albanian and other 
Balkan principates, Kosovo Polje had a ‘domino’ effect that resulted in further capitulation to 
the Sultan Murat II and later to his son, Sultan Mehmed, who was named ‘the Conqueror’. 
Although many Albanians fought and died next to Serbs, including the feudal lord Teodor I 
Muzaka, Serbian nationalism appropriated Kosovo Polje and mythicised this battle as a 
spiritual doctrine; using it to describe themselves as defenders of European Christianity against 
‘the other’ Asian-barbarian-Turks.121 According to Payton, initially Albanians who converted 
to Islam and, later on, all ethnic Albanians regardless of their religion were viewed by Serbian 
nationalism as “others”.122 Therefore, the Kosovo Polje battle marked a turning point in the 
relations between Albanians and Serbs, and entered history via Serbian folklore, songs and 
myths, which were “…enriched with nationalistic tones only in the nineteenth century…”.123 
One of the central tenets of Serbian and Balkan’s nationalism, which considers Albanians as 
Turks, is not only based on a superficial analysis of equating Albanians as Muslims and thus 
Turks, but is also misleading and unfounded as, under the Ottoman rule, ethnic Albanians 
experienced the same level of sufferings as other Balkan ethnicities.  
Charles and Barbara Jelavich emphasise that Albania was identified as one of the “most 
backward”124 areas of the Ottoman Empire. Throughout the Ottoman period, the majority of 
Albanian speaking people – especially peasants, lived within the “limits of what their rural 
homeland could support”.125 On the other hand, the national tradition in Balkan historiography 
tended to equate Albanians with Turks, which for Anscombe is “incomprehensible, 
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incorrigible, intolerable”.126 Although many Muslim Albanian leaders were part of the 
Ottoman privileged strata, it is not at all clear whether the entire Albanian speaking populations 
accepted the Ottoman rule. We have to consider the influence of the Ottoman Turks over 
Albanian identity and its culture in a historical context. 
On the other hand, the view that Albanian culture came under siege from the Ottomans 
is also misleading. It will be rather instructive to explore that the arrival of the Ottoman-Turks, 
and thus their language, culture and religion in Albanian speaking lands, brought about more 
confusion for the existing contested Albanian identity. As Fox argues, the Ottomans fostered a 
new religion along with Turkish customary law that was heavily based on Sharia (Islamic 
law)127, which will be discussed later in this study. The ways in which the Islamic doctrine and 
its way of life slowly blended with that of the Albanians to create a mix of culture and identity 
that was neither Roman, nor Byzantinian needs more refinement to be understood. The arrival 
of the Ottomans in Albania inevitably introduced terminology and elements of Turkish culture 
into all spheres of the Albanian life such as military, administration, language and religion. Nor 
can one ignore the Turkish culinary tradition that was incorporated into the cuisine of Albania, 
and other Balkan countries, from a simple Turkish coffee to dollma, shishkebap, qofte, or even 
the turko-Byzantinian burek and so on – culinary elements that are still present in today’s 
Albanian and Balkan society. Therefore, thorough analysis of this influence, and its positive 
and negative effects, will be the focus of the discussion of the fourth chapter. 
 
2.1.9 Turkey and Albanian Islam  
 
Unlike their Greek and Serbian neighbours, the Albanians did not have real attachment to their 
Christian religion since the Middle Ages. They embraced religion according to the 
advancements of Roman or Byzantine Empires. The process of shifting religion in Albania 
happened to both gegs and tosks. Vickers and Pettifer paraphrased Skendi who mentioned the 
case of Prince Gjon Kastrioti (Skenderbeg’s father) changing his religion several times from 
“Catholic as an ally of Venice and turned Orthodox as an ally of Stefan Lazarevic of Serbia”.128 
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It is well known that the Albanian national hero, Skenderbeg, was born into an Orthodox 
family, educated as a Muslim, and died as a Catholic. Therefore, since the late Middle Ages, 
“…the Albanian feudal lords—often followed by their populations—espoused Catholicism 
when the West was in the ascendant” 129 and embraced Orthodoxy at times when Byzantium 
prevailed. Thus, the process of alignment with the religion of whoever was in power at the time 
often occurred. 
Malcom points out that religion was not an element considered crucial by Albanian 
tribes since Illyrian times and “…did not greatly matter for Albanians”.130 The same scholar 
argues that Albanian identity existed independently and is rooted in their Illyrian past.131 
Another fact to consider is the absence of an Albanian Kingdom which might have unified 
Albanian speaking people under a specific religion. From the defeat of the last Illyrian 
Kingdom by Romans in 168 BC, until the arrival of the Ottomans at the end of the fourteenth 
century, Albanians had been divided into tribes and clans and religion mattered less compared 
to other issues crucial for survival. Analysing the Islamisation of Albanians, Jacques points out 
that “in Albania the unique internal religious disunity, and the peculiarity decadent character 
of Christianity greatly weakened their defences”.132 Thus, according to Jacques, had the 
attachment of the Albanian speaking peoples to their religion been stronger, they might have 
resisted conversion to Islam and might have retained a different identity into the twenty first 
century.  
The process of Islamization in Albania is highly debated and controversial. It needs 
closer attention as voluntary and forced conversions often happened simultaneously.133 As 
Sugar discusses, the phenomenon of religious change occurred before, during and after the 
Ottoman occupation.134 Along with shifting their religion to Islam, Albanians also shifted from 
Muslims to Christian-Orthodoxy. Karalis argues that “the project of historical Christianity” in 
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Greece, which began in 1453 with the fall of Constantinople, created new opportunities for the 
Eastern Christendom; culminating with the Greek national uprising in 1821.135 However, 
according to Karalis, following this revolution, the Greek “national identity did not really mean 
religious affiliation”, as both Christian and Muslim Albanians, fought the Ottomans side by 
side with Greeks.136 Misha found that during the uprising of Greeks in 1821-1830, many 
Albanians underwent a process of Hellenization, a process that was accelerated by their 
participation in the War for Independence of Greece. Their participation, Misha argues, played 
an important role as they led a substantial faction of the resistance to The Porte during this 
war.137 However, while some Albanians converted back to Christian Orthodoxy, more 
converted to Islam. Following on the argument of both Karalis and Misha, a couple of points 
need to be highlighted in the Albanian context. Firstly, why the ‘project of the historical 
Christianity’ did not reach Albanian speaking lands? And secondly, why Albanians fought for 
Greece and not for Albanian Independence? Although answering both questions is not the aim 
of this thesis, analysing the role of religion during the Albanian Awakening (rilindja) period, 
a time when foundations of the Albanian national identity were crafted, may help to explore 
Albanian identity.  
It might be speculation, but the Albanian rilindja leaders knew that religion would have 
been problematic to unite Albanians in their struggle to create their nation. As a result, little 
importance of religion prompted the Albanian rilindja leaders to place religion second to 
‘Albanianism’. The famous poem of Pashko Vasa “the Albanian’s faith is Albanianism”138 was 
a call to all Albanians to protect their forefathers’ motherland, regardless of their religion. 
However, it is inaccurate to claim that the rilindja movement was anti-religious. One example 
is the position of the influential rilindja leader and writer, Naim Frashëri, who commanded all 
Albanians to have one belief in God; claiming that God cannot be that of unattached religions, 
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but that of “pantheism, included and unified as it is into the nature and universe”.139 Therefore, 
the matter requires more attention to understand conceptualisation of religion by rilindja 
nationalist leaders, and the way it affected the future Albanian identity. Analyses of religion 
and its interaction with nationalism in forging Albanian identity at the end of the Ottoman rule 
will assist to better understand the nation building process and Albanian identity. 
Albanian identity issues are covered at length in this thesis. Threads are interlaced 
throughout, and issues such as Albanian identity, nationalism, culture, language, religion and 
traditions will be returned to numerous times. However, a broad-brush definition that does not 
appreciate the volatile, complicated and manifold facets of Albanian identity today would only 
be counterproductive. Rather, a narrowing of the focus of Albanian identity issues and, indeed, 
debates with regard to their heritage and similarities with regard to Turkish culture and identity 
will be helpful in setting the scene for this research.  
 
2.2 Turkish national identity in the post Ottoman era 
2.2.1 Introduction  
 
This second part of the chapter will briefly discuss the contested Turkish national identity since 
the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The discussion will emphasise controversial 
attempts by Turkey’s leaders to abandon the Ottoman ideology and create the Republic of 
Turkey as a modern secular nation-state. The struggle of modern Turkey to abandon the Islamic 
ideology as part of the state, have created tensions with Islamic sympathisers who felt Ottoman 
nostalgia. It will provide a strong foundational knowledge in order to initiate the debate about 
the contested Albanian identity and the historical influence of Ottoman Turks that in the 
twenty-first century, may continue to complicate Albania’s Euro-Atlantic orientation.  
 
2.2.2 Contested post-Ottoman Turkish identity: Escaping the East, but not part of the 
West 
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Turkish national identity is no less contested than Albanian identity and since the creation of 
the Republic of Turkey in 1923, according to Yavuz, Turkish national identity is one of the 
most contested in the world.140 Turkey is geographically located at the crossroads of Europe 
and Asia. Debates about Turkish cultural belongings has engaged scholars in discussions to 
whether Turkey is an Islamic or Secular, Western, Eastern, a bridge between the Western 
European and Middle Eastern civilisations141, or a bridge “between East and West”.142 Mango 
thinks that Turks have a strong sense of national identity, although simultaneously 
“experiencing a crisis of identity, torn between East and West”.143 The Turkish elite sees 
Turkish national identity as being part of Western culture but, according to Huntington, the 
“West refuses to accept Turkey as such”.144 This is because, as Huntington notes, Turkey is 
culturally a Middle Eastern Muslim society, or what he describes as a “torn” country that has 
the opportunity to become the leader in the region; “involving seven countries from the borders 
of Greece to those of China”.145 
While Turkey’s Ottoman past has marked Turks as Easterners, a new Republican era 
began to embrace the famous sentence of the late Ottoman intellectual, Abdullah Cevdet, who 
stated: “Civilization means European civilization”.146 The post-Ottoman Turkish elite praised 
European civilisation, which, following Cevdet’s thought, “must be imported [to Turkey] with 
both its roses and thorns”147. The ‘father’ of modern Turkey and the President of the first 
Republic of Turkey—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk— initiated stringent reforms that aimed to 
secularise Turkish polity and society.148  Atatürk’s pragmatic reforms aimed to separate the 
state from religion in a similar way to what occurred in Western polities. Herper argues that 
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the abolition of the Caliphate, replacement of religious courts with secular counterparts, 
introduction of a Western-style education system, substitution of the traditional Arabic-Islamic 
scripts with the Latin alphabet, and adoption of the European theatre, music and law codes 
from different European countries aimed at “reformation rather than the renaissance of 
Islam”.149 Atatürk, attempted to bring Western culture closer to Turkey. However, his legacy 
was challenged and questioned soon after his death in 1938. In the post-Ottoman era, religion 
has divided Turkish society into two political groups: those who subscribe to a secular, 
republican view, known as “Kemalists” and those who side with “Islamic neo-Ottomanists”.150 
For Yavuz, from 1947 to 1974, Turkey’s foreign policy was driven by the new “statist elite”151 
who tried to split the Ottoman era from the modern-day Republican Turkey; portraying the 
former as founded on obsolete Islamic ideology. However, this scholar argues, the policy of 
“disengagement” with Islam created a considerable gap between the general populace and the 
Turkish elite.152 Perhaps the radical reform of Islam, in such a short period of time, meant 
changing everyday life, customs and laws was a very ambitious task.  
Another characteristic of Turkey’s new elite was its aspiration to be part of Europe—a 
decision that, Mango argues, was reinforced after 1 December 1964 when Turkey became an 
associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC, later EC, and more recently 
EU).153 During the Cold War, the Turkish political elite adapted to the international system of 
two poles154; receiving NATO membership in 1952, which ended Turkey’s long struggle to be 
portrayed as anti-European. Analysing the Turkish foreign policy, Erickson discuses positive 
relations with Western Europe and the US, which became temporarily strained in 1974 when 
Turkey invaded and occupied Northern Cyprus155 ultimately leading to economic and military 
sanctions against Turkey. The US ban on the provision of spare parts and logistics support for 
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previous armaments sold to Turkey, and for Erickson, Turkey’s first coup156 in 1960, 
diminished the capacity of the Turkish military. 157 The US embargo ended in 1980, when the 
US realised the importance of Turkey as a secular and pro-western Islamic state.158 However, 
according to Erickson, six years were enough for the Turkish economy to deteriorate, 
generating much social unrest. A second military coup occurred in 1980; relative normality 
was re-established in 1985, and since then, the Turkish state has been in the hands of 
“conservative, moderate, and Islamic parties”.159  
Since 2001, when the current Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan founded the 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP), which came to power in 
2002, the Turkish political and religious orientation started to shift. AKP was established on 
the foundations of a moderate Islamic ideology and united a number of existing conservative 
Parties. It was successful in five consecutive elections, in 2002, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 
Presidential elections in 2018. While AKP seems to be Turkey’s preferred Party in the twenty-
first century, attempts to re-introduce Islam as the foundation of Turkish society, remains a 
constant in Turkish political life.   
 
2.2.3 Islamism in modern Turkish politics and neo-Ottomanism of the twenty-first 
century  
 
Islam is an important link with the Ottoman past when Turkey enjoyed relative prestige. In the 
twenty-first century, a new Turkish middle class, close to the Turkish government, is 
embracing Islam as an ideological tool in order to craft a new Turkish national identity. The 
concepts of “neo-Ottomanism” and “Islamism” in contemporary Turkish politics are associated 
with the Islamist AKP. In November 2002, AKP secured control of the Turkish parliament 
allowing Erdoğan to become prime minister the following March.160 Soli Özel considers a 
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‘paradox’161 the fact that Turkey is being led by the (AKP), a Party that in appearance seems 
to rush toward reforms and the EU, while going back to discover values of Islam and the days 
of the Ottoman glory. Others such as Ömer Taspinar believe that Turkey is not aiming to 
resurrect the Ottoman Empire, but is rather extrapolating Turkish influence in a way that 
bolsters Turkey as “a bridge between East and West, a Muslim nation, a secular state, a 
democratic political system, and a capitalistic economic force”.162 The declaration of the 
Turkish Head of Parliament, Ismail Kahraman, in April 2016 stating that Turkey is a 
“…Muslim country and this is why we need an Islamic constitution” was immediately 
criticised by Opposition Leader Kemal Kilicdaroğlu who argued that the ‘father’ of modern 
Turkey, Atatürk, built the modern state based on laicism and thus, religious freedom.163  
Erdoğan’s centre-right wing AKP, is an Islamic Party that is aiming to align Turkey to 
the Middle-East; abandoning the West. It is questionable whether Turkey has achieved any 
separation of religion and state, as the AKP and its Islamic ideology, seems to be the preferred 
choice for the Turkish people. The alliance between the AKP and the far-right Nationalist 
Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), regarding the 2019 presidential elections, was 
secured in February 2018164; further supporting Erdoğan’s rule in the future. During the 
parliamentary and presidential elections in June 2018, the AKP lost its sole majority in the 
assembly after nearly16 years; having to rely now on the support of its nationalist MHP allies, 
who outperformed expectations to win more than 11 percent of the vote.165 As an extreme-right 
party, MHP espouses a mix of nationalism and scepticism towards the West166, which is now 
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added to the Islamic ideology of the AKP. Erdoğan, however, expanded new powers under a 
powerful executive presidency narrowly approved in the 2017 referendum.167 The opposition 
group led by the centre-left wing of secular Kemalists or the Republican People's 
Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), allied before 2018 elections with the pro-Europeans—
Iyi Parti (Iyi Party), and the Sunni far-right-conservative—Saadet Partisi (Saadet Party).168 
The pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) was not part of an alliance and earned 11.7 
percent of votes to become the assembly’s second largest opposition party after the CHP.169 
Opposition parties have not been able to halt Erdoğan’s marsh. As Aksoy argues, criticism 
continuous to rise regarding Erdoğan’s move towards abandoning the West and aligning 
Turkey with the Middle East by using sectarian politics to help him to turn himself into a 
regional leader, a sort of “new caliph”, or the leader of the Islamic world.170  
Nonetheless, it is not clear whether domestically, Turkish people voted AKP due to its 
Islamic orientation or whether the majority of Turks support Erdoğan’s position towards what 
the Turkish government considers ‘Kurdish terrorists’. Erdoğan’s decision to position 
Turkish’s foreign policy against the Syrian regime of Bashar Al Assad, the self-declared 
‘Islamic State’ (ISIS) and Kurds of Syria that helped to defeat ISIS is contentious.  As Brown 
argues, for Turkey, the Kurds are a big “imbroglio”171, despite the fact that Syrian Kurds 
demonstrated to be the best coalition ally in fighting ISIS on the ground. Republican Kemalists 
also see Kurdish ethnicity in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria as a threat to the Republic of Turkey, 
whereas, according to Taspinar, the ‘Neo-Ottomanist’ approach of the AKP, “seeks to rise 
above this Kemalist paradigm”172; portraying a sort of Muslim “macro-identity among 
populations that share the Ottoman Islamic heritage”.173  The reality on the ground is different: 
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Kurdish people who also practice Islam are considered second-class citizens in Turkey. 
Turkey’s aim is to stop every attempt for recognition of the Republic of Kurdistan, to avoid its 
secession from Turkey. Although the assimilation of ethnic Kurds in Turkey has failed174, 
according to Schoon, persisting economic underdevelopment and “longstanding social 
inequality”175 might further exacerbate the ethnic Kurd’s relationship with Turks. While the 
relationship of Turkish national identity and the issue of an independent Kurdish state are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, this issue may be another case to further explore the concept 
of ethnic groupings as the basis for the formation of nation states. However, the Kurdish 
struggle can also rise a question: Why is Turkey trying to protect their Muslims-brothers in the 
Western Balkans and fight Kurdish Muslims in Turkey? 
 
2.2.4 Turkey and the EU 
 
Turkey is aiming to get closer to Europe and thus, the Balkans. On the other hand, Erdoğan 
and his AKP are convincing the Turkish people that the EU is not the only alternative. 
Erdoğan’s ambition to become the regional Muslim leader may influence the EU to reject 
Turkey’s application for accession. In return, Europe’s reluctance to accept Turkey as a EU 
member, may generate more ‘“Islamically’ shaped neo-Ottomanist foreign policies in the 
future”.176 This may shift Turkey’s foreign policy position towards Asia, the Middle East and 
perhaps an attempt to drag the Western Balkans back to the East, enabling Turkey to become 
the regional “hegemon”.177 The deadlock between Turkey and the EU is at a critical stage. The 
EU is waiting for Turkey to resolve its issues with Cyprus and quickly progress with the EU 
recommendations on issue, such as corruption, free media and human rights. Nevertheless, the 
question to be asked is whether Turkey will wait endlessly for Europe’s decision to include it 
as a member state or whether it will redirect its energy toward the alternative of becoming a 
regional leader. Membership of the European Union represents not only an aspiration but also 
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a challenge for Turkey.178 Although Europe remains the main goal for Turkish foreign policy, 
Erdoğan has used the alternative as a political bargaining tool.179 Since 2015, Turkey’s leverage 
towards the EU has increased due to Europe’s difficulty in accommodating large numbers of 
refugees fleeing ISIS and Syrian war. Turkey is a crucial player for the NATO forces using the 
proximity of Turkish bases to defeat ISIS and Syrian regime. Secondly, so far, Turkey has 
received the largest number of Syrian refugees in Europe; functioning as a buffer zone for 
Europe.  
Ultimately, as Taspinar mentions, it is becoming clear that “Turkey is deeply polarized 
over its Muslim, secular, and national identities”.180 It is argued by Turkish opposition and 
Western media that the last Turkish coup d’état, in July 2016, was organised by Erdoğan, trying 
to shift the attention from the corruption scandal of 2013181, whereas the Turkish government 
insists that the coup was organised and led by the Turkish cleric in exile, Fethullah Gülen.182 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, politics in Turkey are marked by titanic 
contradictions. If anything is clear, Erdoğan’s authoritarianism goes hand in hand with Islamic 
ideology and will be challenging not only Turkey, but the entire region. 
 
2.2.5 Contribution to literature  
 
The question of Albanian identity is not a new area of scholarly debate as the literature 
demonstrates. Debate and controversy around the Ottoman legacy and its influence on 
Albanian identity across the Balkans is an open question with many dimensions. The centre of 
this debate has been the five-century love-hate relationship between the Ottoman-rulers and 
Albanians living in the Western Balkan region. However, after the decline of the Ottoman 
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Empire and the creation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, scholarly analyses of a further 
continuation of bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania are very limited. Turkey and 
Albania during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has continued to cooperate in various 
economic, political, diplomatic, cultural and defence levels, however, this has been overlooked 
by scholarly analyses. This research will contribute to the existing literature with bringing 
closer to the English reader debates that surround Albanian identity by embedding it in the 
broader analysis of the bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania, with a focus on the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In doing so, this thesis will attempt to address many of the 
misapprehensions and stereotypes regarding Albanians and Albanian identity that continue to 
exist, but also offer a contribution to the literature and policy makers of how to better envisage 
Albanian identity in the future. The thesis will attempt to enlighten the role of religion and its 
relationship with Albanian nationalism, in Turkish context, which is lacking scholarly analyses. 
This thesis may also offer a contribution to the EU policymakers, at times when Albania is 
invited to become a candidate member of the EU. Whether the EU is ready for its enlargement 
is a question of further research, however, if and when it happens, Albania, if not Bosnia and 
Kosovo, may be European Union members with a majority Muslim population. Therefore, a 
better understanding of Albanian identity will only help through the EU accession-membership 
process. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL TERRAIN 
 
The conceptualisation of the Albanian ‘nation’ through lenses of ‘nation building’ 
theories and civilization 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide some theoretical scaffolding that will be the basis of 
contemplating Albanian national identity and its relationship with Ottoman cultural heritage. 
The chapter will discuss notions such as ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘religion’, 
which according to Hastings, are important for understanding modern society.183 A brief review 
of a number of substantive nation-building theories will follow. Secondly, the chapter will 
continue to discuss other theoretical concepts such as ‘civilization’ and ‘political influence’. 
Ultimately, it will focus on Todorova’s analyses of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. This 
chapter will thus provide the platform to build on theoretical foundations required to investigate 
whether the Turkish influence is encouraging a realignment of Albanian national self-identity, 
to then advance with the second part of the research question: discovery of a number of 
implications that a realignment with the Ottoman culture would have for Albanian identity in 
the twenty-first century.  
 
3.2 The conceptualisation of the ‘nation’ as a concept 
 
Hastings argues that ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘religion’ concepts are considered 
as “distinct and determinative elements within European and world history”.184 As he argues, 
these concepts are closely interrelated, and scholars must consider all of them equally. These 
four concepts and the interrelation between them, will be helpful to scrutinise some nation-
building theories. The discussion will commence with the concept of ‘nation’. 
‘Nation’ as a word originates from the Latin natio, which means birth. The ‘nation’ 
conceptualisation is a relatively new term that coincides with the arrival of modernity and 
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nationalism at the beginning of the nineteenth century185,  but is also a contested concept. 
Questions of how and why nations are created remain crucial to this thesis. Much work has 
been done by scholars and many different approaches have been applied to explain the concept 
of ‘nation’.186 The French theorist Ernest Renan who was also influential in Benedict 
Anderson’s theory of conceptualising a ‘nation’ as an ‘imagined community’187, defined the 
nation as “a large scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of sacrifices that one has made in 
the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future”.188 Smith delineates ‘the nation’ 
as “a named human population inhabiting an historic territory and sharing common myths and 
historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and 
duties for all members”.189 In one of his later writings, Smith identifies five features required 
for a nation in order to exist, namely: a collective proper name, myths and memories of 
communal history, a common public culture, common laws and customs and an historic 
territory or homeland.190 For Hastings, 
A nation is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. Formed from one or more 
ethnicities, and normally identified by a literature of its own, it possesses or claims the right to 
political identity and autonomy as a people, together with the control of specific territory, 
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comparable to that of biblical Israel and of other independent entities in a world thought of as 
one of nation-states….191 
While a distinction between ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ needs to be made, Hastings coins another 
modern paradigm here; the ‘nation-state’, which according to him 
identifies itself in terms of one specific nation whose people are not seen simply as 'subjects' of 
the sovereign but as a horizontally bonded society to whom the state in a sense belongs. There 
is thus an identity of character between state and people.192 
 
3.3 The concept of ‘ethnicity’ 
 
For Smith, nations and ethnies “must be differentiated in a number of dimensions”.193 In his 
earlier book published in 1986, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Smith defines ethnic 
communities (ethnies) as  
 
named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an 
association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity.194   
 The term “ethnicity” is vague with no clear definition and a lot of overlap with similar 
terms and concepts and thus leads to misunderstandings of race, tribe, nation and minority 
groups.195 According to Eller, “some of the most perplexing problems arise from the vagueness 
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of the term and phenomenon called ethnicity and from its indefinite and ever-expanding 
domain”.196 As an example, he continues, “not all ethnic groups are organic social entities; 
some can make the claim, while others are noticeably recent”.197 Therefore, there are a number 
of different conceptualisations of ‘ethnicity’. The term ‘ethnicity’ is relatively recent and 
derives from the Greek ethnos, which means “a large group of people bound together by the 
same manners, customs or other distinctive features”.198 Reflecting on the anticipated 
disappearance of “ethnicity” and “race”199 in the modern world, Cornell and Hartmann argue 
that the twentieth century “turned out to be an ethnic century” that started with ethnic and racial 
cleansing in Nazi Germany before WWII, and ended with similar methods in 1999, during the 
ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.200 The notion of ‘race’, in use until 1945, was gradually 
replaced by the term ‘ethnicity’201, which began to be used more widely in the 1960s. 
Therefore, anthropologists started to shift the meaning of race to what Jenkins called a “less 
embarrassingly colonial ‘ethnic group’”202 that was included under the “roof” of a broader 
“church”.203 The gradual replacement of the concept of ‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’ was a complex 
process. Focusing on the “composition and context”204 of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’, Cornell and 
Hartmann state that “a race may be, but is not necessarily, at the same time an ethnic group; 
and an ethnic group may be, but is not necessarily, at the same time a race”.205 Distinction also 
need to be made between the concept of ‘nation’ and ‘ethnicity’ that Hastings describes as 
follows: 
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An ethnicity is a group of people with a shared cultural identity and spoken language. It 
constitutes the major distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a 
strong subdivision with a loyalty of its own within established nations.206 
 Therefore, it becomes problematic to fit the ethnic concept within modern nations. British 
scholars, like their American and Australian counterparts, usually ascribe ethnicity to minority 
groups in a society.207 For them an ethnic group is “a distinct collective group” of the 
“population within the larger society whose culture is different from the mainstream 
culture”208, and as a result, according to Cashmore, members of the group “feel somehow 
marginal to the mainstream of society”.209 In this way, the use of the term ‘ethnic’ is loaded as 
it is in counterpoint to a perceived mainstream norm. Unlike the British, American and 
Australian approaches, in the European tradition, ethnicity is understood not as a synonym for 
minority groups, but as a synonym for “nationhood” or “peoplehood”.210 Following the 
European approach, everyone, (minorities and also the mainstream majority groups) belongs 
to an “ethnic group”.  
 In his discussion, Isagiw writes that because ‘ethnicity’ is an abstract concept, the 
meaning of ‘ethnicity’ depends on the meaning of “ethnic group and ethnic identity”.  211  For 
Isajiw, ethnic groups can be divided in primary and secondary groups.212 Ethnic groups that 
have lived in the same place in which historically they have been formed are called primary 
(or indigenous), while those who live in a different place, such as Italians, Germans or French 
living in the United States or Canada213 are secondary ethnic groups. 
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 Other scholars such as Pires and Stanton consider the ‘ethnic group’ a community that is 
organised around kinship and shared solidarity between group members.214 Eller argues that 
ethnicity is “one of the most elastic social concepts” and a successful claim to identity and 
rights can make a group of people an “ethnic group”.215  
The interesting question that Smith then asks is whether “such ethnic myths, memories 
and attachments persist over centuries to form the cultural basis for nation-formation?”216 
Albania is a case in point to answer this question as it fulfils Smith’s compulsory features  to 
be considered as a nation-state: a collective and uncontested name; myths and memories of 
communal history, such as the Rozafa legend and Skenderbeg, its folklore and oral songs such 
as ‘Eposi i kreshnikëve’; a common public culture, which while showing similarities, can be 
distinguished from other shared cultures in the Balkans; common laws and customs, and a 
historic territory or homeland. Despite these features, the nationalistic role of Rilindja leaders 
in forging Albanian identity should not be underestimated. 
 
3.4 The role of nationalism 
 
The notion of nationalism is linked to modern-nation states and thus, is modern concept. 
Gellner explains that “nationalism is rooted in modernity”, “a political principle which 
maintains that similarity of culture is the basic social bond”.217 In line with Gellner, Hastings 
also argues that 
 
‘Nationalism’ means two things: a theory and a practice. As a political theory - that each 
‘nation’ should have its own ‘state’ – it derives from the nineteenth century.218 
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Other scholars agree that nationalism is a modern phenomenon; dating back to the end 
of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, which, according to Smith, 
originated in Western and Central Europe, and the United States.219 According to Smith, 
‘ethnicity’, “whether in the sense of ‘race’ or culture, is largely irrelevant to modern 
nationalism”.220 Smith considers Anderson’s seminal and highly influential Imagined 
Communities as “a novel and path breaking account of nationalism” that provides “a 
postmodernist reading of the nation within a modernist framework”.221 For Smith, Hobsbawm 
and Anderson were both instrumental in their modernist approaches in the way they connected 
networks of communication and symbolist concepts “in forging national communities”.222 
Together, Hobsbawm’s, Gellner’s and Anderson’s work, along with Breuilly’s examination of 
nationalism represent “the principal current orthodoxy in nationalist studies”, which according 
to Hastings, is challenged by medievalists.223 Citing Stringer, Hastings believes there is a need 
for both medievalists and modernists to learn from each-other to close the gap of the “current 
crisis of historiography”.224 Hobsbawm argues that in the late twentieth century we witnessed 
a revival of an ethno-linguistic type of nationalism that “sometimes [is] combined with 
religion”.225 It is interesting indeed to explore how, under the Ottoman rule, Albanian 
nationalists of the Awakening period used the Albanian language and religion in crafting the 
concept of the Albanian nation. 
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3.5 The role of ‘religion’ in constructing nations 
 
Ultimately, Hastings argues that ‘religion’ is another element that has been instrumental in 
shaping nationalism and nation-states.226 For him, religion is embodied in “many cultures, most 
ethnicities and some states”227, and both Anderson and Breuilly overlooked nation-state and 
religion; focusing on the rise of nationalism as an ideology. According to Smith, the main two 
reasons that have shaped the process of nation-formation are the inter-state warfare and 
religion.228 In his book The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Durkheim defines 
religion as a system of practices such as rites and cults, but also “ideas whose object is to 
express the world”.229 Durkheim argues that beliefs are considered to be the essential 
element230 of religion, which brings into play spiritual powers and acts upon moral life.231  
The relationship between religion and modern society has been thoroughly analysed by 
Weber, who according to Turner, discovered “the roots of modern society in religion”, but also 
posed the question “whether that religious legacy could in fact survive into modern times.”232 
Smith agrees with both Durkheim and Weber about importance of religion; mentioning that 
religion “transcend[s] all boundaries of caste, class and nation”.233 For him nationalists 
contemplate language and religion a “must become” feature of the common public property, 
“or official, distinctive culture”.234 On the other hand, Smith argues with Kedourie’s approach 
to consider modern nationalism as “a purely modern and secular doctrine and movement”; 
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stating that “nationalism is also the secular heir of a religious millennialism”.235 Therefore, 
Smith highlights the importance of religion, mentioning that in the pre-modern era, there was 
no need for a nation state. With the arrival of industrialism, though, traditional religion 
  
acted as barriers to the formation of both nations and the desire for social change and 
development. With the erosion of traditional religions and the rise of nations, national self-
government was the only way to harness the social and political resources necessary for social 
development.236  
Smith thus provides a generic conceptualisation of the regressive role of traditional 
religion in relation to the ‘nation’ creation process, as he admits that religion replaced the role 
of the nation in pre-modern societies.  
Kapferer has analysed the relation between religion and nationalism in two case studies: 
Sri Lanka and Australia. In both cases Kapferer found there is a correlation between these two 
concepts. While he believes, in Sri Lanka traditional Sinhalese Buddhism has been politicised 
and its peaceful rituals have been hijacked by nationalists to serve the violent meaning of an 
inter-ethnic warfare, the Australian secular nationalism is framed by emphasising religious 
forms, which are evident while reinventing themes of self-sacrifice, suffering, death, and 
rebirth of the Australian national identity through the narrative of the Australian and New 
Zealand Army Corps (known as ANZAC soldiers), who died in the disastrous Gallipoli 
campaign of 1915.237 Smith argues that in both cases analysed by Kapferer, but also in the 
‘religious nationalism’ coined by Mark Juergensmeyer, “the past plays a vital role, linking the 
sacred to the secular”, and transforming nationalism in a “religion of history”.238 
Juergensmeyer sees a new cold war emerging and replacing the old one between the West and 
the Soviet ideological block with one between a secular, liberal West and religious-revivalist, 
if not fundamentalist ideologies and movements stretching from the Protestant revival in 
America,  to the Shi’ite  revolution in Iran, from the Sunni revival in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
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Pakistan to the Hindu revival in India and the Buddhist in Sri Lanka.239 In his 1927 book Does 
civilization need religion? A study in the social resources and limitations on religion in modern 
life, Niebuhr mentions that “Religion is not in a robust state of health in the modern 
civilization”.240 However, he argues, the future of both religion and civilization “are thus hung 
in the same balance”.241 On the other hand, Hobsbawm argues, nationalism has not stopped its 
mission that “sometimes [is] combined with religion”.242 It will be interesting to see how 
Albanian nationalism has combined ‘religion’ throughout  their mission. Exploring the role of 
religion in forging Albanian identity will also be useful to examine beliefs of some prominent 
scholars in the field (discussed above) such as Weber, Hastings, Smith, Kapferer and 
Juergensmeyer, who all are convinced of the impact of religion on nation and nationalism.  
Although in his 1997 book, The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion, and 
Nationalism, Hasting attempts to end the nation-building debate by placing nations, 
nationalism, ethnicity and religion within a larger historical context, it will be helpful to briefly 
scrutinize some nation-building theories and see how these concepts are interrelated, and 
whether they can fit the Albanian case.   
 
3.6 Nation building theories 
 
The field of nation-building scholarship is not a homogeneous field, and at times scholars have 
little agreement with each other. This, according to Smith, while providing theoretical 
foundations for understanding the nation-building process, has also generated confusion.243 
Nation-building processes have been explored by various scholars in their theories. 
                                                 
239 Mark Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism confronts the Secular State. Berkeley CA 
and Los Angeles CA: University of California Press, 1993. In ibid. 
240 Reinhold Niebuhr, Does civilization need religion? A study in the social resources and limitations on 
religion in modern life, Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock. Previously published by Macmillan, 1927, 1. 
241 Ibid., 17. 
242 Hobsbawm, 164. 
243 Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations and nationalism, 223. 
 64 
Smith describes theories of nation building developed in 1950s and early 1960s as “relatively 
crude models” of approach, focusing on ideologies of nationalism per se or on the 
“sociodemographic correlates of ‘nation-building’”.244 This trend, he continues, shifted since 
the 1960s, as scholars started to pay greater attention to “subjective dimensions of collective 
cultural identities ... and the influence of ethnic symbol, myth and memory”.245 Despite 
contributions to the field, nation-building theories have also generated confusion, in particular 
regarding the definition of the nation, when the ‘nation’ was created, and factors that brought 
about the making of a nation. For Smith, due to basic disagreements and different approaches, 
the idea of having a unified methodology is “quite unrealistic and any general theory [is] merely 
Utopian”.246 Following Max Weber’s warnings of difficulties in attempting to construct a 
unified ‘sociological typology’ of ‘community sentiments of solidarity’, Smith thinks that 
“paradigms” in the field still remain.247 Despite these constraints, theories of ‘nation-building’ 
can be grouped into five main approaches; namely primordial, perennial, modernist, ethno-
symbolic and post-modernist.248 These theories differ in their explanations of when, how and 
why the ‘nation’ was created.  
 
3.7 Primordialism and Perennialism 
 
Primordialist approaches are the oldest in sociological and anthropological literature.249 
Sociobiological and sociological analyses of the origins of ‘nation’ as a primordial 
phenomenon sustain the idea that nations are a natural form of a collective identification, 
created not as historical development but due to natural social bonds between members. These 
                                                 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Smith defines five main problems in the field such as “failure to reach a consensus on the delimitation of the 
field” (for example disagreements between the modernist with the perennialist and primordialist), “the notorious 
terminological difficulties in the field”, “the problems of definitions”, “many divergent research programs and 
interests in the field” and finally, “the problem of different value-orientations to issues of ethnicity and 
nationalism”. See ibid., 221-3. 
248 Ibid., 223-5. 
249 Isajiw, 2. 
 65 
theories place great emphasis on ethnicity being fixed at birth. Wan and Vanderwerf state that 
“Ethnic identification is based on deep, ‘primordial’ attachments to a group or culture”250,   and 
derives from “the kin-and-clan-structure of human society, and hence something more or less 
fixed and permanent”.251 While for Clifford Geertz, an earlier primordialist scholar, the 
strength of such primordial bonds, “differ from person to person, from society to society, and 
from time to time”252, for another primordialist, Van den Berghe, society is based on kin 
selection, reciprocity and coercion.253 In short, primordialist theories do not link modernisation 
and development with nations but rather, they treat nations as descendants of ethnic groups. 
Smith believes that primordialist scholars in their cultural or sociobiological approaches have 
alerted us to intimate links between ethnicity and kinship, and ethnicity and territory, and the 
way these correlations “can generate powerful sentiments of collective belonging”.254 If we 
apply Van den Berghe’s concept, the Primordialist approach can only explain the existence of 
modern Albanians as linked to Illyrians by primordial ties255, which is not a convincing 
approach for nation building.  
Perennialist theories, on the other hand, hold that nations existed before modernity. 
While the theme of perennialists is linked to the question of when nations were created, the 
phenomenon of nation creation is not treated as natural or primordial. In his analysis of 
ethnicity and language in Eastern Europe, Fishman found that the “human body itself is viewed 
as an expression of ethnicity and ethnicity is commonly felt to be in the blood, bones and 
flesh.”256 For another perennialist scholar, Connor, a ‘nation’ is basically “a group of people” 
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who are “ancestrally related”.257 For Smith, perennialism considers nations “over the longue 
durée” and focuses on the long-term role to acknowledge nations as “temporally continuous or 
recurrent in history”.258 Therefore, for perennialists, nations are eternal. This model is not 
applicable for the case of Albania, as the Albanian ‘nation’ is a modern phenomenon that dates 
only to the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 
3.8 Modernist and post-modernist theories: The role of nationalism 
 
Unlike primordialists and perennialists, modernists describe the ‘nation’, as a ‘novel’ and 
‘recent’ concept, and, a product of nationalism. For most Modernists, modernity (itself a 
contested notion) provides the foundation for development of nationalism which then leads to 
the creation of nation-states and the problems associated with nations. The more elaborate 
Modernist theories are, compared to Primordialist and Perennialist theories, perhaps better able 
to explain nation-building processes. However, Modernists struggle to explain the Albanian 
case. During the nineteenth and the twentieth century, the Balkans were associated with 
economic, cultural, technological and political backwardness, and thus, according to Modernist 
theories, should not have advanced to the stage of nationalism and nations. Albanian 
nationalism started to rise in the second half of the nineteenth century, which was before the 
creation of the ‘Albanian nation’, although its instrumental role needs to be understood and 
explained “within a broader context that exceeds Albanian ‘exceptionalism’”.259 Indeed, 
Gellner recognises the paradox of Balkan nationalism, which constitutes a major problem for 
his theory, “given the backwardness of the Balkans by the standards of industrialism and 
modernity”.260 Furthermore, the process of Albanian nation building was not only an invention 
of Albanian nationalism, but rather needs to be seen “as a product of controversial political 
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elites’ interests, struggle for independence, social engineering and Great Power rivalry situated 
in particular political, social and cultural conditions”.261 
Ultimately, postmodern theories are seen as a continuation of modernist approaches. 
They suggest a post-national model that is the next phase of globalisation. For Wan and 
Vanderwerf, these approaches are more concerned with nations and nationalism than with 
ethnicity.262 Smith describes postmodern analysis as a “fragmentation of contemporary 
national identities, and suggest the advent of a new ‘post-national’ order of identity politics 
and global culture”. 263 Therefore, Smith argues, “postmodernists stress the hard bedrock of 
‘cultural difference’”, in “joining of hands with perennialism over the heads of the 
modernists”.264 For him, studying nations and nationalism is not helpful; but rather, one has to 
proceed to the earlier stage of ‘ethnicity’.265  
 
3.9 Smith’s ‘ethno-symbolic’ approach 
 
As a student of Gellner, Smith elaborated modernist theories, drawing heavily on the origins 
of culture and ethnicity. Smith agrees with Modernists in considering the existence of nations 
as a modern phenomenon, stating that ‘nations’ and ‘nationalism’ is a postmodernist 
phenomenon that “commences in the nineteenth century, or... even later”.266 However, Smith 
does not agree with the structural sociological and chronological analysis of modernist 
approaches267 with regards to the concept of the nation. Smith believes that nations are modern 
but always rooted in ethnicity as even “if the nation is modern and perhaps ‘invented’, it does 
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not, cannot, emerge out of nothing.268 
As he continues to explain, nations are likely to be formed by those groups that “have 
had, at their core, a substantial ethnic community with its own memories, symbols, myths, and 
traditions, and whose populations share common sentiments and aspirations”.269 Therefore, 
Smith redirects the focus back to ethnicity and culture in order to explain the concept of 
‘nation’. In short, he explains that his focus of analysis “began to shift from nationalisms to 
nations, and from nations to ethnic communities”.270  
In his seminal Nationalism and Modernism, Smith commences his discussion by 
analysing Renan’s “large scale solidarity”271, which according to Smith, can be considered as 
a group or community who feel and try to preserve its own values.  Smith firstly explores who 
are the communities that form nations.272 He thinks “the key” to answering this question “lies 
in their [communities] pre-modern ethnic base” and not in the concepts of the Modernists who 
think that “nation is a category of modernity” because it is “a territorial unit, with clear borders, 
… a legal political community … legitimated (if not created) by nationalist ideology, … a mass 
community…”.273  
In order to address the above issues, Smith defines another paradigm, that of ‘historical 
ethno-symbolism’.274 Defining the historical ethno-symbolic approach, Smith draws attention 
to the seven constitutive elements of collective-cultural identities.275 The concept of ‘ethnicity’ 
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is the foundation of Smith’s ethno-symbolism paradigm, and that becomes clear in the way he 
summarises his own theory: 
 
Ethno-symbolism aims to uncover the symbolic legacy of ethnic identities for particular 
nations, and to show how modern nationalisms and nations rediscover and reinterpret the 
symbols, myths, memories, values and traditions of their ethno-histories, as they face the 
problems of modernity.276 
It also shows that ‘ethnicities’ are not fixed entities, but rather there is a correlation with 
modern nationalism, although the relationship between them is problematic. For Eriksen, for 
example, the main difference between ethnicity and nationalism lies “in their relationship to 
the state”.277 The assumption is that ethnicity can be transformed into nationalism but not the 
other way around. However, for Eriksen, if a group cannot mobilise a community via 
nationalism, then they might latch onto ethnicity as their “members reside more or less 
uncomfortably under the aegis of a state which they do not identify with nationality or ethnic 
category”.278  
 
3.10 Religion and civilization 
 
Another term that is highly debated in contemporary discussions regarding Albanian identity 
is the concept of ‘civilization’. ‘Civilization’ lacks an agreed upon definition and is thus used 
in varied ways.279 For example it can be used to describe developmental stages of societies, 
which gradually transformed through agrarianism and industrialisation from primitive into 
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civilized societies.280 Crone envisages that “primitive (or simple), and civilized (or complex), 
are too different to be treated together”.281 Jenkins believes that “primitive” people organized 
into tribal groups, after they realized the danger of being colonized by other groups.282 
According to Gellner, ‘civilized’ societies created their own polities to protect their cultures 
within the boundaries of their power.283 Another example is the use of the term ‘civilization’ 
to differentiate development between various groups of society. Targowski, who analysed 
some early and contemporary definitions of the term civilization proposes that civilization is a 
large society that differentiates 
 
from other civilizations by the development of its own advanced cultural system driven by 
communication, religion, wealth, power, and the sharing of the same knowledge system within 
complex urban, agricultural infrastructures, and other infrastructures such as industrial and 
information ones. It also progresses in a cycle of rising, growing, declining and falling.284  
For Mandalinos, civilizations contain “a multiplicity of communities – religious, 
linguistic, ethnic, national, indigenous and regional – and their resultant forms of identity”.285 
According to this scholar, civilizations construct a self-image, which is civilized, and an 
“other”, which is considered as uncivilized, or “barbarian”.286 
Huntington defines civilization as “the highest cultural grouping of people and the 
broadest level of cultural identity … [that] distinguishes humans from other species”, defined 
by common objective elements, such as “language, history, religion, customs, institutions”, 
and by “the subjective self-identification of people”.287 For Huntington, civilization is a cultural 
entity, as “villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, religious groups, all have distinct 
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cultures at different levels of cultural heterogeneity”.288 Therefore, Huntington’s unit of 
analysis does not include either ‘nation’ or ‘ethnicity’, but rather the concept of ‘civilization’. 
This is explicated in his theory that in today’s world, conflicts will not occur between nations 
but rather nations will be challenged by different civilisations through conflicts, or what he 
calls “clash of civilizations”.289 As he so famously laid it down, in what was an exaggerated 
and controversial context: 
 
The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations 
will be the battle lines of the future.290 
 
Huntington highlights differences between civilizations, mentioning five factors, such 
as profound differences in history, language, culture, tradition and, more importantly, religion; 
perception of people’s “local identities”, which is stronger than nation-states; “de-
Westernization and indigenization of elites”, and finally, “cultural characteristics and 
differences” that are less variable and negotiable than political and economic ones.291  These 
differences are further exacerbated by geographical propinquity, which “gives rise to 
conflicting territorial claims”.292 
Huntington claims there are eight civilizations293 coexisting in today’s world, however 
he focuses almost exclusively on the clash between the West and Islam. The clash of 
civilizations, Huntington continues, will occur at micro and macro levels294 on what he calls 
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“the fault lines” between Western Christianity “and Orthodox Christianity and Islam”, which 
coincides with the historic boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires in the 
Balkans.295 In short, for Huntington, “the interaction between Islam and the West is seen as a 
clash of civilization”296 by both, West and East. As an example, Huntington cites the conflict 
that erupted at what he calls the “northern border of Islam” between Orthodox and Muslim 
faiths, “including the carnage of Bosnia and Sarajevo”, which was followed by the “simmering 
violence between Serb and Albanian”297 individuals at the end of the twentieth century—an 
analysis far removed from what Cornell and Douglass define as “ethnic cleansing”.298 This 
thesis will take a quite separate position from the controversies provoked by Huntington’s 
original piece, however, Huntington’s perception that it was not ‘ethnicity’ which sparked the 
conflict between the Albanian and Serbian regimes, but rather religion, especially Islam that 
provoked other civilizations, as he believes that “Islam has bloody borders”299 is misleading. 
Although in Huntington’s views, Islam is regarded as the main cause of many conflicts across 
the world, in the case of the Kosovo war of 1999, this claim does not seem credible. The conflict 
in Kosovo was not only of a religious nature, but rather ethnic Albanians opposed the Serbian 
regime in the same way other Christian-ethnicities of ex-Yugoslavia did in 1991-1992.  
Maria Todorova maintains that after the Cold War, while the idea of “Central Europe” 
died, the West, as part of Habsburg nostalgia, pursued “new trench lines”300 reinvented by 
Huntington. This is the case in the current rise of some far-right political parties in France, 
Italy, the UK and the Netherlands, reviving his controversial work. Huntington’s ‘clash of 
civilizations’ is however unable to explain the Albanian situation. The paradox of the claims 
that Albanian identity belongs to the West (which according to Huntington means Christian) 
or East (interpreted as Islam) is one of the main topics of the twenty-first century discourse in 
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Albania and this thesis will engage with this debate through analyses of the Albanian prominent 
writer, Ismail Kadare. However, Albanians live in a global world where interaction with others, 
or the decision to follow a certain path may be influenced by other actors. Therefore, two other 
theoretical concepts in this context are important to be discussed: power and influence. 
 
3.11 The concept of political influence  
 
Both ‘power’ and ‘influence’ are contested concepts.301  For Nye, a longstanding scholar of 
power, changes in modern tendency and the political environment are having significant effects 
on the nature of power and the resources that produce it.302 As Nye argues, concepts such as 
“cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions” are all influencing techniques used 
to achieve success in world politics.303 However, the concept of influence needs to be 
distinguished from power. Nye defines power as “ability to influence the behaviour of others 
to get the outcomes one wants”.304 According to Cox and Jacobson, “Power may be converted 
into influence, but it is not necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent”.305 In line with 
these arguments Arts and Verchuren made a “distinction between power as the general ability 
to influence, and influence as the realisation of a single effect”.306 They also believe that “part 
of the definition of power should refer to the ability of actors to achieve or prevent outcomes 
against the will of others.”307 
Banfield defines influence as the “ability to get others to act, think, or feel as one 
intends”.308 This means that in a political field, we are considering two political actors 
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(symbolically: A → B); actor A can be an individual or a collective player such as a pressure 
group that modifies the behavior of actor B in a political arena. Arts and Verchuren point out 
that most social scientists agree on this general-definition of influence.309 According to these 
scholars, while “the phenomena of influence and power are elementary aspects of political and 
social life” it is difficult to measure them objectively as both are contested concepts.310  As a 
result, Arts and Verchuren, extended the three classical approaches311 of assessing power (and 
influence), to include a fourth concept,  the so-called “stakeholder model”, “a set of 
stakeholders who try through formal and informal bargaining practices to influence a decision 
that must be taken by a set of formal decision-makers.”312 In short, they offered a tridimensional 
– the “EAR Instrument”313, which includes: ego-perception (E), alter-perception (A) and 
researcher analysis (R).314 It is generally accepted that in bilateral relations between two actors, 
the power exercised by the stronger actor will influence the weaker. Therefore, the rising power 
of Turkey, which might influence Albanian identity is crucial to this thesis. As seen in the 
previous chapter, ‘cultural attraction, ideology, and international institutions’ are all concepts 
that Turkey might exercise to influence Albanian identity in the twenty-first century, and thus, 
pull Albania back towards Eastern civilisation as it did for more than five centuries. 
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3.12 Imagining the Balkans – ‘Balkanism’, stereotypes and legacy 
 
Maria Todorova’s Imagining the Balkans (2009) has added significantly, to scholarly analyses 
of the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans. Todorova argues, the ‘Balkan concept’ has never been 
seriously considered a central category of identity315, but is rather considered a “subspecies of 
the larger identity problem of small peripheral nations”.316 As a result, Todorova is “convinced 
that the problem merits a whole genre of work on ‘balkanism’”.317 This thesis will add to the 
Balkan studies. Narrowing Todorova’s research on the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans this 
thesis will emphasise the Turkish impact on Albanian identity. 
Todorova is concerned with the difficulties of the Balkan states to make democratic 
progress. This is affected by ongoing territorial disputes, which increases nationalism, but for 
her, the main cause of little success is “the ethnic complexity of the Balkans …”.318 Todorova 
asserts that the elites of Balkan countries must assume some responsibility319 for their 
unsuccessful story, rather than using the “Ottoman Empire and Turkey as the convenient 
scapegoat for all their misfortunes and misconducts” and demonising each other.320 
 ‘Balkan’ is the name of a mountain, also used in a metaphorical way since the fifteenth 
century.321 Since then, the Balkans have been depicted as dangerous and savage, in a way that 
Todorova considers “more than a stereotype”.322 This all began by the “very use of ‘tribal’ 
[that] relegates Balkans to a lower civilization category, occupied primarily by Africans, to 
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whom the term is usually applied”.323 Different travellers, in different times and circumstances 
published various opinion pieces about people living in the Balkans. While traveller’s literature 
became a fashionable genre324 and produced a significant body of writings all over Europe, 
Todorova argues that in reality, traveller’s writings served as a “combination of all elements 
that shaped the existing stereotypes of the Balkans”.325 An example is an eighteenth century 
painting which was painted in Syria and it shows Germans above other Europeans.326 At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the understanding of the Balkans image had already been 
shaped327 in such a way in European literature that its connotations conjured a pejorative image, 
“triggered by the events accompanying the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire and the 
creation of small, weak, economically backward, and dependant nation-states, striving to 
modernise”.328 According to Todorova, the Balkan’s image of Albanians is “aggressive, 
intolerant, barbarian, semi-developed, semi-civilized and semi-oriental”.329 
In the updated edition of Imagining the Balkans, Todorova explains that ‘region’ as a 
term is complex and does not relate only to geographical territory. It is rather shaped by global 
developments in a way that “regions can supersede the nation-state”, such as the case of the 
EU.330 It is useful to remember that Todorova distinguishes region from tradition and legacy—
terms that, according to her, are “less straightforward” and require more attention in order to 
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be understood.331 For Todorova, tradition is “a conscious selection of elements bequeathed 
from the past”, whilst “legacy encompasses everything – chosen or not – that is handed down 
from the past”.332 The European peninsula before the nineteenth century was shaped by 
political legacies (for example, the Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman Empires and even the 
communist era), however, Todorova focuses particularly on:  
 
the half millennium of Ottoman rule that gave the peninsula its name and established its longest 
period of political unity. The Ottoman elements – or those perceived as such – have contributed 
to most current Balkan stereotypes. In the narrow sense of the word, then, one can argue that 
the Balkans are, in fact, the Ottoman legacy.333 
 
Not only does Todorova have no doubt about the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans, she 
argues that Turkey also shows elements of Balkan legacies, as “modern Turkey is a Balkan 
state”.334 Todorova identifies two forms of legacy: legacy by continuity and, legacy by 
perception.335 Legacy by continuity carries characteristics of entity as the ‘survival’, which will 
decline “immediately before its collapse”, and on the other hand, Todorova defines legacy by 
perception as “the articulation and rearticulation of how the entity is thought about at different 
times by different individuals or groups”.336 Therefore, Todorova suggests that by the end of 
WWI the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans had shifted from continuity to perception; a shift that 
she names as one of the main “pillars in the discourse of Balkan nationalism” that “displays 
striking similarities in all Balkan countries”.337 
Todorova’s analysis of historical legacies of the Balkans and Eastern Europe assists us 
to better understand the Balkans’ different identities and questions the tendency to consider 
                                                 
331 Ibid., 198. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Ibid., 199. 
334 Ibid., 49. 
335 See ibid., 198. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Todorova hopes only ‘Europeanization of the region will end the Balkans as a metaphor and, the Ottoman 
legacy’. Ibid., 199. 
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“others”– lessons that Europe should have learned as a result of two world wars. However, as 
Todorova suggests, 
 
 Europe, in this vision, emerges as a complex palimpsest of differently shaped entities, not only 
exposing the porosity of internal frontiers, but also questioning the absolute stability of external 
ones.338 
 
Albania is not immune to these developments as, in the twenty-first century, the 
Albanian question in the Balkans, is often portrayed as ‘Greater Albania’. 
 
3.13 Todorova’s Christian Balkans 
 
One of Todorova’s more challenging concepts is the definition of the Balkans as a ‘Christian’ 
region, especially when applied to Albania and Bosnia, countries with a Muslim majority 
population. While it is known that prior to the Ottoman arrival, Christianity was largely 
diffused in Albanian speaking-lands, the current debate of what Todorova calls ‘legacy’, 
involves the Ottoman and the post-Ottoman era. For Todorova, Albania is part of the Balkans, 
however, Albanian elites are “externalizing undesired qualities on some imputed 
Balkanness”.339 However, when it comes to religion, Todorova thinks that, before Albania 
 
became atheist [it] was 70 percent Muslim bespeaks the naïveté and straightforwardness of the 
new Albanian political discourse that has not mastered the ennobling façade of the pluralist 
vocabulary.340  
 
                                                 
338 Todorova writes ‘In this respect, the task for balkanists and East Europeanists consists not so much of 
“provincializing” Europe but of “de-provincializing” Western Europe, which has heretofore expropriated the 
category of Europe with concrete political and moral consequences. In the academic sphere, this translates as the 
continuing necessity on the part of East Europeanists to have a good grasp of the West European fields, as well 
as to challenge the sanctioned ignorance of West Europeanists about developments in the eastern half of the 
continent. If this project comes to fruition, we will actually succeed in “provincializing” Europe effectively for 
the rest of the world, insofar as the paradigm will have broadened to include not only a cleansed, abstract, and 
idealized version of power, but also one of dependency, subordination, and messy struggles’. See ibid., 202. 
339 Ibid., 46. 
340 Ibid., 45-6. 
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Todorova’s appeal to the Christian values of Balkans is an interesting point, as religion 
generates much discussion within Albanian society, its politicians and scholars. With analysing 
the effects of religion and the Ottoman legacy in Albania, this thesis will compliment and 
narrow down Todorova’s research on the Ottoman legacy in the Balkans.  
 
3.14 Why investigating the Albanian case using these concepts? 
 
Albanian identity is contested as is the Albanian nation, ethnicity, nationalism, religion and 
civilisation. Each of these concepts presents a different aspect and often they are intertwined. 
Investigating these notions in the post-Ottoman context, will not only help to scrutinise these 
theoretical concepts, it will also add to the scholarship to better understand Albanian identity 
in the twenty-first century. 
The first key issue addressed in this study is the concept of the Albanian national 
identity. This pointed the study towards nation-building theories. The Albanian ‘nation-state’ 
was only created at the beginning of the twentieth century, after other ‘modern’ nation-states 
in Europe were created. As a result, this study started to use Gellner’s and Hobsbawm’s 
modernist approaches who both consider creation of ‘nations’ as a ‘modern’ phenomenon. 
This, in turn, lead to the realisation of the importance of ‘nationalism’ in building the ‘nation’; 
however, this was not an easily applicable concept as ‘modernism’ arrived in Albania (and 
indeed the Balkans) after ‘nations’ and ‘nationalism’ had been established. Albanian 
nationalism only became prominent during the Albanian Awakening period at the end of the 
nineteenth century, however, it arrived before industrialisation and modernity reached 
Albanian-speaking lands. Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ was also not of great 
aid as today’s Albanian ‘nation’ does not include those Albanians living in territories that are 
currently part of other Balkan countries, although they imagine themselves as ‘Albanians’. This 
is related to the “Greater Albania” issue, which will be discussed in chapter five.  
This led to question the ethnic composition of Albania and pointed the study to consider 
earlier nation-building theories of primordialism and perennialism. However, these approaches 
were not well suited to explain the Albanian nation. The former could only link to the contested 
concept that Albanians are related to Illyrians through primordial and unchanged ties, whereas 
for the latter, the Albanian nation has always existed. The existence of Albanians in terms of 
language and culture, is proof of a different ethnic group that inhabited the Balkans. 
Archaeological sites and artefacts found in Albania are indeed the only proof that Illyrians 
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inhabited these lands. However, finding the link between these two distant eras is not a simple 
task, and the lack of Albanian archaeological and historical literature does not help either. This 
was the reason to look at this issue from Smith’s lenses of ‘ethno-symbolism’.  
According to ‘ethno-symbolism’ the Albanian nation as a concept is modern, but rooted 
in ethnic Illyrian culture and language, myths and memories that have evolved since Illyrian 
times. In the context of Albania, ‘ethno-symbolism’ uncovers the symbolic legacy of Illyrian 
ethnic identities, and shows how Albanian nationalism rediscovered and reinterpreted symbols, 
myths, memories, values and traditions of Albania’s ethno-history.341 However, ‘ethno-
symbolism’ has also limitations. It lacks historiography and research to link how “far earlier 
forms of ethnic sentiment and later forms of nationalism were similarly imbued with religious 
beliefs and sentiments”342, to put it in Smith’s own words. This drew my attention to another 
paradigm, religion, which further completed the puzzle. As discussed in this chapter, the 
important role of religion and its connections with nationalism and ethnicity in creation of 
nations are recognized by many scholars, including Smith. One of the contributions of this 
thesis to the scholarly literature is to explore the role of religion in Albanian context, which 
appears to have had inadequate treatment.  
At this point in the exploration, Hastings’ advice to focus equally on nations, ethnicity, 
nationalism and religion, aided building the theoretical scaffold. Deconstructing nation-
building theories and focusing on the holistic picture of concurrent analyses of nation, 
ethnicity, nationalism and religion, in Albanian case is more convincing, as none of those five 
nation-building theories discussed earlier could provide the theoretical framework.  
The theoretical groundwork regarding Turkish influence on Albanian national identity 
and reflection of Ottoman culture on Albanian identity is more complex, as little analyses in 
this field exists. This provided the opportunity to introduce Todorova’s seminal work on the 
Balkans and the Ottoman legacy into the discussion and direct the focus on Albanian 
particularism. Therefore, another contribution of this thesis will be an attempt to add and 
                                                 
341 As Smith states: ‘… the attempts by Armstrong, Hutchinson and myself to trace the role of myths, symbols, 
values and memories in generating ethnic and national attachments and forging cultural and social networks, 
have added to our appreciation of the subjective and historical dimensions of nations and nationalism. This is 
matched by a parallel concern with investigating the ways in which nationalists have rediscovered and used the 
ethno-symbolic repertoire for national ends, in particular the myths and memories of ethnic election, sacred 
territory, collective destiny and the golden age’. See Smith, Nationalism and Modernism: A critical survey of 
recent theories of nations and nationalism, 224. 
342 Ibid., 227. 
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complement scholarly analyses in the field by narrowing down Todorova’s concept of the 
Ottoman legacy in the Balkans to that of Albania.  
Theoretical concepts of influence also help to comprehend Albanian identity influenced 
since the Middle Ages by the Roman and Byzantine Empires. However, as Todorova argues, 
the effect of the Ottoman Empire on Albanian speaking lands was far more pronounced due to 
its length, but also to the fact that it is the more recent event. Thus, a combination of the 
concepts of nation, ethnicity, nationalism religion, civilization and influence, along with 
Todorova’s ‘Ottoman legacy’, can assist explaining Albanian national identity and analysing 
the ways it may be influenced by the Ottoman culture.  
Finally, theories of nation-building have not been able to explain Albanian national 
identity for another reason. The reason lies in Albanian identity itself: while contested, 
Albanian identity is also unique. First and foremost, what makes it unique, are all of these 
discussed theoretical concepts, which in Albanian case are all contested. However, it is a fact 
the Albanian national identity survived in the face of the Ottoman-Turks and Albania’s 
neighbours. In addition, the more inexplicable role of religion compared to other Balkan states 
with stronger religious backgrounds than most Western countries makes the Albanian case 
distinctive. It is this uniqueness that makes it even more difficult to fit Albanian identity into 
the scholarly literature. This thesis will try to offer its contribution to close this gap in the 
literature. 
 
3.15 Conclusion 
 
This chapter provides the theoretical platform that will be the basis for exploring both parts of 
the research question. It was decided to employ a deconstructed approach that does not analyse 
Albanian identity using a specific nation-building theory, but rather use Hastings’ approach to 
analyse proportionally concepts such as ‘nation’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘religion’. The 
chapter briefly reviewed substantive nation-building theories, that is primordialism, 
perennialism, modernism, post-modernism and ‘ethno-symbolism’. However, not only do 
these nation-building theories have limitations, they are not able to explain the unique Albanian 
identity.  
In order to complete the theoretical scaffold, the chapter briefly discussed other 
theoretical concepts such as ‘civilization’, ‘influence’ and ‘legacy’; to address the second part 
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of the research question: the ramifications of past and present Turkish influence in Albania in 
the twenty-first century. Ultimately, the chapter emphasised Todorova’s Ottoman legacy in the 
Balkans. Although Todorova’s analyses are valuable, they emphasise the Balkans as a 
Christian entity. This precludes explaining all different ethnic and religious groups, nations, 
and nation-states in the Balkans using Todorova’s ‘Balkanism. It also creates the opportunity 
for this thesis to address the gap and contribute to the wide scholarly literature through analyses 
of the Albanian case. 
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CHAPTER 4. CONTEXTUALISING IMPLICATIONS OF THE OTTOMAN 
INFLUENCE IN ALBANIAN SPEAKING LANDS: 1385-1912  
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss major implications of the Ottoman occupation of the Albanian-
speaking lands from their arrival in 1385 until the declaration of the Albanian Independence in 
1912. While drawing on historical narratives of the Ottoman occupation, the aim of this chapter 
is to discuss how the Porte impacted, or suppressed the creation of the Albanian entity. It will 
explore how the Ottomans affected the Albanian speaking lands, focussing on social 
organisation, infrastructure, written language, the system of education and the ongoing debate 
regarding the role of nationalism and religion.  
 
4.2 The political aims of Ottomans in organising the society in Albanian speaking lands 
 
The social and political structure of Albania has changed significantly over time. Prior to the 
Ottoman arrival, Albanian identity was not homogenous and reflected both Christian—
Catholic and Orthodox elements. Albanian Catholics of the North, and Orthodox in the South, 
were dissimilar not only in terms of religion, cultural differences between gegs and tosks were 
evident. One of the most eminent scholars on Ottoman civilisation, Speros Vryonis, believes 
that during the Byzantine rule, Southern Albania was included in a partial Byzantinization or 
in a “semi-Byzantinized zone”, while the Byzantine effects did not affect Albanian mountain 
regions.343 In a sense, this version explains the presence of Albanian Catholics in the North—
an area that was ruled by Rome for a considerable period of time. Nevertheless, there were no 
simple divisions based on religion and culture between gegs and tosks, as not all Albanian gegs 
were Catholics, and similarly, not all tosks were Orthodox-Christians.  
Vryonis emphasised that the Ottoman system, in a broad sense, was similar to the 
centralized bureaucratic theocracy of the Byzantine Empire.344 However, he argues that on a 
                                                 
343 Jr Speros Vryonis, "The Bysantine Legacy and Ottoman Forms", Dumbarton Oaks Papers, vol. 23, no. 24, 
1969-1970, 256. 
344 Ibid., 267-308. 
 84 
macro level of analysis, the upper levels of society, the Seljuks and Ottomans were “Islamic 
rather than Byzantine”, whereas with regard to folk cultures, the Ottoman structure isolated the 
Balkan peoples from developing contacts with the West.345 As Morgan outlines, Romans, 
Byzantines and then the Ottoman Empire, transformed Albanian speaking lands into 
“badlands”346, but according to Todorova, the impact of the Ottoman Empire has been greater.  
Following an old system used in the Middle East, the Porte organised its society based 
on the millet347 system. This system served to regulate all inhabitants of the Empire who did 
not believe in Islam and thus, could not use Islamic law to participate in the social structures 
of the Empire in terms of legal, and administrative jurisdictions. Licursi thinks the decision to 
organize the social structure in millets “laid the groundwork for the institutionalized 
incorporation” of non-Muslim population, which according to Barkey, “would evolve, 
eventually, into a fluid system of millets”.348 All millets were considered to be at a lower level 
than Muslims.349 However, despite the systemic imbalances of millets, the system guaranteed 
a certain language and religious autonomy, provided that millets accepted their “inferior 
status”350 compared to Muslims.   
As the millet system was based on religious affiliation, the concept of the Albanian 
ethnicity and social groupings were completely ignored.351 In Albania, deep divisions between 
powerful families, and the differences between gegs and tosks, were further jeopardised by the 
millet system. They now had to re-group into Muslims, and Christian-Orthodox that belonged 
to the Rum millet. Albanian Muslims were considered as ‘first class citizens’, equal to Islamic 
Turks. They were subject to lower taxes and regulated their social interaction through Islamic 
                                                 
345 Ibid. 
346 Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship 1957-1990, 5. 
347 Millet derives from the Arabic (millah), which means people of a religion other than Islam. 
348 Karen Barkey, Empire of Difference: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective, Cambridge Cambridge 
University Press, 2008. Cited in Emiddio Pietro Licursi, "Empire of Nations: The Consolidation of Albanian 
and Turkish National Identities in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1878 – 1913" (2011, Unpublished thesis. 
Department of History, Columbia University), 26, 
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:131865/content/Licursi_Senior
_Thesis.pdf. 
349 Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, London: Hurst, 2000, 28. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid. 
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courts. After the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the Orthodox Patriarchate set the rules under 
which the Albanian Christian-Orthodox millet lived, while reporting directly to Sultan Mehmet 
II. The situation of Catholic Albanians was different. While they were not ‘Turks’, they were 
not considered as a separate millet either. Since 168 BC, a time that Romans defeated Gentius, 
the last Illyrian king, Albanian Catholics were part of “the jurisdiction of Rome until 731 when 
Illyricum was placed under the Patriarchate of Constantinople”.352 However, both Romans and 
Venetians continued their influence and protection of North Albania, as it did later Austro-
Hungary and France.353 However, according to Doja, during the long reign of the Byzantine 
Empire, Albanian Christians “entered further into the orbit of Eastern Christianity”354—a 
situation that was further complicated after the Ottoman occupation as Christian Albanians 
found themselves in the middle of the existing East-West “fault-line and the Muslim faith of 
the conquerors”.355 
Despite claims of cultural and religious pluralism within the empire356, the coexistence 
of various ethnicities, languages and creeds proved difficult. As Misha emphasises, at the end 
of the nineteenth century,  
 
the millet system had resulted in complex demographic patterns throughout the Ottoman 
Empire. This may explain the confusing mixture of races, faiths and nationalities, which 
confronted the ‘map makers’ of Europe when they turned their minds to the Balkans in the 
second half of the nineteenth century”.357  
 
                                                 
352 Doja, 427. 
353 Licursi, 28. 
354 Doja, 427. 
355 Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer and the Dictatorship 1957-1990, 8. 
356 George W. Gawrych, "Tolerant Dimensions of Cultural Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire: The Albanian 
Community, 1800-1912", International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 15, no. 4, Novembre 1983. 
357 Misha, 145. 
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The Porte abolished the millet system at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a time 
that tanzimat reforms replaced timar—a system that aimed to collect feudal taxes (timars) 
through the ‘holy’ Islamic soil, which was considered to be the property of Sultan.358  
 
4.3 The Ottoman’s social, economic and administrative reforms in Albanian-speaking 
lands 
 
Along with the millet system, the timar system lasted for more than four centuries and left an 
indelible mark on Albanian lands. It reduced the majority of Albanian peasants to living in 
poverty: “many who worked the land, pushed others off it, and contributed to the problems of 
feeding the [Albanian] population in troubled times”.359 This not only affected the land and 
agriculture, but also demographically re-shaped Albanian lands; creating uncertainty in the 
already fragile Albanian society.360 The Albanian middle class started to disappear, while 
Albanian Christians lived under the constant pressure of paying higher taxes to their chieftains 
and the Porte.361 By the end of the eighteenth century, through the timar system chaos and 
anarchy reigned in the Albanian-speaking lands.362 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
the religious composition of Albanian-speaking lands changed permanently in favour of Islam, 
whereas with exception of Bosnia, other Western Balkan countries through the millet policy, 
maintained more easily their Orthodox-religious composition. 
By then, following the change in the administration of the Empire, the relationship 
between landowners and peasants also changed: The ‘livelihood’—a grant that was “sufficient 
                                                 
358 See for instance Karl Kaser, "Serfdom in Eastern Europe", in Household and Family in the Balkans: Two 
decades of historical family research at University of Graz, ed. Karl Kaser, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012, 152. 
359 Anscombe, 95. 
360 Ibid., 94. 
361 Christian families who lived in these territories paid 10-20 percent of harvest and several days of free service 
to the Sultan. See for instance Kaser, in Household and Family in the Balkans: Two decades of historical family 
research at University of Graz, 153. 
362 Zickel and Iwaskiw, 15. 
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to support a cavalryman and his horse”—dirliks363 started to now be organised in çiftliks364, 
which were given to sipahis.365 Larger villages and territories were grouped under a new 
system that Kaser calls “çiflik economy”.366 The Albanian clan-chieftains who had virtually 
become independent rulers (beys), often took advantage of their wealth and power and refused 
to pay taxes, while attacking each other.367 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire started to face military, 
economic, demographic and political challenges. While the Porte was under increasing 
pressure to protect itself from external powers who wished to conquer parts of their lands, 
difficulties of communication between people within the Empire, other external factors such 
as “outside interests” and the rise of nationalism on the Balkan Peninsula further weakened the 
Empire economically.368 Sultan Mahmud II was thus forced to introduce tanzimat reforms in 
1836, in an attempt “to strengthen and modernise the state”.369 During the reigns of 
Abdülmecid I (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876), the tanzimat reforms aimed “to 
strengthen the Ottoman State both to resist outside pressure and to preserve inner unity by the 
adoption of certain Western institutions and ideas”.370  
The tanzimat reform had three arms: the substitution of Ottomanism as an ideology to 
suppress nationalism371, controlling corrupt provincial administration, and a change of the 
                                                 
363 Based on the number of dirliks, the dirlik holder was obliged to returning men, equipment and horses, upon 
the call of Sultan. See for instance, Tobias P. Graf, The Sultan's Renegades: Christian-European Converts to 
Islam and the Making of the Ottoman Elite, 1575-1610, New York: Oxford University Press, 2017, 39-40.  
364 According to Karl Kaser, çiflik was a ‘large territory, similar to East-European domain, and based on the 
deteriorating legal status of peasant families.’ Those peasant Christian families encountered real difficulties 
living as part of a Muslim State. See for instance, Kaser, in Household and Family in the Balkans: Two decades 
of historical family research at University of Graz, 153. 
365 Individuals included in the policy who officially owed privileges such as land given by Sultan. In exchange, 
sipahis were responsible to serve in the army and supply additional armoured soldiers from local peasants.    
366 The more çifliks concentrated in big feudal families, the more economic disparity increased. See for instance 
Kaser, in Household and Family in the Balkans: Two decades of historical family research at University of 
Graz, 153. 
367 Zickel and Iwaskiw, 14. 
368 Jelavich, 4-5. 
369 Ibid., 11. 
370 Ibid., 22. 
371 which began to rise in the Balkans at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
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Ottoman constitution in order to be more flexible and inclusive with regard to the non-Islamic 
population of the Empire. Scholars agree regarding unsuccessful tanzimat reforms.372 The 
tanzimat seemed to be a step forward toward the establishment of the Western type of private 
property, however, in reality, the tanzimat reform “was merely an oriental ruse, and not… a 
serious attempt to rejuvenate the ailing Empire”.373  
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, the stage of expansion and establishment 
of the Ottoman Empire had ended. For Weiker, the insufficient political commitment to 
changing the Ottoman structure of society, led to a bureaucracy that was inconsistent with 
modernisation.374 As Sugar argues, the golden times of the Ottoman Empire were gradually 
replaced with a  
 
need to act evasively, if not dishonestly, [that] became a necessity when the well-organised and 
governed Ottoman state was transformed into the chaotic and corrupt polity…It was the most 
corrupt, ruthless, selfish lawbreaker among the bureaucrats who prospered the most…375  
 
The beginning of the nineteenth century showed that it was too late for the Ottoman 
Empire to survive.376 However, the Ottoman system not only drained resources, it also had 
long-term effects on Albanian lands, collecting taxes but giving little in return. Along with the 
millet system, in Albanian speaking lands, both timar and tanzimat systems primarily benefited 
the Sultan, and their servants—Albanian beys. However, Zickel and Iwaskiw in line with 
Morgan’s ‘badlands’ analogy, argue that during a period of more than five centuries of 
                                                 
372 Weiker for example argues that all three areas of this reform were unsuccessful and thus, the modernisation 
that required the ‘abandonment of the Islamic state and [its] absolute monarchy’ failed.  Weiker, 470. 
373 Bureaucracy for example was also becoming very cumbersome for the Empire, and it was difficult and 
expensive, if not impossible for the Porte to administer Albanian-speaking living in mountainous region. See for 
instance Misha, 83. 
374 Weiker, 470. 
375 Sugar, 288. 
376 It faced problems on a number of different fronts such as the nationalistic movements of Serbia and Greece, 
the Albanian revolts of “bandits” such as Ali Pashë Tepelena in the South and Kara Mahmud Pasha in the 
North, the Great Powers, the Russian front and more importantly, its autocratic and corrupted system that had 
failed to modernise. See for instance, Anscombe. Sugar, 287-90. 
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Ottoman rule, “the Albanian lands remained one of Europe’s most backward areas”.377 How 
did the Ottomans transform Albanian-speaking lands to badlands? 
 
4.4 The Ottoman impact on the Albanian speaking lands: demographic, social and 
environmental effects  
 
Vryonis establishes that the Ottoman advance in Albania at the end of the fourteenth century 
was at a later stage of their transformation from nomadic Seljuks with a deep-rooted destructive 
behaviour to a more “sedentary” Ottoman culture.378 The Ottomans’ political goal was to 
conquer more land, but when they entered Albania, the environment shocked them.  Two thirds 
of Albanian-speaking lands were mountainous and not arable at all; and half of the flat land 
was prone to flooding from the Adriatic Sea on the coastline and inland rivers.379 The Ottomans 
did not have the time, nor were they interested in recovering the Albanian wetlands, as they 
wanted simply to conquer arable land with a minimum effort. By the time all Albanian 
powerful families fell to the Sultan, the iron rule caused terror in Albanian lands. After the 
death of Skenderbeg in 1468, many Christian Albanians in fear for their lives were forced to 
migrate to Italy and neighbouring European countries. This forced migration significantly 
changed the demographics of the Albanian lands. It caused a considerable brain drain effect as 
demonstrated by the loss of educated Albanians such as the historian Marin Barleti (1458-
1512), scientists and philosophers (Gjon Gazulli (1400-1465), Maksim Arioti (1480-1556) and 
Leonik Tomeu (1456-1531) who continued to work in Italy or elsewhere, rather than assisting 
with knowledge and skills in the development of Albania.  
It is a fact that the main aim of the Porte was to collect taxes and give little in return; 
failing even to maintain the existing infrastructure, let alone creating development policies. 
Lack of such policies caused the destruction of the most economically developed Albanian 
cities of Shkodër, Lezhë, Krujë, Durrës and Vlorë at the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
                                                 
377 Zickel and Iwaskiw, 14. 
378 Theoretically, the ‘destructive tendency’ of Seljuks was supposed to be restrained by a well-organised and 
centralised Ottoman State. See for instance Vryonis, 263. 
379 A large part of today’s Albanian myzeqe flatland from Vlorë to Durrës had no drainage and thus, was 
transformed into giant, filthy, permanent lakes that introduced wide scale malaria. 
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Others, such as Deja, Drishti and Sarda, disappeared altogether.380 The Ottoman rulers never 
had total control of the Albanian speaking lands, nor were they interested in protecting the 
Albanian cities and their inhabitants, unless the Albanian “bandits” threatened the Sublime 
Porte.381 The Porte turned a blind eye at the beginning of the nineteenth century, a time that 
rivalry between ayans382 brought about more tension and unfair commerce in Albanian 
speaking lands; resulting in a disastrous situation of reaya who not only suffered due to malaria 
and other infection diseases, but also a shortage of food due to uneven arable land 
distribution.383 By the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was a complete failure by the 
Porte to establish economic and social order in Albanian speaking lands.  
 
4.5 The Ottoman infrastructure development in Albanian lands 
 
Another area that has received scarce attention from the Porte was infrastructure, which only 
included military and religious constructions. For the State, the term “infrastructure” in Albania 
was limited to the construction of bridges to connect fortifications, city castles and fortress-
walls. Other scholars such as Charles and Jelavich agree with the concept of ‘badlands’. As 
they discuss, by 1912, “Albania had remained one of the most backward areas of the empire 
… there were only about 200 kilometres of paved roads”.384 A significant proportion of these 
was Via Egnatia385, which the Ottomans took advantage in using it, but they did not maintain 
                                                 
380 Local Albanians who found themselves rivals and in total ignorance sold part of their cultural heritage such 
as sculptures, paintings and other religious objects in return for a few ounces of gold. After ten years of feudal 
anarchy, rape, warfare and devastation, in 1780, the most developed Albanian town of 40,000 inhabitants, 
Voskopojë, completely disappeared. 
381 Anscombe, 103. 
382 Deputy Governors. For more information see for instance Gabor Agoston and Bruce Masters, Encyclopedia 
of the Ottoman Empire, New York: Facts on File Library of World History, 2009, 65. 
383 When a sancak’s (a district, which derives from the Arabic word, flagg or banner) governor felt threatened 
by another feudal family and asked The Porte for help, the Ottomans showed little ‘interest in investigating 
matters of justice’ and thus, the sancak was often given to a stronger feudal family. For the state, the main 
priority was the collection of taxes and therefore, the control of a sancak often reverted to another governor. See 
for instance Anscombe, 93-103. 
384 Jelavich, in A History of East Central Europe, 223. 
385 A road built by the Roman Empire, which at one time was considered as “the biggest nexus between East 
and West”. See for instance Mehmet Bulut and Mesut Idriz, Turkish Albanian Macedonian Relations: Past, 
Present and Future, Ankara: Adam-Actor, 2012, 9. 
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it, nor did they construct alternative roads. A few longer stone-arch bridges built between 1770 
and 1780 were used for military purposes, while they also facilitated the transport of people 
and their goods. However, due to lack of road construction, remote Albanian areas continued 
to be connected via historical routes maintained by locals. Transport, travel and commercial 
exchange remained sparse due the challenge of almost non-existent civilian infrastructure. 
As discussed previously, select powerful Albanian pashas enjoyed the privileges of the 
tanzimat reforms and the support of the Sublime Porte. They were able to use the support of 
the Porte to resolve their rivalries and gain wealth and power. The conflict of Ahmet Kurt Pasha 
(Ali Pasha’s grandfather) and Mehmet Pasha Bushati at the end of the eighteenth century can 
serve as an example.386 However, with the exception of religious and military infrastructure, 
the Ottomans played no more than a passive role in all other developments. This suggests they 
were focussed on taxes, rather than stimulating or planning the development of Albanian cities 
and improving living conditions.  
The Porte benefited from all of the existing infrastructure in Albania, but it can be 
argued the Ottomans invested in religious and military policies. Upon their arrival in the 
Albanian speaking lands, the Ottomans introduced their faith, Islam. The religious orientation 
of Albania and the influence of Sunni and Bektashi Islam ‘exported’ to Albania by the 
Ottomans will be discussed later in this chapter. For the Porte, Albanian infrastructure came 
second to religious and military advancement, therefore, the Ottomans invested in erecting 
Islamic buildings such as mosques and madrasas.387 After the death of Skenderbeg, a number 
of mosques, unknown in Albania, started to appear: The Mosque of Gjin Aleks (1450) Delvinë, 
Mirahorit (1496) Korçë, Plumbit (1553-1554) Berat, Muradijes (1570) Vlorë, Nazireshtes 
(1600) Elbasan, Daut Pasha (1605) Prizren and the Ethem Beu (1794) Tiranë. The Mosque 
complex (1820) in Peqin started to integrate the concept of religious services with more 
inclusive facilities for people such as local bazars (in Albanian called pazars) and small artisan 
shops.  
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The Albanian occupation by the Ottomans commenced while the Byzantine Empire 
was falling apart and was fully conquered by the House of Osman on 29 May 1453, after the 
fall of Constantinople. A couple of months later, Sultan Mehmet II – “the Conqueror”, decided 
to expand the Ottoman Empire further into Europe. 388 During the second half of the fifteenth 
century the attack of Europe through Albania never happened, and Albanian resistance under 
Skenderbeg was the main reason for this. However, things changed after the death of 
Skenderbeg and the power rise of Sultan Süleyman I at the beginning of the sixteenth century. 
Due to logistic issues and the difficulties of consolidating a large force, which was far from the 
major centres of Ottoman power, in 1529, the Ottomans failed to conquer Vienna. As a result 
of this failure, the Sultan decided to place more attention to Albania, from where the Ottomans 
launched a direct attack to Southern Italy in 1537, expecting a promised French attack in the 
north, with the objective of a combined conquest of Italy.389 But Yapp and Shaw argue that 
France withheld the diversion, fearing a hostile European reaction to its alliance.390 
In line with these attacks, the objective of the Porte was to build a permanent military 
structure in Albanian lands. Despite arguments about the ambiguous role of France to support 
the Ottomans, scholars agree that the political aim of the Sultan was to expand the Ottoman 
Empire to the West.391 Barleti is convinced that “the key of conquering Rome” was to firstly 
take Epirus, as the only way for the Sultan to achieve his goal.392 The geographic proximity of 
Albania and Italy explains the Sultan’s decision of building permanent military structures in 
Albanian lands. Some examples were the sophisticated castle of Vlorë that was built by Sultan 
Süleyman in 1531; the castles of Ishmi (Durrës), which was built in 1574; the castles of 
Tepelenë, Gjirokastër, Butrint and later, fortification walls in the castles of Janine, Preveze, 
Sul, Arte and Porto-Palermo. Military fortifications were followed by some small bridges such 
as the Prizren, Miraka (Librazhd), Tanners and the Kollorcës (near Gjirokastër), which were 
merely constructed to connect military fortifications.  
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4.6 Albanian political stability under the Ottoman rule 
 
Given the divisions among Albanians, it could be argued that the Porte offered more political 
stability to Albanian lands. However, it is important to remember the Porte controlled access 
to resources. This included the political power of Albanian notables such as Ali Pashë Tepelena 
of Janinë and Kara Mahmud Pasha at Shkodër, who both became more aggressive in their 
attempts to secure wealth and power in the period from 1770-1790. The rivalry between 
Albanian notables “caused rising impoverishment and misery in both town and country”.393 
Their increased wealth and power became critical for the Porte, as these pashas started to revolt 
against the Porte at the beginning of the nineteenth century. As Anscombe describes these 
developments, they “shook to its foundations Istanbul’s structure of provincial authority”394, 
and forced the Porte to take quick actions in order to repair the damage.395 By that time, 
Albanian peasants were under the pressure to pay taxes to the Sultan, which was an extremely 
difficult task for people surviving in an environment where even “in the best of times, the 
conditions of life found in regions inhabited primarily by Albanians were tough”.396 The 
Porte’s inaction in combating the banditry the Balkans had been exposed to since the end of 
the eighteenth century, caused profound destruction of commerce and “changes in the urban 
and rural economy”.397 It can be argued that physical distance contributed to the Ottoman’s 
inability to adequately address the issue of lawlessness and security in Albanian mountains, let 
alone larger issues such as order and prosperity of the entire area.398 Thus, I argue that during 
the period of occupation, there were many times when order and stability were challenged. The 
period of Skenderbeg in the fifteenth century, the time of Ali Pasha’s rule at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century, and the rilindja period at the end of nineteenth and the beginning of the 
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twentieth century, are some clear examples that show the paradox of the Ottoman rule in 
Albania: Not only did the Porte fail to restore political stability in the Albanian speaking lands, 
Albanians, while serving the Porte, at times also challenged its rule.   
 
4.7 The Ottoman’s political aim to halt Albanian nationalism and creation of an 
‘Albanian nation’ 
 
The Albanians were struggling to be recognized as a different ethnicity not only from Great 
Powers and their neighbors: The Porte did everything to halt Albanian’s secession from the 
Ottoman territories, which at the end of the nineteenth century become eminent. On 1 July 
1878, Albanian chieftains representing four vilayets of Kosovo, Janina, Shkodër and Manastir 
convened the “League for the Defense of Rights of the Albanian Nation”399, known as the 
Prizren League. The Prizren League was able to secure support from the Ottomans, as it aimed 
to unite all Albanian territories under the sovereignty of the Sultan ruling and thus, asked for a 
Turkish governor general to rule Albanian speaking territories.400 Originally, all requests of the 
League leaders were in line with the Porte. However, leaders of the Prizren League had 
differing opinions regarding whether they should continue to accept the rule of the Sultan in 
the Albanian-speaking lands. The conservative faction under the leadership of Abdyl Frashëri 
(1839-1892) desired autonomy from the Porte. Nevertheless, despite lack of unity between 
Albanians401, the Prizren League carried out Albanian military actions against Serbia and 
Montenegro for nearly three years. In the end, the Sultan refused to grant the League’s requests, 
and the League was brutally crushed by Ottomans in 1881, but not until after realizing its aim 
of secession from the Porte.402 The Prizren League entered Albania’s epic songs403 as a 
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representation of Albania’s diplomatic, political and military resistance. This also marked the 
start of the consolidation of Albanian nationalism, raising the question of an Albanian nation-
state. Therefore, as Morgan has identified, “the seeds of Albanian political nationalism had 
been sown”.404  
On 4 July 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), one of the main factions 
of the Young Turk forces, openly challenged the Sultan and demanded the restitution of the 
1876 constitution; the establishment of a parliamentary system which was to be generated as a 
result of free elections, and the change of the state structure in order to guarantee more ethnic 
unity “irrespective of nationality or religion”.405 On 24 July 1908 the Sultan, Abdul Hamid 
capitulated and announced the restoration of a new constitution. As Pearson discuses, Albanian 
leaders who represented Albanian speaking lands during the Parliamentary session in 
December 1908 sided against the Sultan and supported the Young Turks, who promised 
democratic parliamentary reforms which would deliver “religious freedom, free education, 
freedom of the press, freedom of speech and assembly”.406 However, the only reform realized 
was the freedom of the press.407 According to Psilos, disappointed by the Young Turks and 
conscious of the risk their neighbors professed, Albanians started to unify their anti-Turkish 
movement, which in 1909, sparked on different fronts.408 The reaction of the Porte was 
immediate. In April 1910 General Turgut Pasha led a new military campaign against the 
Albanians, aiming to restore order, collect overdue taxes, and disarm the Albanian tribes to 
stop them from generating more trouble. The Ottoman anti-Albanian campaign reached its 
peak in the summer of 1910 when martial law was proclaimed, Albanian political leaders such 
as Feim Bey Zavalani and Bekir Suleiman Effendi were killed, and many others forced into 
exile. The Ottoman campaign that aimed to “denationalise the south” and “destroy northern 
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Albania” came to an end in October 1910, leaving Albania in total “devastation and 
anarchy”.409 It is important to note that while Albania had been crushed by the Ottoman 
campaign, the country had not been united by this defeat. Glenny Misha points out the Albanian 
tribal fragmentations; divisions between gegs and tosks in culture and language, and their lack 
of an independent church, was further “exacerbated by the divide-and-rule policy of the late 
Ottoman sultans and the Young Turks”.410  
However, from this point onwards, the Albanian uprising started to consolidate and 
intensify. As discussed by Pearson, on 23 June 1911, from the assembly of Greçë in 
Montenegro, the leaders of the Albanian uprising wrote to the Turkish Cabinet; demanding 
“territorial and administrative autonomy for all areas inhabited by Albanians, before they 
would consider a cease-fire”.411 On 3 July 1911, the Sultan signed a decree of amnesty but the 
Albanian insurgents refused to return home.412 The Albanian Malissori chieftains, Bajram 
Curri, Hasan Prishtina, Riza Gjakova, Idriz Seferi and Isa Boletini united approximately 30,000 
Albanian troops for another year. On 9 August 1912, the insurgents of northern Albania sent a 
memorandum to the Sultan with fourteen demands, similar to that of Greçë.413 Other Albanian 
leaders increased pressure from the South and captured the towns of Durrës, Krujë and 
Peshkopi in the vilayet414 of Shkodër, and Fier and Përmet in the vilayet of Janina. Pearson 
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argues that this increasing pressure forced the Sultan to cede to some Albanian demands, 
although he still refused to grant autonomy to Albania.415 
Albanian nationalism, which was transformed in armed resistance was now becoming 
a serious challenge for both the Porte and Balkan nationalism, who according to Pearson, 
attempted to hijack the Albanian resistance. An example was the Albanian uprising of North 
Albania and Kosovo that in autumn 1912, was instigated by “a Serbian terrorist 
organisation”—the Black Hand Society. Its leader Dragutin Dimitrijevic encouraged Isa 
Boletini and his Kosovar Albanian followers in their revolt against the Turks; promising them 
help.416 Some Albanians realised the danger of separation from the Turks, but by then it was 
too late:  
 
Far from fulfilling their promises to help the Albanians to liberty, the Serbian and Montenegrin 
armies fell upon them. The Albanians were trapped and unable to obtain ammunition from 
either side; the Serbs and Montenegrins massacred them wholesale.417 
 
This massacre led to a perception among Albanians that the Ottomans had failed to 
protect “the interest of their still subject Albanian Muslims”.418 It also furthered the anxiety 
created by the Balkan League agreement419 which the Albanian leaders interpreted to be not 
only anti Turkish, but also anti-Albanian. As Pearson points out: 
 
…none of the other Balkan States wished to see an independent Albania, but rather envisaged 
the partition of Albania between them. Thus, they hastened to precipitate war with Turkey, the 
purpose of which was the annexation of Albanian-inhabited territories that were under Turkish 
rule.”420   
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Albanian nationalism was confused and scared to detach itself from the Porte. Sensing 
a Turkish withdrawal421 and knowing the aim of the Balkan League, without any support from 
the Great Powers, Albanians were left with little choice. They were forced “to fight for the 
Turks against their Balkan neighbors”.422  
The first Balkan War broke out on 8 October 1912, and the danger for the Albanian 
controlled lands was imminent. The following month, on 28 November 1912, Ismail Qemali 
declared Albanian independence, which formally ended the Ottoman occupation of Albanian 
territories. This meant that “469 years to the day after the return of Skenderbeg into his capital 
at Krujë, and for the first time since 1468 their [Albanian] country was free from Turkish 
rule”.423 While exhausted Turkish troops gradually started to retire from Albanian vilayets to 
mark the end of the Ottoman era in Albania, anxiety among Albanian leaders increased, as 
Albania’s neighbours were already making moves to fill the vacuum left by the Ottomans. As 
Jelavich points out:   
 
Certainly, Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia showed not the slightest hesitation or 
moral qualm in planning the partition of Albanian lands.424 
 
Furthermore, Albania found itself in the middle of competing powers.  For Skendi, 
Austro-Hungary and Italy were competing for more influence in the northwest and Adriatic425, 
while Edith Durham in 1919, mentions that Austria/Hungary and Russia were deeply opposed 
to an Albanian nation-state and would sacrifice the formation of an Albanian state in favour of 
their allies’ interests in the Balkans.426  
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4.8 Albanian language and the written word within the Ottoman Empire 
 
The enforced language of the Empire— “Osmanlica”, was used for administrative purposes. It 
was incomprehensible to the majority of Turks427, and even more to the Albanians who were 
required to learn and use this foreign language, very different from their own. Trained teachers 
and religious clerics taught the Turkish language in state schools and metjepes in order to offer 
an education that was based on Islam. The aim of the State was to impose Islam as a holistic 
theory and practice through Turkish language. Indeed, the Turkish language introduced 
knowledge, skills, Turkish culture and religion into Albania. 
While the official language for all Ottoman conquered lands was Turkish, the Greeks 
and Serbs were permitted to use their own written and spoken language. However, this was not 
the case for Albanians. As Albanians were considered either Turks or Orthodox millet, the 
official language in all spheres of the Albanian speaking lands was Turkish and Greek. This 
rule extended to all schools and religious rituals. The Albanian language was only permitted to 
be spoken. The Ottomans “did not allow native Albanian schools, nor reading and writing of 
Albanian”428 until 1880, a time when Albanian nationalism, and with it the demand for the use 
of the Albanian language started to increase. Until the mid-nineteenth century, The Porte did 
not have a policy with regards to education in Albania, and policies of the Ottoman Empire 
prevented Albanian speakers from developing their independent language system.429 
Nevertheless, the Albanian spoken language, used in Albanian folklore, songs and epics 
survived across generations to provide what Smith considers the basis for the creation of a 
nation.  
The rise of nationalism after the Prizren League was immediate, and in 1879, the 
Society of the Printing of Albanian Writings was founded in Constantinople. The main goal of 
this society “was to establish a[n Albanian] standard language which would lead to the 
publication of books, journals, and newspapers…”430 From 14 to 22 November 1908, under 
the presidency of the son of Abdyl Frashëri, Mit’hat Bey Frashëri, the Congress of Monastir 
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(Bitola) not only worked on a standardisation of the Albanian language, its alphabet and 
orthography, but also appointed the committee of a national union that aimed for “an 
autonomous Albania within the Turkish empire, which was to include the four vilayets of 
Shkodër, Kosovë, Monastir and Janina”.431 Despite some Albanian Muslim leaders of the 
North who, inspired by the Young Turks, preferred the scripts of the Koran, the Bitola Congress 
decided to use the Latin alphabet to transliterate the Albanian language.  
The role of language in nation building processes is well known.432 Wright discusses 
language as a vehicle of unification analysing the French case. At the beginning of the fifteenth 
century, French people adopted a Vulgar Latin and Roman Gaul type of oral language. The 
expansion of the Kingdom also introduced the German, Dutch, Catalan and Italian languages, 
however, the decision to introduce French as the official language in 1539, created a linguistic 
homogeneity, and also reinforced the French national identity.433 As Wright puts it, “when a 
culture production is language-bound it serves to reinforce the homogeneity of the group and 
mark difference”. 434  
It has often been argued that until the mid-nineteenth century, Albanian speaking 
people could not unite on an ethnic, religious or any other type of platform. The Albanian 
language— “very distinct from the languages of its direct (Slav and Greek) neighbours—was 
the only element that could bridge the differences between religious and regional identities”.435 
Therefore, despite differences in syntax, lexicon, phonology and morphology between geg and 
tosk dialects436, the Albanian language was the main pillar of the ‘bridge’ that united Albanians. 
The translation of the bible by Kostandin Kristoforidhi (1827-1895), in a hybrid of Albanian 
language that represented both geg and tosk dialects was an indication of the possibility for 
Albanians to unite using a collective language. As Misha discusses, the Albanians “were united 
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only by the disaster threatened by the slow collapse of the Ottoman Empire and by their 
language – Albanian”.437 Thus, the Albanian language became an essential vehicle to unite 
Albanian identity.  
In line with this claim, this study argues that the Albanian speaking community was 
united by a ‘language bond’ that was unique and different from the Ottoman language, a fact 
the Porte feared. As a result of this, on 23 July 1909, the Young Turks organised the congress 
of Dibër with two objectives: to gather Albanian support instead of separatism, and to force 
writing the Albanian language using the Arabic alphabet. Despite their inferior position 
compared to the Porte, Albanians “gained complete control of the proceedings”; reversing both 
requests to their favour. The Dibër congress agreed, “…the Albanian language should be taught 
freely”438 in a Latin alphabet. However, The Porte did not give up and on 19 February 1910, 
Young Turks organised another congress in Monastir, pressuring Albanian hoxhas to reverse 
the decision to use the Latin alphabet and replace it with the Arabic alphabet, in line with “the 
religious law and the interests of Islam”.439 The support of mullahs440, who were trained in law 
and theology using the Arabic characters, caused resentment in schools around Albania. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that not all Albanian hoxhas supported the Arabic alphabet. 
An example was the Moslem hoxha, Hafiz Ali, who on the same day that the mullahs opposed 
the Latin alphabet, recited a prayer and blessed a crowd of 15,000 people at Korçë; agreeing 
with protesters that the Albanian letters in Latin “should be retained and that the question of 
the alphabet had no connection with religion”.441  
The second congress of Monastir (21-23 March 1910) established endorsement of the 
Latin alphabet as easier to use, as all Catholic schools were teaching in Latin. After a letter 
from the Supreme Moslem authority of Albania on 22 March 1910, demanding the use of the 
Arabic alphabet, the Turkish Ministry of Education tried to prevent the implementation of the 
Latin alphabet.442 As stated by a Grand Vezir in March 1910: “The government must do 
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everything, and will do everything, to prevent the adoption of the Latin alphabet”443 in Albania. 
This is a clear sign of the importance the Ottomans placed on the suppression of the Albanian 
language. The Albanian language was the strongest element to unite all Albanians, despite 
religious differences.444 
 
4.9 Albanian language trapped between the objectives of the State and Orthodox schools 
 
The Albanian language was trapped by political aims of the Porte and Patriarchate. While the 
Ottoman schools through the Turkish language taught Islam, the Orthodox schools in Albania 
used the Greek language as a vehicle “of Helenization”.445 The establishment of secular 
Albanian schools were opposed by both the Ottoman government and the Patriarchate.446 The 
Ottomans feared the autonomy of the Albanian people, whereas the Patriarchate, in response 
to the issue with the Bulgarian Exarchate447, feared the same separation within the Albanian 
Orthodox Church.448 These attacks on the use of the Albanian language confirms how central 
the language was considered to be for the unification of Albanians. At the end of the nineteenth 
century, the sharp rise of Albanian nationalism enabled the establishment of Albanian schools 
in the pashalik of Janina and thus, an opportunity for perpetuation of the Albanian language 
arose. Due to this pressure, the first Albanian school for boys—Mësonjëtoria opened after long 
negotiations with the State on 7 March 1887 at Korçë, followed by a school for girls four years 
later. However, Albanian schools were immediately attacked by both the State and the 
Patriarchate. The Greek Orthodox Church “excommunicated” students who attended the new 
schools. The Ottoman government went one step further in trying to eliminate Albanian 
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education by deciding in 1902, to ban all books written in Albanian, and disallowing any form 
of communication in the Albanian language.449 Any attempt to learn the Albanian language 
was completely suppressed by the State. However, the more the Ottomans applied pressure to 
suppress the Albanian language, the more Albanians defied the State and learned their language 
secretly in bektashi teqes in the Centre and the South, or churches in the North. As part of the 
campaign against the Albanian language, both Ottomans and Greek persecuted Albanian 
teachers. Albanian Awakening, rilindja, leaders such as Papa Kristo Negovani – a priest who 
taught Albanian in his church – and Pandeli Sotiri, who although he graduated in Greece, 
contributed to the propagation of the Albanian language, were both killed by the Orthodox 
Church as they defied both the Porte and the Greek Patriarchate. Other Albanian language 
teachers suffered the same fate: Petro Nini Luarasi, Gjerasim Qiriazi, Baba Duda Karbunara, 
Hamdi Ohri, Siad Hoxha, Balil Tahiri and Sotir Ollani were killed or at best sent to exile by 
the State and the Rum church.450 
The situation in North Albania was quite different. As state schools in the North were 
almost non-existent, Catholic Albanians were studying in Austrian and Italian schools which, 
at the time, were more popular than state schools. In contrast to the Muslim and Orthodox 
schools, the curriculum in Catholic schools was delivered in the Albanian language.451 The 
Italian schools appeared to be more professional and better equipped supported by both the 
Italian government and the Vatican. However, the Austrians soon started to compete with the 
Italian schools, which were spreading from the North to the Centre of Albania. As became 
apparent over time, both Habsburg and Italian schools had political and religious aims, which 
were similar to those of the Ottomans and Greeks. According to Blumi, the two Catholic 
nations, Italy and Austria, used education as a tool to strengthen their influence in Albania, and 
thus, advance their main aim of counteracting Slavic influences in the region.452  
The State recognised the importance of the Albanian language and attempted to destroy 
it. By 1909, the Young Turks became alarmed at the nationalistic spirit of the Albanians and 
began systematic persecution. They suspended the constitutional guarantees, shut down 
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Albanian schools and clubs, and suppressed newspapers and magazines. Many Albanian 
leaders fled the country or were imprisoned.453 On 2 September 1909, despite consistent 
attempts by the Young Turks to prevent it, the Albanian leaders organised the Elbasan 
Congress to discuss the education system. The Congress adopted Monastir’s findings that 
embraced writing of the Albanian language in Latin characters and teaching it in all Albanian 
schools; identifying an immediate need to train Albanian teachers. Based on the last 
recommendation, on 1 December 1909, a training college – the Elbasan College – opened. 
Luigj Gurakuqi was appointed Principal and the rest of the teachers and children were Muslims 
and Christians.454 However, preparation of Albanian teachers started prior to the establishment 
of Elbasan College, when Kostandin Kristoforidhi secretly trained future teachers at Elbasan 
and Voskopojë. While the Albanian language survived the assimilation attempt of the Ottoman 
rulers, the Ottoman religion, Islam, was widespread in Albania.  
 
4.10 The Ottoman-Islamic polity: Conversions to Islam 
 
Since the eleventh century, sedentary Turks started to replace nomadic Seljuks—a trend that 
continued until the nineteenth century.455 Therefore, tribal chieftains, the highest level of a 
formal Turkish society, were slowly converting to “rulers of non-nomadic states”.456 The 
Ottoman-Islamic polity was built on the Turkish-nomadic-pastoralism culture to that of ‘jihad 
against Christians’, in an attempt to establish elements of Islamic culture in every aspect of life 
such as agriculture, education, arts, crafts, religion, commerce, which in short, would 
contribute to the entertainment, peace and security for the House of Osman.457 The Islamic 
religion element became a strong pillar for the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottomans believed in Prophet Muhammad and preached a monotheist religion that 
included elements of Jewish, Christian, traditional Arabic and some additional Turkish 
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customs.458  The Ottoman society, according to Misha, was divided in two classes: reaya459 
and askeri460 and those monotheists who acknowledged Islam as fundamental and were happy 
to live in a Muslim state under the Ottoman rule were considered as zimmi (protected people). 
For Ottomans, the Islamic element played an important role in the Balkans, as Muslim people, 
regardless of their ethnic background, enjoyed the same privileges within the Empire. In the 
case of Albania where the Albanian language was prohibited by the Porte, Albanians were 
forced to become Turks, or be assimilated in Greeks. 
It is often argued that Albanians started to convert to Islam, as it was easier for them to 
live as Muslims rather than Christians within the Ottoman Empire. There was certainly great 
economic, political and psychological pressure, to convert. Under Ottoman legislation, life was 
hard for Christian Albanians, as they did not enjoy the same rights as their Muslim compatriots. 
In short, Doja argues, due to “a cultural situation severely affected by the brutal and harrowing 
intrusion of ideological, political and foreign domination”461, Albanians did not have much of 
a choice.   
The State imposed policies of Sunni Islam that were based on the sharia law, which 
privileged Muslims and, disadvantaged Christians. For example, as Misha discuses, if a 
Muslim physically injured a Christian, it was enough for the former to pay a ‘blood tax’ to the 
kadi462 in order to avoid Court hearing.463 Not only this was not possible for Christians, they 
could not serve in the high ranks of military, or in bureaucracy and diplomacy (which were 
highly paid jobs), nor were they rewarded by the Sultan with more çifliks, rather they were 
forced to pay a big haraç464 to the Sultan. Christians were also required periodically to provide 
one healthy male child to be converted to Islam and trained either for the Ottoman 
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administration or the elite military corps of Janissaries, known as devşirme.465 Under devşirme 
policy, the Sultan selected children from its vasal provinces and brought them to Istanbul 
through this unique Ottoman invention system.466 Many young boys from Albanian Christian 
families (including Skenderbeg) became great fighters of the Sultan's elite guard—the 
Janissary (jeniçeri) corps, peopled by soldiers of non-Turkish origin; others served as 
bureaucrats in the high ranks of Porte. This system not only caused emotional but also 
economic hardship to Albanian families; losing healthy young males who might have grown 
to contribute to their families and community. As Sugar emphasises: 
 
the disadvantages in human, ethnological, and economic terms were overwhelming and, in 
balance, far more important than beneficial aspects of the devşirme system…It is also the most 
prevalent example of forced conversion in the years predating the seventeenth century.467 
 
The devşirme system was invented by the Sultan to serve his own ends, and it generated 
hate and resentment in Christian Albanians, especially in the North. Skenderbeg’s example 
who reconverted to Christianity upon his return to Albania, was mythicised and functioned as 
a unifying legend for Albanians detesting the Turkish State. Ultimately, Albanian non-Muslims 
were subject to heavier taxes, devşirme, lack of educational opportunities and socio-economic 
status. It is difficult to misjudge the pressure on them to convert to Islam. 
It has also been argued that mass conversion of Albanians increased in the seventeenth 
century, a time when the Russo-Ottoman wars began to generate more economic difficulties 
for the Porte. Therefore, in the mid eighteenth century, the State started to collect more money 
from all non-Muslim subjects; increasing levy taxes, “while those converted to Islam had their 
taxes lowered and were given grants of land”.468 The Christian Albanians lacked these 
opportunities, and were expected to work-menial jobs, while the Albanian Muslims had 
prospects to serve in senior administrative positions, as according to Vicker and Pettifer, they 
were considered allies of the Porte that “protected them from the Slavonic and the Greek 
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encroachment”.469 For this reason, these scholars argue that Kosovars accepted Islam faster 
“perhaps to resist the pressure of their close proximity, the Serbs, who in 1830, achieved their 
own autonomous state.470 Moreover, Anscombe discuses, at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century in Southeast Albania the threat of a total assimilation by the ‘Hellenisation’ idea was 
increasing, after the success of Greek independence, and the brutal suppression of the Albanian 
revolts of Ali Pashë Tepelena in the South and Kara Mahmud Pasha in North.471 Therefore, it 
seems that Albanian-speaking populations did not have much choice, but rather were forced to 
side with the lesser of two evils—protecting their lands from a total annexation by their 
neighbours. On the other hand, the Ottomans were happy to achieve their long-term goal of 
planting Islam in Albanian lands. 
Albanians of both North and the South were converting to Islam in substantial numbers 
in a process that was difficult to be predict when and where it happened. The conversion could 
have happened at any time, but Sugar believes that the conversion of Albanians is “…a 
seventeenth century phenomenon”472; hence, he thinks, earlier conversions must have been 
voluntary. It is also known that Islam could not penetrate parts of the Albanian mountains such 
as the case of Mirditë and other small towns in the North where the mountainous terrain made 
access for the state difficult. Inhabitants of these remote parts of Albania continued to live as 
Christians and were less affected by conversions.  
 
4.11 The ‘soft’ policy of conversions—Albania’s Bektashism  
 
The issue of massive conversion of Albanians is highly debated and scholars have listed forced 
and voluntary as two ways of conversions.473 Sugar agrees with Vryonis on the four major 
reasons for massive conversion474 of Albanians, namely “economic and legal advantages, the 
                                                 
469 Ibid. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Anscombe argues that Albanian revolts of Kara Mahmud Pasha in north and Ali Pasha in south Albania 
directly affected the position of the state  but also the Albanian, Greek and Serbian affairs. See Anscombe, 87-
114. 
472 Sugar, 52. 
473 See for instance ibid.; Vryonis.  
474 Doja, 430. 
 108 
influence of medreses and other Muslim institutions, fear, and the adaptability of folk 
religion”.475 While the first three can be considered as forced conversion, Sugar considers the 
last reason as more important than others. In fact, the new Bektashism can be considered as a 
‘soft’ system of conversion carried out by the Bektashi dervish brotherhood order and 
supported by medreses and tekkes476. Along with Sunni, Bektashi served as a complementary 
religious system to achieve the aim of the Sultan—diffusion of Islam, and thus, the assimilation 
of Albanians into Turkish culture and society. 
Sunni Islam was very rigid477 compared to Bektashism—a more tolerant ‘kind’ of Islam 
that, Hall thinks, in Albania was introduced by jeniçeri in the fifteenth century.478 It is widely 
agreed that Bektashism originated in Iran and that its theoretical foundations are a mix of 
doctrines and practices such as “Shiism and Sufism but also preserving pre-Islamic and non-
Islamic beliefs and customs originating in Christianity and antique religions as well as ancient 
Turkic elements”.479 Therefore, this moderate Bektashism480 drew on a long tradition of Sufism 
including elements of Christianity.481  Although both Bektashism and Sunni were based in 
Islam, the tolerant Bektashism was more attractive and thus, was more accepted by Christian 
Albanians. 
Since the fifteenth century, the State supported the mission of the Bektashi dervish 
order, which was supposed to be faster than Sunni in converting Christian Albanians to Islam. 
Dervishes travelled to remote Albanian villages, where they dealt with daily domestic issues 
and engaged in a ‘door to door’ conversation. At the end of the sixteenth century, the Bektashi 
dervish brotherhood expanded into central and southern Albania, where large numbers of 
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tekkes and tyrbes482 were established. Inside tekkes, the highest leaders—the dervishi babas 
were propagating a kind of more inclusive Islamic folk religion that was based on their code—
the terikat. 483 For Albanians it was easier to adapt to this folk religion compared to the strict 
rules of the Sunni Islam and Christianity. Bektashism was not only more tolerant than Sunni 
Islam, but also had similarities with Christian Orthodox and Catholic rituals. For example, it 
was believed that a mekam484 had miraculous powers at a point that people were praying and 
seeking help upon the name of buried baba. This was similar to pilgrimage sacred places for 
both Christians and Muslims such as Lourdes and Mekka. As a result, this kind of inclusive 
religion was simpler and more attractive to Albanians, considering that prior to the Ottoman 
invasion Albanians practiced both Catholic and Orthodox religions.  
However, the State changed its position towards the Bektashi brotherhood at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the jeniçeri openly challenged the power of Sultan 
Mahmud II, who decided in return to reform the elite troops following a Western-French style. 
For Kressing, the Sultan’s decision to supress Janissaries in 1826 initiated a profound 
retaliation against Bektashi and forced them to move to the margins of the Empire.485 From 
this moment onwards, the new cast of Sunni Ottomans persecuted both Janissaries and 
Bektashi. This was a time when Albanians, especially in the South, had largely embraced 
Bektashism, and as a result could not escape the Sultan’s retaliation campaign that started after 
the defeat of the controversial Albanian Ali Pasha in 1822. After his successful campaign 
against the Russians, the Sultan rewarded Ali Pasha with the vilayet of Janina, which comprised 
the Northern part of today’s Greece. Ali Pasha converted to Bektashism and used his power to 
facilitate the unobstructed growth of the Bektashi order, which in South-Albania, became 
influential under his rule.486 The revenge campaign of the Sublime Porte continued to blame 
the Albanian Bektashi for engineering the Albanian uprising that, by the middle of the 
nineteenth century, according to Norris, a specialist on Albanian Sufism, had become well-
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known and was identified with an emerging Albanian identity.487 Along with rising 
nationalism, Bektashi was becoming very popular in Albania. After the Prizren League (1878-
81) it was considered a symbol of resistance against oppressors. Norris describes the effects of 
the Albanian Bektashi in the late Ottoman Empire as follows:  
 
the Sufism of Albania, equally popular amongst the masses and in its intellectual appeal to the 
poets…was compelling and was grafted into local nationalistic aspirations, as in the case in the 
poetry of the poet, Naim Frasheri, and in the compositions of many poets in Kosovo488 
 
Naim Frashëri (1846-1900), one of the main figures of the Albanian Bektashism, played a 
crucial role in the process of Awakening, known as the rilindja period—a nationalistic 
movement that nurtured the idea of a unified Albania. Hence, Albanian Bektashism needs to 
be understood in the context of rising nationalism. The romanticism of Naim Frashëri’s writing 
also had nationalistic undertones. In his book Histori e Skenderbeut [History of Skenderbeg], 
Frashëri mythicised Skenderbeg as an Albanian hero, downplaying his triple religious life. 
Skenderbeg was also portrayed as an innocent Christian child, who was forced by Turks to 
learn and practice the Muslim religion. Frashëri describes the Ottoman Empire as “a big beast” 
that came from Asia and with “cruelty in eyes” and “a satanic heart”, “killed, severed and 
impoverished” in a way that “grass wouldn’t grow” wherever the beast stepped in the 
“flourishing” Albanian soil.489 On the other hand, in line with his nationalistic ideas, Frashëri 
propagated the Bektashi ‘religion’. In 1896, he published the Fletore e Bektashinjet [Bektashi 
notebook], a theological novel that identified “practical principles of Bektashism and the 
organizational rules governing its functioning”.490 In this attempt, he promoted the Bektashi 
religion, which he considered a better vehicle than other religions to unite Albanians; 
describing it as a “sort of religious-cum-nationalist tract”.491 Therefore, Bektashism and 
nationalism were both embodied in Frashëri’s writings. However, it was not his priority to 
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replace the Albanian religious spectrum with Bektashism, but rather to “propagate religious 
tolerance”492, or better, craft a unique Albanian religion that was based on elements of Islam 
and Christianity. This is the way his brother Sami Frashëri is appealing to Albanians in his 
book:  
 
Do not turn to religions and beliefs. Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox - they are all Albanians 
wherever they are, and they are all brothers. They must all unite under the sacred flag of 
Albania.493  
 
Therefore, the concept of this ‘Albanian particularism’, which was not based on 
religious creed, but rather on the ‘ethno-linguistic’ concept of Albania is overlooked by 
scholars. Some Bektashi leaders494 and scholars claim that Bektashism played an important 
role not only in influencing Albanian nationalism495, but also in constructing the Albanian 
nation.496 Others such as Abazi and Doja dispute this claim; considering rather the dynamic 
role of nationalism in the rise of Bektashism in Albania.497 In paraphrasing Clayer, Abazi and 
Doja argue that Bektashi activity in Albania started to increase after the League of Prizren in 
1878, a time that Bektashi came to be at the centre of nationalist propaganda, to then reach its 
peak in 1907-08, when many tekkes became places of refuge for Albanian “armed nationalist 
bandits”.498 In 1908, once the short alliance with the Young Turks was over, many Albanian 
Bektashi leaders, babas and their tekkes, embraced Albanian nationalistic ideas in their entirety 
and sided with the platform of an independent Albania. Since then, the role of Bektashism in 
                                                 
492 Duijzings, "Religion and the politics of 'Albanianism': Naim Frasheri's bektashi writings", in Albanian 
Identities: Myth and History, 68. 
493 Frashëri. Cited in Licursi, 86. 
494 Ali Turabiu, Historia e pergjithshme e Bektashinjvet [General history of the Bektashis] Tirana: 1929; Baba 
Rexhebi, Misticizma Islame dhe Bektashizma [Islamic mysticism and Bektashism]. New York: Waldon Press, 
1970. 
495 John Norton, "The Bektashi in the Balkans", in Religious Quest and National Identity in the Balkans, ed. C. 
Hawkesworth, M. Heppell, and H.T. Norris, New York: Palgrave, 2001, 168-200; Kressing, in Albania, A 
Country in Transition: Aspects of Changing Identities in a South-East European Country, 65-91. 
496 Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, 157-75. 
497 Abazi and Doja, 862. 
498 Ibid., 874. 
 112 
Albania has increased, with the exception of the communist period. Therefore, the August 2017 
participation of the Albanian President, Ilir Meta, in the annual five days Bektashi rituals at 
Tomorri mountain, where the tomb of Baba Tomorri is situated, did not come as a surprise. In 
his speech Meta echoed Bektashi religion and reciting Vasa’s poem, ‘The Albanian faith is 
Albanianism’, he stated that “Bektashi faith and Albania are the same body”.499 Although 
Meta’s aim might not have been that of placing Bektashism above other religions, it is noted 
that Bektashi is one of ‘ingredients’ of Albanian identity formation. Nevertheless, going back 
to the impact of religion on nationalism that scholars such as Weber, Hastings, Smith, Kapferer 
and Juergensmeyer all support, analyses of Bektashism in Albania ascertain also the opposite: 
rilindja nationalist movement influenced Bektashi fraction, turning it in a filo-nationalistic 
movement.  
 
4.12 Conclusion 
 
This chapter discusses how the Ottoman rule affected Albanian-speaking lands from their 
arrival, in 1385, until the declaration of the Albanian Independence in 1912. The chapter 
establishes that the impact of the Ottoman rule and its legacy in the Albanians-speaking lands 
in areas such as social organization, infrastructure, written language, the system of education 
and religion is uncontestable. The Ottoman culture added an extra layer to the Albanian culture, 
(as did the Roman and the Byzantine cultures).   
The Porte organised the Albanian society in millets—a religious affiliation but failed 
(as it did in the rest of the Empire) to recognise Albanians as a different ethnicity. Since the 
sixteenth century, the Ottomans introduced the timar system, which brought about more 
poverty and inequality. In the mid nineteenth century, tanzimat reforms replaced the timar 
system, but did not change the desperate situation of the Albanian peasants and where the Porte 
focused solely on collecting taxes. Little was given back to the Albanian people. The 
infrastructure investments were exclusively military and religiously driven following Sultan’s 
aim to build in Albanian speaking lands a permanent structure and assimilate all Albanians in 
Islamic-Turks. As a result, Albanian speaking lands were transformed demographically, 
environmentally and socially. Peasants had to compete with each other to secure more land—
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their only hope to pay taxes, and thus, survive. Different uprisings of the Albanian speaking 
people are demonstrations that the Porte failed to bring full political stability to Albanian lands. 
Therefore, the Ottomans had little interest in the existing social structures in Albanian speaking 
lands and enforced their own system, which served Sultan’s political ends of building in 
Albania a society that was permanently based on religious structure—Islam.   
The chapter discussed also how the Albanian language and its writing system as the 
main vehicle kept the idea of an Albanian identity intact. The Albanian language united all 
Albanians, despite religious differences. Knowing this importance, unlike other Balkan states, 
both the State and the Orthodox Patriarchate suppressed the Albanian language. However, the 
Albanian language survived the suppression by both the Ottomans and the Rum Patriarchate 
and acted as ‘glue’ that united Albanians together. 
Also addressed in this chapter were the religious controversies surrounding Albanian 
national identity. Since the Middle Ages, Albanian speaking populations have aligned their 
religion based on the power ruling Albanian lands. The Ottoman occupation period between 
the fourteenth and the twentieth centuries was no exception. During this period, Albanians 
converted to Islam as a result of what scholars’ call forced and voluntary actions. The Ottoman 
policies disadvantaged Christian Albanians, while creating more opportunities for Muslims. 
While the Ottoman Sunni Islam was more distant from the Albanian Christian religion, the new 
‘folk religion’—Bektashi, had closer ties to both Islam, and Christianity, and thus, played a 
major role in conversion. Therefore, the case of Albania shows that religion and nationalism 
were interrelated, but it is hard to believe Bektashi, and indeed other religions, affected 
nationalism, and not the other way around. 
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CHAPTER 5. IMAGINING ALBANIAN IDENTITY  
 
5.1 Turkey and Greater Albania: between myth and veracity 
5.1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is divided in two parts. The first part of the chapter discusses the theme of ‘Greater 
Albania’, focusing on its causes and how it emerged as a concept. During the eventual collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the nineteenth century, partition of Turkish domains by 
the Great Powers created small and unhappy nation-states in the Balkans. At this time, the 
Albanian nation-state was inexistent, and Albanians were considered Turks. The collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire created conditions for a re-alignment of the Balkan region, and thus, the 
quest for a nation state, or what is often called from the Balkan nationalism: ‘Greater Albania’ 
that has a direct link to the Porte. Albanian identity perception in the work of Kadare, Qosja 
and other Albanian scholars, politicians and media will follow. 
 
5.1.2 Re-emergence of ‘Greater Albania’ in the twenty-first century 
 
The end of the Cold War also marked the beginning of disintegration of the Yugoslavian 
federation. This period coincides with the end of the communist regime in Albania, a time that 
some students from Kosovo crossed Yugoslavian borders to study in Albanian Universities due 
to repressive Serbian rule of Slobodan Milošević. Despite their low economic position, 
Albanians were meeting with other Albanians from Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro that 
were more advanced economically. As Pettifer points out, some critics have analysed this issue 
in a simplistic way, to the point that the re-union of Albanians is equated with the ‘re-birth’ of 
Albanian nationalism. This is now seen as the beginning of a new project – ‘The Greater 
Albania’, with the aim to “extend the boundaries of the current Albanian state”.500 Judah noted 
that many Western observers believe that Greater Albanian nationalism is now replacing 
Greater Serbian nationalism as the biggest threat to stability in the Balkan Peninsula.501 
Nationalism is a common occurrence  on the Balkan Peninsula; however, the projects of 
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Greater Serbia (Nacertanie), Greater Croatia, and Greater Greece (Megali-Idea)—all older 
than ‘Greater Albania’—have ceased, at least for the time being.502 Why then is ‘Greater 
Albania’ still alive? 
Since the independence of Kosovo in 2008, according to Judah, Slav Macedonians have 
always feared that, in the long-term, the “ethnic Albanian goal is secession and union with a 
future independent Kosovo or even a Greater Albania”.503 Therefore, he believes that in 
Kosovo, Macedonia and to some extent in Southern Serbia and Montenegro, there is an active 
“Albanian question”.504 For Albania’s neighbours, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and 
Greece, the anxiety over a ‘Greater Albania’ is mounting.505 Pettifer, on the other hand, 
describes ‘Greater Albania’ issue as a myth that has been created by the European Union to 
obscure an attempt to revive Serbian dominance in the region. However, according to Pettifer, 
the EU overall is losing any leverage they might have had, and in the Balkans the EU is 
essentially seen as pro-Serb.506 For other scholars, as Judah argues “there is considerably less 
to Greater Albanian nationalism than meets the eye”.507 Here it is crucial to understand how 
the concept of Greater Albania originated. 
 
5.1.3 The Ottoman-Albanian territories ready for the taking–Albanian nationalism in 
ascent 
 
In line with stereotypes, Kadare thinks Albanians feel humiliated508 by the European Great 
Powers’ decision to re-draw the Albanian map—a sentiment that originated after the Treaty of 
San Stefano in March 1878. As previously discussed, The Porte while opposing Albanian 
autonomy and independence, was forced to cede its Balkan territory to the emerging states of 
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Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro and Greece. This shift directly affected the Albanian-speaking 
territories, at the time considered as a Turkish domain. Six months later, the Treaty of Berlin 
attempted to resolve the Balkan question by re-drawing the Balkan map. However, the Berlin 
Treaty completely ignored the Albanian question, as it did not exist for Bismarck.509 
It is argued that the project of a ‘Greater Albania’ originated at the Prizren League in 
1878. If one accepts the Prizren League as a reaction to the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano, 
the result would merely be that the Prizren League was founded and manipulated by the 
Ottomans. In reality, the Prizren League initially had Ottoman support and was politically used 
to halt Serbian advancement in Albanian-speaking territories; however, once the Porte realized 
the ambition of the Albanian plan, the Porte crushed the League. Despite the political 
miscalculation of requesting autonomy or independence from the Ottomans, the fact remains 
that the Prizren League produced a petition as an Albanian entity, which included the four 
Albanian-speaking vilayets of Manastir, Kosova, Shkodra and Janina. Thus, the seed of a 
mutual ‘Greater Albania’ was planted during the final stages of the Ottoman Empire. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Albanian nationalism experienced a sharp 
rise that brought about social unrest to four Turkish vilayets. Despite the decline of the Ottoman 
Empire, Albanians felt humiliated as their culture, language and their lands faced extinction. 
Paraphrasing the Albanian linguist Arshi Pipa, Schwandner-Sievers points out the importance 
of the Albanian indigenous culture, the folklore and its unique language, which “became the 
basis of constructing a distinct national identity and pride, and a distinct territorial 
definition”.510  
The Ottoman Empire was still strong enough to oppose the Albanian uprising at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. However, the Porte was powerless to protect the four 
vilayets of Albanian-speaking lands from their partition. As discussed by Psilos, the Ottoman’s 
destructive military campaign in North and South Albania came to an end in October 1910, 
leaving Albania in total “devastation and anarchy”,511  which further aggravated the situation 
through promises by the Young Turks.512 Turkish devastations and divide-and-rule policy 
implemented by the Sultan Abdülhamid II, while catalysing more reaction to the Albanian 
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uprisings, brought about more complications in protecting four vilayets within an Albanian 
entity. On the other hand, Albanian frustrations increased as they were not invited to join the 
Orthodox union of The Balkan League513 in December 1912. Thus, Albanian nationalism found 
itself in direct opposition to all forces in the region: Turks, Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks. 
The only hope that remained was a declaration of independence and the hope to be recognised 
by the Great Powers.  
 
5.1.4 The London Conference – the confirmation of a “little” Albania 
 
The London Conference (also known as the Ambassadors’ ‘meetings’), chaired by the British 
foreign minister Edward Grey, was officially opened on 17 December 1912, and continued for 
more than 6 months. Although it was proposed for the conference to be held in Paris, because 
of the links between France and Russia, Austria argued for it to take place in a neutral location 
to avoid bias in decision making. While the London Conference aimed to resolve territorial 
disputes between the Turks and the Balkan League members, the Albanian status and its 
territorial boundaries became the main topic of the conference. On 30 May 1913, the 
Conference made the important decision to recognise the Albanian state as an individual entity; 
Albania’s autonomy from the Ottomans, however, was only officially recognised at the fifty-
fourth meeting of the Conference of London on 29 July 1913.514 Despite those decisions, the 
Conference also decided that the “boundaries of Albania were to be fixed by the great 
powers”.515 The aim of the Conference was to bring peace to Europe, regardless of the cost to 
any single state. The criteria of re-drawing the ex-Ottoman territories were based on rewarding 
winners at the expense of the Ottoman losers. However, the Conference struggled to provide 
solutions when military advancements overlapped territories of every single Balkan state.  
Although the focus was then shifted on the ethno-linguistic elements, according to Grey, 
reaching a peace agreement was the main goal. As he states, “we could not destroy 
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achievements of the London Conference for some Albanian towns such as Gjakova…”.516 
Thus, Grey admits that the town of Gjakova was an ‘Albanian town’, and while this, again, 
explains the lack of awareness for the Albanian-speaking territories, it also shows unwise 
decisions to leave this and other Albanian-speaking towns out of the Albanian map; 
foreshadowing future dangers.  
The London Conference considered the Russian and Austro-Hungarian proposals. The 
Russian proposal lobbied for Serbian, Montenegrin, Bulgarian and Greek interests at the 
expense of Albanian-speaking territories. Although the Russian proposal map included as part 
of Montenegro Ulqini, Plava and Guzija, cities with a majority of Albanian-speaking 
populations, Russian energy was primarily focused on the Serbian need of securing sea access. 
Thus, the Russian proposal included the plain of Kosova and North Albania down to Durrës in 
the Serbian territories. The Russian strategy was clear: at worst, the port of Shëngjin was to be 
secured for Serbia. The Russian proposal also excluded the Albanian-speaking territories of 
today’s West Macedonia from Albania but did not oppose the Greek claim to include parts of 
today’s Albania such as Korçë, but also Gjirokastër, Sarandë and the south East of the Vjosa 
River including Vlorë. Unlike the Russians, the Austro-Hungarians strongly lobbied for 
Shkodër to remain part of Albania. Their proposal-map of Albania included territories of 
Kosovo and some parts of today’s Western Macedonia, while opposing Greece’s claims for 
Korçë, Gjirokastër, Sarandë and Vlorë. Denying Serbia access to the Adriatic Sea was not only 
focused on impeding Serbia’s economic expansion but would have also confined Russian 
expansion in the Balkans.  
All representatives of recognised Balkan states were invited to the London Conference 
to present their claims, with one exception: Albanians. Upon advice by Austria, Ismail Qemali 
did not want to leave Vlorë due to the fear of a possible uprising or government coup. Pro-
Ottoman elements, unhappy with the Independence proclamation and the first Albanian 
government, were still very active. However, he managed to send an Albanian delegation 
composed of a Muslim, Mehmet Konica, a Catholic, Filip Noga, and Rasim Dino, who 
represented the Chameria (in Albanian Çamëria) region. Under pressure from Austria-
Hungary, Grey allocated only 13 minutes to hear the Albanian case. The Albanian chair of 
delegates, Konica, basically claimed that the Albanian territory should include all parts of 
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Albania shown in the Austro-Hungarian proposal, but also Ulqini, Plava and Guzije in 
Montenegro, and the Chameria region including the costal north part of Epirus, down to 
Preveza. For obvious reasons, i.e. because there were no Albanian military advances into other 
Balkan states, the Albanian representatives were forced to base their claim on ethno-linguistic 
arguments, i.e. that the majority of the population in all four vilayets was comprised of 
Albanians.  
Despite their own interests and competition, the Great Powers had no clear criteria for 
designing the borders; therefore, they used the Albanian speaking territories to satisfy 
Albania’s neighbours.517 In reality, none of the two proposals submitted to the London 
Conference was fully implemented. Hence, the Chameria region was given to Greece, but not 
Korçë, Sarandë, Gjirokastër, Himarë and Vlorë; Kosovo with a population that was 90 percent 
Albanian was attached to Serbia; Plava, Guzia and Ulqini were handed to Montenegro, and the 
East part of Ohrid lake (today’s Western part of FYROM) was attached to the new Serbian 
dominated territory, which in the aftermath of WWI became part of the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia. Thus, the Conference is responsible for redrawing the Balkan map; a map which, 
for Albanians, has remained largely unchanged since then, with the exemption of Kosovo that 
was separated from Serbia in 1999.  
 
5.1.5 The unification into the ‘Natural Albania’  
 
The struggle of unifying Albanian speaking territories continues in the twenty-first century. 
Kosovo is not connected to Albania, however, the project of unification with the ‘mother-land’ 
is supported by the Kosovar political Party Lëvizja Vetëvendosje [Self-determination 
Movement], which was founded in 2004. This party fundamentally supports the idea of 
people’s self-determination; opposing foreign involvement in internal affairs of Kosovo. The 
Vetëvendosje statute declares that Kosovar people must have “the right to unite with 
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Albania”.518 Although this mission unleashes the Albanian aspiration for a “Greater Albania”, 
its implementation seems impossible without involvement of the current major international 
actors, as Kosovo is not yet recognised by five EU members: Greece, Spain, Romania, Slovakia 
and Cyprus. This also means that Kosovo is unable to realise its aspiration of becoming a 
member of the UN, and thus gain the ability for self-determination. However, in the last 
Kosovar elections on 11 June 2017, Lëvizja Vetëvendosje was the first preference for Kosovars; 
achieving more votes than any other party: the leading Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and 
the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).519 
In March 2011, the Aleanca Kuq e Zi [Red and Black Alliance] Party was founded in 
Albania. Supporting ‘Greater Albania’, this party claims protection of Albanian rights in 
“Albania, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro Chameria and the Presevo Valley”.520 However, 
the party was resoundingly defeated in the 2013 Albanian elections, receiving only 0.59 percent 
(10196) of votes.521 Since then, the party has kept a low profile. It can be argued that the defeat 
of Aleanca Kuq e Zi, the only political party to promote “Greater Albania” in Albania, shows 
the hesitancy of Albanians who live in Albania to unite in a Greater Albanian nation-state. 
However, reluctance of Albanians to unite in a Greater Albania, remains a contentious 
question. 
In 2010 Koço Danaj, an Albanian University Professor founded a second Albanian 
movement, ‘The Platform of the Natural Albania’. According to Danaj, the Platform has only 
one goal: the creation of the Albanian nation-state, or what he calls “The Natural Albania”.522 
Danaj claims the Platform is nothing more than what was declared at the Vlorë Parliament on 
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28 November 1912: an appeal for the ‘Natural Albania’, basically a request to implement a 
judicial act. Danaj argues that this act was ignored by the London Conference, which instead 
made a “colonialist” and “criminal” decision by dividing the Albanian-speaking territories 
between five different nation states.523 Therefore, according to the Platform, history needs to 
be revisited, the injustice needs to be addressed and the London Conference decision needs to 
be reversed in such a way that the Albanian territories from Preshevo Valley to Preveza, from 
Durrës to Skopje again join “The Natural Albania”.524 Danaj argues that the London 
Conference decision can be reversed and Albanians can be united under the same nation-state 
umbrella in a similar way Germans reunified. Furthermore, Danaj claims, the decision to 
dissolve the Yugoslavian federation, revoked the previous decision.525 However, the case of 
Albanian unification is more complicated as it affects not one but five Western Balkan nation-
states.  
Although, it can be argued that the decision to divide Albanian-speaking territories may 
be used as a legal argument, realistically, it is difficult for Albania to challenge the decision 
made by the Great Powers. Firstly, the composition of today’s Great Powers’ and the political 
environment are different. Of the Great Powers of 1913, only Russia can be still considered a 
global power. Others, such as Germany, the United Kingdom and France, are economically 
better placed than Austria, Hungary and Italy, and thus might be defined as ‘Great Powers’ in 
the twenty-first century. However, along with the transformed landscapes of Europe, 
governments of these countries may be reluctant to change political decisions made in 1913. 
In addition, challenging the London Conference decision in a court of law, seems impossible, 
as such courts does not exist.  
Even the unification of Kosovo and Albania is a challenging project. Martii Ahtisaari’s 
2007 binding proposal to resolve the status of Kosovo still makes it impossible for Kosovo to 
seek a union with “any State or part of any State”.526 According to Marcus Tanner, even the 
removal of Kosovo from Serbia cannot undo the damage done in 1913, and the only way to 
resolve ‘Greater Albania’ is the integration of the whole region into Europe, which will require 
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their borders will become semi-redundant. “Then, not before, the ghost of Greater Albania will 
be laid to rest”.527 
 
5.1.6 A ‘Greater Albania’ under Turkish leadership? 
 
A Turkish scholar, Cuneyt Yenigun, thinks that due to challenges the unification of Albanians 
under the same nation-state umbrella cannot happen for another two decades.528 In order to 
surpass this Yenigun offers his solution for immediate unification of Albania with Kosovo and 
Macedonia. He proposes a type of cooperation called “Albkomac”529; similar to that of 
Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg (Benelux) or the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).530 
According to Yenigun the GCC model of cooperation in fields such as economy, trade, 
customs, legislation, agriculture, and joint military forces, is better for “Albkomac” as 
collaborating with each other due to “cultural, religion and historical background”531 is more 
sustainable. Although the Albanian model compared to the GCC is lacking in capital, Yenigun 
argues that “Albkomac” could be established under the leadership of Turkey. He reasons that 
Turkey as the second fastest growing country in the world would be able to nurture this 
unification based on the historical, cultural and religious links with Albania.532  
Although Turkey has strong cultural and historical links with the Balkans, the concept 
of religious links between Albania and Turkey is a simplified one. As shown in chapter four, 
although Albanians converted in large numbers to Islam, religion in Albania is a controversial 
topic. At a time when Albania is relying heavily on its “European identity”, this project might 
give mixed messages to its strategic allies, the US and the EU, and thus endanger the continued 
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alliance. On the other hand, the large Albanian community in Turkey, which has been estimated 
to be of a similar size as the population of both Albania and Kosovo533, may play an important 
role here. This community will always act as an established bridge that is built on historical, 
cultural and traditional links and as a result, may always have ambitions to influence the 
Turkish government and side with Albania, regardless of the Albanian foreign policy swings. 
 
5.1.7 The Albanian unification into a ‘Greater Europe’ 
 
For Danaj, unification in a Greater Albania is the only option as this is supported by the people. 
According to him, supporters of ‘The Natural Albania’ are firstly Albanians: “82 percent in 
Kosovo, 64 percent in Albania and 89 percent in Macedonia”.534 Not only is this data 
contentious, the quantitative analysis seems to be presented in a simplistic and superficial way, 
as indicated in the defeat of Aleanca Kuq e Zi. Danaj argues that Albanian politicians accept 
the importance of unification but are divided between those representing their own vilayet and 
others who are still scared to speak out.535 In reality, Albanian and Kosovar politicians cannot 
afford to disappoint the Euro-Atlantic partners, therefore the argument remains the same: the 
Albanian unification will only happen under the EU banner.  
In fact, the elite of Tirana does not seem to be interested in redesigning Albania’s 
national borders to create the so-called ‘Greater Albania’. On 16 December 2011 former 
Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha stated that “the best interest of Albanians is to protect 
the existing borders; hence Albania and Kosovo will be united inside the EU, as we cannot risk 
our territories”.536 The current Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama, holds a similar opinion 
about ‘Greater Albania’. However, his statement in April 2015 that Albania and Kosovo will 
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unite in “a classical way”537 sparked much criticism from European leaders and Albania’s 
neighbours Serbia and Greece. Immediately the Serbian Prime Minister, Aleksandar Vučić, 
and Macedonian and Greek leaders contested Rama’s statement. The statement was then 
corrected by Rama—reassuring the critics that the unification of Albania and Kosovo would 
only happen once both Albania and Kosovo have become European Union members. Hence, 
Judah thinks that “no mainstream Albanian political party, whether in Kosovo, Albania or 
Macedonia, publicly espouses the idea” 538 of a Greater Albania.  
The discussion in Albania is not about Albania’s desire to expand its boundaries, but 
rather, the historical humiliation is still alive for Albanians. Albanian humiliation is expressed 
in a form of victimisation, which perhaps is based on the fact that Serbia, Montenegro, 
Macedonia and Greece are still in charge of those Albanian-speaking territories given to them 
by the London Conference. On the other hand, Serbs, Macedonians, Bulgarian and Greeks are 
overreacting to the misleading concept of the Greater Albania, possibly indicating their fears 
of an Albanian rise in power in the region.539 Nevertheless, while it seems difficult to determine 
whether ‘Greater Albania’ is a myth or a (possible) future reality, it is also dangerous to 
disseminate such an idea at a time when Balkan countries need to unite and leave behind 
centuries of hate and wars. Nevertheless, on the verge of collapse, the Porte was not only unable 
to protect Albanian lands, it also opposed Albanian independence. This adds on Albanian 
humiliation, who blame the Ottomans for their fate. It is interesting to explore how Albanians 
perceive their own national identity in relation to the Ottoman heritage. 
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5.2 Albanian identity and the Ottoman culture in the work of Ismail Kadare 
 
5.2.1 Introduction 
 
In analysing Albanian identity, one cannot ignore the extensive work of the Albanian 
prominent writer, Ismail Kadare, which in 2009, was compiled for the Albanian reader in a 
form of twenty volumes. Kadare has tried with his fiction and non-fiction books to illuminate 
the historical past and the future of Albania. Therefore, his thesis is crucial and needs to be 
explored. This second part of the chapter discusses Albanian identity in relation to the Ottoman 
heritage in the work of Ismail Kadare, Rexhep Qosja and other Albanian scholars, politicians 
and the media. It will explore some elements of the contested concept of Albanian identity 
through a short analysis of the thesis put forward by Ismail Kadare, who claims that Albanian 
identity is European. While helping the reader to understand Albanian identity, Kadare’s thesis 
is steeped in controversy. As a result, Kadare’s thesis is strongly opposed by some Albanian 
scholars such as the Kosovar academic, Rexhep Qosja who argues that Albanian identity also 
reflects elements of Turkish culture, and thus, Eastern civilization. This part will conclude the 
endless debate triggered by Kadare-Qosja disagreements, which have engaged in their analyses 
scholars, Albanian politicians and the media.  
 
5.2.2 Kadare— “the Albanian-Aeschylus”  
 
So much of what we know and understand regarding Albanian identity is due to extensive 
narratives of Ismail Kadare. This is particularly true at the level of the emotional, physical and 
psychological trauma of the Albanian nation, which often gets lost in larger narratives of the 
Ottoman period. According to Carey, Kadare, who creates the entire map of Albanian culture, 
its history, passion, folklore, politics and disasters, “is a universal writer in a tradition of 
storytelling that goes back to Homer”.540 Morgan, whose work has closely studied Kadare’s 
writings, reminds us that Kadare’s aim is to connect the period between the Illyrian and the 
modern Albanian cultures, in the same way Aeschylus did.541 For Kadare, Aeschylus is the 
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character “who forged the transitional path from the oral legacy of the Homeric Greek to the 
written forms of modern literature”.542 Therefore, Kadare, or what Morgan describes as the 
“Albanian-Aeschylus”543, offers his contribution to defining Albanian identity. He is 
convinced his duty to his motherland lies in conveying its ancient folklore and epic songs (as 
Aeschylus did with Greek literature) into a structured literary. No other Albanian writer has 
written more than Kadare on Albanian identity and its links to the Ottoman heritage and 
therefore, analyses through his work is paramount. 
Kadare has been persistent in his effort to uncover the ancestral roots of Albanian 
identity. In his seminal essays Aeschylus, the great loser and The Palace of Dreams, Kadare 
has asked questions about his origins and the authentic core of the Albanian existence, as he 
did in The Shadow going back to the period of Christian Albania in the Middle Ages, before 
the Ottoman conquest.544 For Kadare, there are two main reasons for the corruption of the 
integrity of Albania’s European culture: The Ottoman occupation and the communist regime. 
Therefore, Kadare’s aim is to reconnect Albania’s pre-Ottoman era with that of the Post-Cold 
War period. 
 
5.2.3 Albanian identity perception through Kadare’s thesis 
 
Inspired by Greek mythology, Kadare argues that Albania’s culture belongs to its geographical 
ancestors—the Illyrians, who, together with the Greeks are the most ancient people to have 
lived in the Balkan Peninsula, or what he considers “the cradle of civilization”.545 Based on 
archaeological facts and historical studies, Kadare envisages the Greco-Illyrian civilization as 
the oldest in the Balkan Peninsula. In his essay Aeschylus, Kadare advances his “imaginative 
evocation” of similarities in “the original Greek and Illyrian civilization of Homeric 
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antiquity”.546 Kadare claims that Illyrian-Albanian culture existed in the Balkans before the 
Slav migration, as “Albanian Christianity was older than that of Serbia”.547 While Illyrian 
history is used as a powerful foundation myth to pave the formation of the new Albanian nation, 
the Ottomans are considered as “hegemonic occupational powers”.548 For Kadare, as a result 
of the clash of two civilisations, the Oriental-Ottoman Empire and Occidental-Europe, the 
Balkan Peninsula was removed from the body of “the mother”.549 However, Kadare is 
convinced that Albanian identity was not affected by the Ottoman conquerors, as he 
emphasises, “nations cannot be changed by occupations, or conversions”.550 While in the 
earlier Aeschylus Kadare discusses Albania’s European credentials, in his 2006 essay Identiteti 
evropian i shqiptarëve [The European identity of the Albanians], he aims to craft the 
intellectual and spiritual foundations in order to facilitate “a new and more profound 
reattachment of Albania to its European heritage”.551 In fact, throughout his writings, Kadare 
maintains his thesis that Albania is part of Europe. In his essay The European identity of the 
Albanians, he supports this claim arguing that geography, race, the Albanian national hero 
Skenderbeg, whose name was mythicized by Albanians and Europeans alike, the similarities 
of the Albanian kanun with European epics and the early Albanian literature which was written 
in Albanian and also in Latin languages, are all indications of the European identity of 
Albanians. His argument begins with the geography, which according to Kadare, “is hard to 
argue with”.552 He points out that Albania is on the periphery of Europe to the East; at least, on 
the map, three more countries are located further East: “Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria, not 
to mention what is called ‘European Turkey’”.553 Therefore, the line of separation between 
Occident and Orient, which according to Kadare does not cross Albania, is a validation of 
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Albanian European-ness.554 In order to prove his argument, Kadare argues that three Albanian 
ancient cities: “Durrës, Shkodër and Berat have nearly the same age of Rome”.555 In short, 
Kadare is convinced that geographically and physically Albania is part of Europe. 
Kadare’s second justification is based on race. His argument is that the Albanian 
population, as the entire European continent, is white and its ancestors are “at best Illyrians, or 
at worst Thrace-Illyrians”.556 Kadare’s genetic differentiation of the human population of 
Europe proves that he is not interested in issues of race, but rather posits himself ‘on a mission’ 
to enlighten Europe that the Albanian race was ‘mistaken’ for Turks, and thus, non-European. 
Kadare’s analysis based on race/skin colour is a simplistic approach that excludes Albanian 
minorities and multiethnic Europeans, and thus, can be counterproductive to shifting Albanian 
identity closer to that of Europe. 
The third argument advanced by Kadare is the fact that the Albanian national hero 
Skenderbeg, the mention of whose name in Albanian lands was prohibited until the end of the 
Ottoman occupation, “became firstly a European myth”557, and then, an Albanian myth. Kadare 
is convinced that Skenderbeg does not rest in his tomb at the castle of Lezhë as his “dead body 
was never found since the first day”.558 While it is speculation that Ottoman officers opened 
the tomb and stole Skenderbeg’s bones, the disappearance of Skenderbeg’s  dead body is a 
major theme in Albanian epic songs and occupies a large part of the Albanian narrative—the 
Albanian myth that protected not only Albanian lands but also Europe from the Ottoman 
barbarians, to the point that the mystical disappearance of Skenderbeg’s body was considered 
by Kadare as a resurrection: “the same as Jesus”.559  
Kadare believes that another link, and reason for Albanians to be proud of their 
European ‘roots’ is the fact that the Albanian kanun and epic poems share similarities with 
European epics. The controversial “blood feud” as part of the Albanian kanun, which in the 
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twenty-first century, is still present in Northern Albania, creates challenges for local Albanians 
and for the government.560 The reputation of kanun as the best issue resolution policy, due to 
weak state has been paradoxically the rule in Northern Albania.561 However, Kadare is 
interested in the historical narrative of the Albanian kanun and kënget e kreshnikëve [epic 
songs], which he reveals, are all part of the European epics, from Diogenes, one of the creators 
of the European culture, to the “Saxo Grammaticus, which in 1200, dedicated around forty 
pages to the history of the blood feud” of the prince Hamlet.562 Therefore, according to Kadare, 
preservation of the Albanian kanun is further proof of the connection with the European 
tradition.  
Ultimately, the Albanian language, according to Kadare, has similarities with other 
European languages. Historical linguists have agreed that the Albanian language is different 
from the Greek and Slavic languages, hence according to Kadare, the closest option is to think 
it originates from “ancient Illyrian”.563 Kadare has a high regard for the Albanian language—
the main constituent that played a crucial role in keeping the imaginary of the Albanian nation 
alive: he positions the language above the state.564 For him the Porte knew the power of the 
Albanian language and that was the reason to why it was targeted: 
 
there are a thousand Greek schools in Albania, the same as Turkish. There are three hundred 
Slavic schools, Vlach, Bulgarian, why not Albanian? Why is there no Albanian?565 
 
Kadare also thinks language was more important than religion in the formation of Albanian 
identity. He argues that, for the Ottomans, religion was “less dangerous than language…the 
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language was going to still be one; the same as it was people’s identity”.566 Not only does 
Kadare equate the Albanian language with Albanian identity, he is convinced that correlation 
of Albanian and European identity is also demonstrated by the fact that Albanian writers such 
as Pjetër Budi, Frank Bardhi, Gjon Gazulli and Pjetër Bogdani published their books mostly in 
Europe’s Latin language.  
Kadare urges Albania to join Europe, this ‘beautiful creature’, that for Kadare 
represents a star. Thus, in one of his last novels, Bisedë për brilantët në pasditen e dhjetorit 
[Conversation about brilliants on a December afternoon], Europe is described as “a strange 
star, very dense, a sort of a colossal diamond…a brilliant”567 that is more important than 
anything else. While Kadare deliberately distinguishes Europe as a “diamond”, on the other 
hand, Europe has also been contemplated as “cold and useless such as death” and helpless to 
protect the Balkans—its “cradle of civilization”.568 However, for Kadare, this enormous 
diamond is illuminating Albania’s way to join Europe. While for him, the ‘mother’ Europe has 
been non-existent and late for many years569, the loss and rediscovery of the mother continent, 
it does not make Albanians less European than others. On the contrary, it marks them more.570 
Thus, the Albanian nation with a ‘European-Latin’ language and cultural similarities to those 
of Europe needs to re-join the European Union. Kadare is as obsessive in his quest to attach 
Albania to Europe, as he is anxious to distance Albania from its Ottoman past.  
 
5.2.4 Kadare’s ‘others’  
 
At a time when the Albanian nation-building process is underway, Kadare “remains fuelled by 
the same fears” that this process can also “capitulate again to internal as well as external forces 
of destabilization”.571 In short, Kadare’s emotive language is addressed externally to the West, 
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Orient, and Albania’s neighbours, but also to the Albanians themselves – “the four others of 
the Albanian nation”572 that Jing Ke has found scrutinizing the work of Kadare. However, Ke’s 
analysis of Kadare’s shift from considering the West as “the hostile other” to becoming “the 
dear Mother”573 of the Albanian nation is simplistic. While Kadare never denies the West’s 
indifference on the Albanian fate, his analyses need to be read in the context of the time and 
the environment he wrote. Kadare’s three ‘others’ are unchanged: the Oriental Turk, Serbian 
nationalistic ideology, and those Albanians who since the fourteenth century have been 
working against Albania’s interests, have been his constant adversaries.  
For Kadare, the main opponent for Albanian identity remain the Ottoman-Turks. He is 
a master of crafting fiction-narratives without a specific chronological time. In one of his last 
essays, ‘Secret relation’, Kadare’s creative characters speak an emotive language that is 
directed to different audiences. His invented character, ‘Tuz effendi’ (a high Ottoman figure 
who may be a representation of Sultan Mehmeti II) is coming to visit Albanian pashaliks after 
the death of Skenderbeg. Kadare’s Tuz considers the European continent as “threatening, 
without soul”.574 While some Albanian people speculate about the purpose of his visit, others 
claim that Tuz effendi is preparing a big attack against Europe. Tuz himself cannot stop 
thinking about Skenderbeg, who became a myth for Albanians.575 Skenderbeg’s disappearance 
deeply troubles him. One local-‘other’ Albanian, speaking to Tuz effendi states:  
 
Our Osman state soon will swallow Europe. I once saw a python swallowing a gazelle. It was 
terrible, but beautiful. This is what is going to happen; the swallowing [of Europe] will start 
just here; the Balkans.576  
 
This fiction narrative aims to reach different audiences in the past, present and future. 
While it articulates the Albanian resistance to halt the destructive effects of the Islamic Turks 
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that arguably might have come to occupy Europe, it also compares the Turks with a snake that 
swallows a beautiful gazelle. On the other hand, Kadare’s message is clear: These ‘other’ 
Albanians are meeting and supporting Tuz effendi. This fiction-element can also be relevant to 
current and future times; aiming to warn Albanians in the twenty-first century. Bellos has 
realised difficulties with translating Kadare who manipulates chronological times of his 
narratives; providing “the backbone and the whole point of his often quite peculiar sentence 
structures, which simultaneously assert and deny the monodirectional flow of time”.577  
The second ‘other’; Serbian nationalistic ideology, is no less dangerous for Kadare. 
Kadare implies in his thesis that “Albanian Christendom was older than the Slav”578, thus, 
Albania’s ancestors – the Illyrians inhabited the Balkans before the Serbs. In fact, in 
contradiction to Serbian claims that consider Kosovo as the “cradle of Serbia”, Kadare believes 
that Albanians were settled in Kosovo many centuries before Slavs.579 However, for Kadare, 
the main issue lies with the Ottoman-Turks, who continuously jeopardised conflicts between 
Albanians and their Serb and Greek neighbours; trying to convince them that it was Turkey 
that would protect them “from this unfaithful” Orthodox world.580 While the Greeks were 
obsessed with the Albanian Latin alphabet, for Kadare, Serbs attacked Albanian identity in a 
more aggressive way581; exploiting Albanian conversions to Islam and using it as a vehicle in 
order to destroy it.582 After Albania’s recognition as an independent entity, Kosovo was left 
alone to handle the Yugoslav racist policies against Kosovar-Albanians. According to Kadare, 
the Serbian policy was very clear: to break the link between Kosovo and the Albanian nation. 
In order to achieve this, the Serbs turned to the “old Turkish policy: Mosques are enough; you 
do not need schools”.583 According to Kadare, despite their disagreements, Serbia and Turkey 
implemented a secret plan to empty Kosovo. Kadare refers to the project initiated in 1937 by 
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the academic Vasa Cubrillovic [Čubrilović], known as “Iseljavanje Arnauta”584 [The expulsion 
of the Albanians], which, according to Kadare, “shows its explicit aim in its very title”.585 In 
fact, in 1938 Turkey agreed with Serbia to empty Kosovo; accepting 40,000 Albanian families 
to be transferred to Turkey.586 Therefore, for Kadare, Serbian and Ottomans effects became 
similar: harming Albanian identity. Kadare is concerned with negative effects of the Porte, as 
during the occupation of Albanian speaking territories, the State not only benefited from 
Albanian lands and its soldiers, but after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a large number 
of Albanians never returned to their country. Kadare then embarks on uncomfortable 
discussions that consider these Albanians as being assimilated, to the point that their “women 
continued to deliver Turks”.587 Serbs on the other hand, he claims, could have enjoyed 
Kosovo’s plain land without the unwanted Albanian population.588 The Kadare analysis of 
policy links between Turkish and Serbian governments shows once more the effects of Turkey 
with regards to Albanian identity, while Serbian atrocities came to an end after NATO’s Euro-
Atlantic intervention in 1999.  
 Ultimately, Kadare’s last ‘other’ are all those Albanians who damage the Albanian 
cause. Kadare is convinced that ‘new Albanologists’ who envisaged the Albanian existence as 
merits of two protectors, that is the Ottoman and the Communist State, also helped the Serbian 
cause.589 He classifies Albanians in three main categories: those who “did not exchange 
anything” with the Ottoman Turks, others that “threw the cross” (but they did not forget 
Albania, nor did they accept Islam) and those who “sold everything for their own interest”.590 
Kadare’s main focus again is to highlight Albania’s destruction at the hands of her own: 
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 give up the cross to get prestige. Keep the cross; give up the Albanian language... Keep 
the gun; give up the cross. And the main thing: to be a Turk…so unfaithful, you will be 
punished.591 
 
For Kadare, one of them was Enver Hoxha who in 1947 wrote his “only historical 
prose”; mythicizing Haxhi Qamili (an Albanian-Ottoman officer) and making it easier for 
Yugoslav propaganda to damage Albanian identity. Although Hoxha threw away both the cross 
and the crescent moon, according to Kadare, due to his isolationist policies, he allowed Europe 
to forget Albania for some decades.592 However, Hoxha was not the only Albanian leader to 
have damaged Albanian identity. For Kadare, the long line of leaders who have shown 
sympathy to or sided with the Turks begins with the Ottoman occupation and is still alive in 
the twenty-first century, as demonstrated by Albanian political leaders hiding the statue of 
Skenderbeg when meeting with their Turkish counterparts.593 On the other hand, the statue was 
proudly presented when meeting with other European leaders. Kadare interprets this as nothing 
less than a demonstration of Albania’s ambiguity towards abandoning the Eastern way, or at 
best, this is a confirmation of the influence of Turkey. Kadare’s concern is that these Albanians 
may impede the Albanian march to join Europe and allow Turkey to pull Albania back into its 
sphere of influence as the Ottomans did in the past. 
 
5.2.5 Kadare’s Post-Ottoman era: The role of religion in nation building 
 
Kadare’s thesis is clear: Albanian Christian religion was ‘contaminated’ by the 
Ottomans, as “a new faith, added to our ancestors, Muslim faith and its mosques”.594 Kadare 
asserts that the rilindja period was pivotal in laying the foundation of today’s Albanian national 
identity: during the rilindja period, from the scrimmage of three Albanian faiths, Catholic, 
Muslim and Orthodox, “the miracle happened” as three faiths showed respect and loyalty to 
                                                 
591 Ibid., 67. 
592 Kadare, Identiteti evropian i shqiptarëve [The European identity of the Albanians], 38. 
593 Kadare, Mosmarrëveshja: Mbi raportet e Shqipërisë me vetveten [Disagrement: On relations of Albania with 
itself], 41. 
594 Kadare, Identiteti evropian i shqiptarëve [The European identity of the Albanians], 25. 
 135 
‘Albanianism’.595 As he emphasises, the harsh medieval formula, “where is sword, lays 
religion”596, was replaced with the soft approach: “The Albanian faith is Albanianism”’.597 The 
sentence “where is sword, lays religion” has a cultural meaning in Albanian language, which 
relates to the fact that religion is not to be trusted—it rather generates wars through the 
symbolic use of swords.  
Thus, following Albanian independence, religious differences did not affect Albanian 
identity, as Albanianism was above religion. Kadare discusses the example of the Albanian-
Muslim King Zogu, who attempted to create a new “European Muslim”598, through legislation, 
which regulated the relation of Albania’s three religions and the state.599 Although Zogu was a 
Muslim himself, the legislation contained policies such as prohibiting men from wearing the 
white Turkish fez and women from wearing the veil; other laws regulated physical posture for 
prayer: standing, rather than sitting on one’s knees – as this would clash with the old Albanian 
kanun, which protected Albania’s male pride. Religion could not force an Albanian man to sit 
on his knees.600 In short, Albanianism and kanun remained above religion. 
 
5.2.6 Kadare-Qosja debate: Albanian Christian and Islamic civilizations 
 
Kadare’s Albanian identity thesis is strongly opposed by Rexhep Qosja – a long-standing 
intellectual figure in Kosovo and another ‘giant’ of contemporary Albanian literature, a 
historian and critic also very active in politics and social science. The debate between the two 
erupted in 2006, with the publication of Kadare’s essay, Identiteti Europian i Shqiptarëve (The 
European identity of the Albanians), and became fiery when Qosja responded in the same year 
with his essays Idetë raciste të Ismail Kadaresë (The racist ideas of Ismail Kadare), Ideologjia 
e Shpërbërjes (Disbanding Ideology) and Realiteti Shpërfillur (Neglected Reality), all 
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published by Toena in 2006. The two-way argument between Kadare and Qosja is central to 
this research as it goes to the heart of Albanian identity establishment, and thus will be 
explored. 
While for Kadare, Albanian identity has remained unchanged and clearly belongs to 
the European-Christian civilization, Qosja believes that it is a mixture of two civilizations: 
Christian and Islamic. However, for Qosja, “Islamic civilization” in Albania is more 
widespread than the “Christian civilization”.601 Qosja centres his claim on Albania’s culinary 
culture; folk dress; songs and dances; death and birth ceremonies and their rules; gender 
culture; morals and laws; pop art that have Turkish and Arabic similarities; religious, illuminist, 
pedagogical and moral literature written in Arabic; architecture of Albanian cities; bridges, 
mosques, tekkes and tyrbes built during the Ottoman occupation, which, according to him, are 
all part of the “Islamic civilization”. While for Kadare the Ottomans represented Islam, 
backwardness, intolerance and barbarism, Qosja disagrees, arguing that the Ottoman Empire 
was also “tolerant” such as in the case of religion. 
The Albanian religious dichotomy creates strong divisions between two schools of 
thought. Qosja thinks that Kadare’s thesis put forward in the essay, The European Identity, 
reveals “the cultural disagreement between Europe and Muslim-East, while…it shows 
superiority of European identity towards…Muslim identity!”.602 Qosja argues that equating 
Albanian identity with that of Christian Europe, which according to him, was not less 
“barbarian” than the Ottomans, as shown during the period of Christian crusades, is a racist 
assumption and ignores the fact that the Albanian Muslim community is the majority group in 
Albania and Kosovo.603 Hence, while for Qosja, Islam is part of the Albanian national identity, 
Kadare simply posits Islam as incarnated with the Ottoman-Turks, and thus, the main ‘other’ 
for Albanian identity. Kadare thinks that during their protests in 1981 and 1989-1990, Kosovar 
students fought for freedom, not for Islam, whereas Qosja believes the students fought not for 
Christianity either, but for a simple request: to see Kosovo becoming a Republic, and unite 
with “what was then called, the mother state – Albania” . Qosja went as far as revealing his 
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position against “mythicising Mother Teresa” in Albania, who for him, is a religious figure 
and, therefore, the “name, portrait and her statue must be present at religious, humanitarian or 
health institutions, but not at Tirana airport, political, state institutions and city plazas” . Qosja 
thinks that Albanian politicians (including Kadare who is not a politician) use a religious figure 
“in a multi-religious country” to achieve their political ends. It is not hard to grasp Kadare’s 
alignment for Christian Europe, or Qosja’s writings with regards to “the Albanian Muslim 
heritage”. In relation to Islam and Albanian identity, both positions, Kadare’s and Qosja’s, 
have been politically instrumental for the Albanian nation-building process of the post-Cold 
War period.604 
While Qosja tries to paint a realistic picture of Albania’s current religion, Kadare is  
going back in history to discover the ‘unchanged’ Albanian-Christian identity. Qosja argues 
that Albanians have different religious identities such as “Catholic, Orthodox, Muslim, 
Protestant, Atheist”, however, they are all united in what he calls “the Albanian national 
identity”.605 Kadare instead, ignoring the overall religious composition of Albania, thinks that 
the “cards are clear” for Christian-Albania to join Europe. This is not the case for Qosja’s 
Albania with its mixed religious identities, or ‘more’ Muslim identity, which, following his 
logic, is not yet ready to join the Christian Europe.606 
Kadare argues with Qosja that identity is not something fleeting that can alter quickly, 
whereas for Qosja, national identity can be transformed and changed, absorbing new elements, 
as it did in Albania’s case. Kadare thinks that Albanian identity cannot be “half”, which in the 
Albanian language means “torollak [fool]” but must be entirely Occidental—the same as 
European identity. Kadare refers to Kosovar identity as an example that, according to him, did 
not change under the Serbian rule, nor did Albanian identity under the Ottomans. Qosja, on the 
other hand, considers Kadare’s thesis racist607; arguing with some of those factors that Kadare 
brings forward to prove the European identity of Albania. For example, Qosja continues to 
oppose Kadare, who considers the Albanian population to genetically have the ‘white colour 
of the skin’; the same as Europeans. As a result, he calls Kadare’s thesis dangerous, 
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differentiating Albanians from Asians and Africans, at a time when Europe is in the process of 
unifying, and adapting cultures and languages, and is not created on the basis of race or skin 
colour. As discussed in chapter three, Europe has shifted from the concept of race for some 
time now, and European countries in their ‘ethnic’ composition are including people with 
different coloured skin who share the rights of white Europeans. Hence, Qosja deems Kadare 
an ‘Orientalist’ and ‘Muslimanist’, in the same way that Edward Said uncovers enemies of the 
Orient.   
While Kadare blames the Ottomans as primarily responsible for wreaking destruction 
on Albania, both Kadare and Qosja are united in their criticism of the Great Powers for their 
lack of interest in dividing Albanian-speaking lands in 1913; of Europe for its negligence 
regarding the Albanian case, and in their criticism of those Albanians who work against the 
national interest. Moreover, both hold Albanian rilindja writers in high regard. Thus, Kadare 
and Qosja contemplate the same ‘others’ in relation to Albanian identity, with one exception: 
The Ottoman-Turks and their religion.  
 
5.2.7 The Albanian ‘sanguine temper’, two distinctive writing styles, or different 
interpretations? 
 
It is important to remember that Qosja and Kadare—one geg and the other tosk—are writing 
in very different styles, attacking each other in a way that the Albanian historian and academic, 
Kristo Frashëri calls the Albanian “sanguine temper”608 —another Albanian identity element. 
For Frashëri, Kadare is a great writer and novelist, while Qosja tries to academically probe the 
Albanian national identity question. However, despite the fact they are both Albanian ‘giants’ 
in the field of literature and possess extensive knowledge, according to Frashëri, they both 
argue in “historical, sociological, philosophical and ethnological fields”, fields of which they 
both lack knowledge.609  
They also grew up in very different environments, which shaped their ideas. Kosovo 
was annexed into Yugoslavia, and its economy under Tito enjoyed relative progress compared 
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to that of the remote-centralised-communist Albania. Therefore, Kadare’s and Qosja’s paths 
were divided from the beginning. For a Kosovar such as Qosja, the Serbian-Orthodox enemy 
was extremely visible, and existed outside the Albanian community. Along with the Albanian 
language, the Kosovar-Muslim religion acted as an important bond in opposing the Serbian 
orthodox religion ideology, used by Serbian nationalism against Kosovar-Albanians. For 
Kadare, instead, Albanian enemies—the Islamic-Ottomans, Russian and Chinese imperialists, 
were easy prey. In short, for Kadare, religion played only a limited role in safeguarding 
Albanian identity. Although things have changed in the last two decades, Kadare is openly 
trying to revitalise the importance of Albanian identity and its Christian belonging.  
 
5.2.8 Albanian politicians and scholars differ between Kadare and Qosja, West and East, 
Orient and Occident  
 
Since the end of the Cold War, bi-partisan political support for Kadare’s thesis has become 
more apparent in Albania. The post-Cold War discourse of the Albanian elite is a chorus 
echoing the West and its values, and Kadare is considered the spiritual leader. Albanian 
governments of the post-Cold War have all been convinced that it is only by returning Albania 
to the ‘European family’ that the historical humiliation will be eradicated. The majority of 
Albanian politicians support Kadare’s thesis, which consider Albanian identity part of 
European identity. At the peak of the debate, when Qosja criticised Kadare in his essay, The 
racist ideas of Ismail Kadare, the former head of the Albanian Parliament, Jozefina Topalli, 
was quick to state that “Albanians have European identity” .610 Former Albanian President 
Bamir Topi did the same, stating: “Albania must return to Europe… to which it belongs both 
historically and geographically…”.611  Topi’s predecessor, Alfred Moisiu went even further in 
one of his speeches, stating that “every Muslim Albanian carries 15 centuries of Christianity 
in their soul”.612 In his statement, Moisiu ignored the post-Ottoman period—three decades of 
                                                 
610 "Topalli mbështet Kadarenë: Kemi Identitet Evropian [Topalli’s support for Kadare: We have European 
Identity] ", 31 May 2006, 
http://www.shekulli.com.al/shekulli/?s=%E2%80%98Topalli+mbeshtet+Kadarene%3A+Kemi+Identitet+Evrop
ian%E2%80%99. 
611 Topi, 7 February 2008, http://www.aiis-albania.org/. 
612 Alfred Moisiu, "Toleranca ndërfetare në traditën e popullit shqiptar [The tolerance of Albanian Inter-
religious tradition]", lecture at Oxford Forum, author’s translation, Koha Jone, 10 November 2005, accessed 11 
November 2011, http://www.kohajone.com/lexo.php?id=42679. 
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a dysfunctional Albanian state between 1912 and 1944, half a century of communist atheism, 
and more than two and a half decades of a wild transition anarchy and corruption culture—a 
new ‘religion’ that is neither Christian nor Islamic, but seems to be part of the Albanian fabric 
of the twenty-first century, which arguably is part of the Ottoman legacy. Therefore, these 
statements demonstrate a political willingness to follow the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ path as the only 
way the Albanian state-building process ‘must go’. However, individual statements by 
Albanian leaders are politically motivated and not supported by policies of the Albanian 
government. 
The Kadare-Qosja debate has divided most Albanian scholars who either side with 
Kadare or proclaim to be against his thesis. Frashëri suggests that both Kadare and Qosja focus 
too much on religious identity issues and thus miss the real debate about Albanian identity. For 
him, Kadare’s thesis needs correction, whereas all analyses of Qosja are wrong; Albanian 
identity should be understood outside of religious bias; other elements such as Albanian 
language and culture can better explain it. In their attempt to better explicate Albanian and 
European identity, Frashëri thinks, both Kadare and Qosja are confusing “identity” with 
“civilization”. For Frashëri identity is a property of ‘nation’ and cannot be changed, whereas 
civilization is very dynamic and continually absorbs new elements. It can be argued that 
Frashëri’s ‘unchanged identity’ sides with Kadare’s thesis, and on the other hand, opposes 
Qosja who equalises the “religious civilisation”, which for Frashëri does not exist.613 Although 
for him, Islam and Christianity are guided by their ‘static’ policies, little changes are made to 
reflect continuous developments. However, Frashëri notes that “religion has no power over 
civilization”, but rather follows civilisation developments. Hence, Islam and Christianity 
cannot be identified with either Eastern or Western civilisations, as “religion is different from 
civilisation”.614  
Other Albanian scholars are divided in their analyses. Ibrahimi supports Qosja for his 
realistic assessment of the Albanian demographic composition and also sides with him in 
criticising Kadare for idealism. Ibrahimi expresses his concern over the cultural and spiritual 
re-orientation of Albanians who live in territories of ex-Yugoslavia, for shifting their loyalties 
                                                 
613 Frashëri, 19 June 2015, 
http://www.albasoul.com/vjeter/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=1970. 
614 Ibid. 
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from Tirana towards Pristina.615 Other scholars, in the same way as Qosja, analyse the new 
orientation of the Kosovar-Albanian society that seems to focus on religious rights and creating 
a new Kosovar identity.616 However, the new Kosovar identity issue requires more research, 
and as mentioned, it is not the focus of this thesis. Although Shala, upholds Kadare’s thesis of 
the Western-European-Christian origins of Albania617, in Qose-Kadare and the dynamic 
identity, Shala fails, in the same way that Kadare does, to recognise the dynamism of Albanian 
identity and the fact that, historically, it has been transformed to reflect elements of both East 
and West. One of Kadare’s historical rivals, Agolli, supports Qosja’s arguments about 
Albanian identity. He highlights the dynamism of the concept of identity, in stressing that 
Albanian identity, language, cultural and social habits have changed, and many more changes 
can be expected in the future.618 However, Agolli neglects Albanian religious identity, focusing 
more on the dynamics of continuous social, cultural and political change. Another Albanian 
writer and critic, Nano, in his analyses, does not side with either Qosja or Kadare. While for 
Nano, Kadare exaggerates in thinking that Balkan nations added to the Ottoman culture “desire 
to become more European”, Qosja perceives Albanian identity to be a mix of Oriental and 
Occidental components.619 Furthermore, for Nano, Qosja unjustly equates barbarian events of 
Eastern-Ottomans with those of Western-Europeans. According to Nano, Albania’s ‘Eastern 
civilisation’ is not “autochthon and authentic” and, thus, Albania has no other choice but to 
follow its own culture, which, is similar to that of Europe since its birth620; a concept that is not 
far, if not the same as the thesis of Kadare. Plasari, another Albanian scholar, is instead 
criticising both Kadare and Qosja ⎯ Kadare for ‘nonsense’ in claiming that the Albanian 
                                                 
615 Zekerija Ibrahimi, "Bregovici dhe Tatlisesi [The Bregovic and Tatlises]", author’s translation, Shekulli, 20 
April 2006, accessed 3 November 2010, 
http://www.shekulli.com.al/index.php?page=shownews&newsID=94100. 
616 Dukagjin Gorani, Orientalist Ethnonationalism: From Irredentism to Independentism Discourse analysis of 
the Albanian ethnonationalist narrative about the National Rebirth (1870-1930) and Kosovo Independence 
(1980-2000) (School of Jurnalism, Cardiff University, unpublished PhD thesis, December 2011), 289; Mehmeti. 
617 Xhavit Shala, "Qose-Kadare and the dynamic identity", Shqip, 9 May 2006. 
618 Dritëro Agolli, "Intervistë për debatin e identitetit kombëtar Shqiptar [An interview over the debate of the 
Albanian identity]", author’s translation, 16 May 2006, accessed 11 November 2011, http://gazeta-
shqip.com/lajme/. 
619 Mustafa Nano, "Kultura Perëndimore dhe Qytetërimi Lindor i Shqiptarëve [The Western Culture and 
Albania’s Oriental Civilization]", 22 May 2006, accessed 17 July 2015, 
http://albanur.eu/showthread.php?t=282. 
620 Ibid. 
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Christian Church is older than the Orthodox one, and Qosja who is “mixing-up Istanbul with 
Jerusalem”.621 Plasari is referring to Qosja’s claim with regards to freedom of religion that 
Christians can go for their religious rituals even to Turkey, if they wish to. The issue of Muslims 
traveling and participating in their religious rituals to Jerusalem might be irrelevant, and the 
focus of the Kadare-Qosja debate gets out of context here. However, Plasari thinks that the 
debate between Kadare and Qosja is beneficial for the Albanian nation but also tells us there is 
much to be resolved concerning the question of Albanian national and religious identity.  
Visar Zhiti, an Albanian artist who was arrested during the Albanian Cultural 
Revolution in 1979 and released in 1987, highlights the importance of plurality as part of 
national identity and states that both Kadare and Qosja represent Albanian identity.622 Indeed, 
this is an important issue for Albania and merits further scholarly research rather than 
subjective analysis such as Kadare’s and Qosja’s. Zhiti also points out that a personality such 
as Mother Teresa should not be part of the debate, as she does not have the recognition she 
deserves in Albania. Unfortunately, Albanians are far from understanding the humanitarian 
significance of a figure of the calibre of Mother Teresa, and what she represents for Albania 
and the entire world, regardless of her religion. Nevertheless, the Albanian ‘clash of 
civilisations’ debate between Kadare and Qosja is a clear indication of how contested the 
Albanian national identity is. Ultimately, recent comments by Nano that Skenderbeg was more 
Christian than Albanian, and that his mother was Serbian623, sparked outrage from Albanian 
scholars, historians, and even ordinary Albanians whose comments on social media reached 
the point of death threats. While Skenderbeg seems to be untouchable for Albanians, ordinary 
people need to participate in this debate and have a voice. This is an indication that there is a 
need for a thorough analysis of Albanian identity considering the actual experience of 
Albanians; statements by politicians cannot fully represent the facets of this identity.  
                                                 
621 Aurel Plasari, "An interview with Aurel Plasari, ‘Debati për identitetin? Kadare ka nonsens, Qosja ngatërron 
Stambollin me Jeruzalemin’ [Arguing about identity? Kadare has no-sense, Qose is mixing up Istanbul with 
Jerusalem]", author’s translation, Shekulli, 2012, accessed 26 August 2012, 
http://shekulli.com.al/web/p.php?id=2847&kat=104. 
622 Visar Zhiti, "Kadare dhe Qose së bashku krijojnë identitetin tonë [Kadare and Qose together create our 
identity]", author’s translation, Albanur, accessed 23 February 2011, http://albanur.eu/showthread.php?t=277  
623 Mustafa Nano, "Skënderbeu ka qenë më shumë i krishterë se shqiptar, nënën e kishte sllave [Skenderbeg was 
more Christian than Albanian and his mother was Sllav]", author’s translation, Telegrafi.com, 14 July 2017, 
accessed 18 July 2017, http://telegrafi.com/skenderbeu-ka-qene-shume-krishtere-se-shqiptar-nenen-e-kishte-
sllave/. 
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5.2.9 Albanian rhisomatic identity in the twenty-first century.  
 
In the twenty-first century Albanians are struggling to express their identity. In religious terms 
their identity is represented by four religions, all claiming to be Albanian. An Albanian scholar, 
Yzeiri focuses on differences between Muslims and Christians; using the rhizomatic624 
concept, which was coined in the second half of the twentieth century by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Constructing his analyses on these scholars, Yzeiri is convinced that Albanians have a 
rhisomatic identity.625 Deleuze and Guattari realised that the analogy of imagining the nation 
as a tree or plant that lives vertically and is composed by roots, the trunk and its branches is 
challenged by postcolonial nations that have adsorbed other elements in their identity. Hence, 
Yzeiri thinks the rhizomatic model, which spreads horizontally without root connection, is 
better suited to explain Albanian identity.626 According to Yzeiri, the main reason for this claim 
is religion: Albanians claim European roots, which in religious terms are known to be Judeo-
Christian or Greco-Roman. Unlike Kadare who thinks that Albanian roots and its origins were 
not affected by Ottomans, Yzeiri believes these roots have been modified by the Ottomans in 
a way that even rilindja leaders could not convince Albanians to return to their origins. As a 
result, Yzeiri emphasises, the ‘Albanianism’ model that Pashko Vasa suggested is the 
confirmation of the rhizomatic identity of Albania. Vasa and indeed other rilindja writers 
stressed the idea of having a unified Albanian identity, while the issue of religion was 
purportedly downplayed. While Yzeiri has no doubt that Albanian ‘religious identity roots’ 
were affected and modified by Ottoman rulers, the question is whether Albanians are willing 
to again re-modify their religious roots and return back to the Christian-European identity? An 
affirmative answer to this question will, without any doubt, create tension between Erdogan’s 
Turkey and Albania.  
 
 
                                                 
624 According to the Oxford Dictionary the term is used in a figurative way and has appeared in philosophy but 
originates from botany and defines “resembling an interconnected, subterranean network of roots. Hence: non-
hierarchical, interconnected”. 
625 Ilir Yzeiri, "Identiteti rizomatik i shqiptarëve [The rhizomatic identity of Albanians]", author’s translation, 
Gazeta Shqip, 18 Maj 2015, accessed from a personal communication with the author on 10 March 2018. 
626 Ibid. 
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5.2.10 Albanian identity in the making  
 
Albanian identity is contested by Albanians themselves. As we have seen through endless 
debates between Kadare and Qosja, but also other Albanian scholars, politicians and the media, 
an agreement is missing. The main two opposing factions are those of Kadare and Qosja who 
have become catalysing forces of this debate. Energies spent in these debates, and the elevated 
tone used by participants, shows how difficult it is for Albanians to agree on what constitutes 
their own identity. While Kadare’s ‘others’—the West, Orient, Albania’s neighbours and 
Albanians themselves are not motionless, the Ottoman-Turks have always been unchanged: 
aggressors, ruthless and ready to assimilate, or ‘swallow’ Albanian identity. If Kadare is correct 
here, the loyalty of Albanians to the Porte during the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries 
makes little to no sense. On the other hand, Qosja is building his claims regarding religious 
tolerance of the Ottoman Empire on voluntary conversions. However, forced conversions also 
took place, along with lack of infrastructure development, political instability, and more 
importantly, the Ottoman policy of stopping Albanians from developing their own language 
and Latin alphabet—all indications of political aims of the Porte. Qosja correctly claims that 
Albanian identity is more aligned to “Islamic civilization” as Albania’s culinary culture; folk 
dress; songs and dances; death and birth ceremonies and their rules; gender culture; morals and 
laws; pop art that have Turkish and Arabic similarities; religious, illuminist, pedagogical and 
moral literature written in Arabic; bridges, mosques, tekkes and tyrbes built during the Ottoman 
occupation. While there is no doubt Albanians embraced imported culture elements such as 
culinary, folk, songs and dances, celebrations, morals and pop art with Turkish and Arabic 
similarities, they struggled to learn and practice the Arabic literature, alphabet, and never 
detached from their Albanian language. Building of mosques, tekkes and tyrbes has little link 
with Albanian willingness, but rather shows Sultan’s political aim to build a permanent 
structure in order to achieve his ends: make Albanian lands an extension of the Empire and 
assimilate all Arnahut-Albanians627 in Turks in order to then get physically closer to the West. 
Another thing to consider is that, during the communist period, the Ottoman heritage, Turkish 
and Arabic culture elements were more preserved through Albanians living in ex-Yugoslavia. 
Reasons are known: while Hoxha’s regime abandoned, after 1967, from Albania’s life any 
religion activity, Albanians of Yugoslavia continued to safeguard anything that protected their 
                                                 
627 Arnahut is the way the Ottomans and most Turks call Albanians. 
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uniqueness, and practicing Islam was perceived as defending Albanian identity. However, in 
the twenty-first century, as Yzeiri mentions, Albanian ‘religious identity roots’ has been 
changed for all Albanians and this fact needs to be contemplated when defining Albanian 
identity. Therefore, both Qosja and Kadare have failed to correctly define Albanian identity. 
Kadare’s Albanian identity that have resisted both the Ottoman atrocities and communist 
pressures is more comprehensible for Albanians who lived under the regime of Hoxha. 
However, for Albanians of Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia Kadare’s hate for 
Ottoman-Turks and Islam is challenging. This is one of the reasons that a detailed study of 
cultural differences within Albanians will complement Albanian identity analyses.  
Qosja has the right to oppose Kadare’s racist ideas and believe that Albanian identity 
reflects elements of both the Western and Eastern civilisations. Frashëri, who tried to stop the 
debate between the two, is engaging instead in philosophical analyses of definition of 
‘identity’, which according to him is property of ‘nation’ and thus cannot change and evolve 
unlike civilization, which is dynamic and can absorb new elements. The Albanian national 
identity has changed and evolved and while Frashëri’s unchanged identity is aligned with 
Kadare’s unchanged Albanian identity, the change of civilization opposes Kadare’s thesis of 
Albania’s belonging to the Western civilization, which for Kadare remains unchanged. Other 
Albanian politicians, scholars and media are superficially ‘scratching’ Albanian identity 
puzzle; focusing often on ‘sanguine temper’ of Kadare and Qosja. Albanian identity debate 
does not represent Kadare and Qosja, but is rather represented by them, and the continuation 
of these analyses will only bring to the light benefits for Albanians and the international 
community to better comprehend Albanian identity.  
 
5.2.11 Conclusion 
 
The first part of the chapter analysed the complexities of the ‘Greater Albania’ issue, the origins 
of this claim and its causes. The subsequent involvement of the Great Powers led to the 
redistribution of territory and redesigned borders of nation-states in the Balkans. Although the 
decision made by the Great Powers did not fully accommodate all requests of emerging Balkan 
states, it is safe to state that the impact was greatest on Albania. The redistribution of territory 
decided at the London Conference in 1913 led to the incorporation of territories with a majority 
of Albanian-speaking population into Montenegro, Serbia and Greece—a situation which 
remains unchanged in the twenty-first century. The feasibility of reversing the decision of the 
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Great Powers and the re-establishment of an Albanian nation-state in the twenty-first century, 
despite its attraction for Albanians, seems unlikely and would again create instability in the 
Balkans. The project of a ‘Greater Albania’ does not have a strong political support in Albania, 
but rather is fuelled by Albanian and Balkan nationalism. The Albanian government is reluctant 
to speak about the “Greater Albania” question and claims that this is not on the agenda, at least 
not until EU membership has been gained, which would allow for a unification under the 
auspices of the European project. Albanians feel humiliated by this decision of the Great 
Powers to divide Albanian-speaking lands, but also the Ottoman-Turks who not only failed to 
protect Albanian lands from their partition, they also opposed the independence of Albania. 
Secondly, the chapter analysed a number of controversies and challenges surrounding 
the self-perception of Albanian identity. It introduced the two main theories about Albanian 
identity. The first one is set out by the Albanian famous writer, Kadare who sees Albanian 
identity as historically determined and Western. Kadare claims that Albania belongs to the 
European family, and the Ottoman barbarians removed Albania from Europe. In opposition to 
Kadare’s theory, the Kosovar scholar, Qosja has formulated his own theory, which emphasis 
the hybridity developed through the Ottoman occupation and thus, considers Albanian identity 
to be more oriented towards the East than the West. Such contradicting theories demonstrate 
the unresolved nature of the question of the Albanian national identity. Their debate circles 
around the role of religion and the Ottoman heritage in shaping Albanian identity. The 
Albanian society, scholars, politicians and the media are all divided by these two theories. This 
indetermination also finds its expression in the political arena. While at an individual level, 
some politicians agree with Kadare, in the twenty-first century, the Albanian government’s 
policy to distance the Albanians and thus Albanian identity from that of the Ottoman-Turks is 
missing. It will now be beneficial to explore bilateral relations between Albanian government 
and the Republic of Turkey in the post-Ottoman era. 
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CHAPTER 6. FROM RULERS TO THE MAIN SUPPORTERS: THE POLITICAL 
RELATIONS BETWEEN TURKEY AND ALBANIA IN THE POST-OTTOMAN ERA 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will explore bilateral relations between Albania and Turkey in the context of the 
economic, energy security, military, geopolitical spheres and religion in the post-Ottoman 
period. The chapter will examine whether Turkish support for Albania is intentional. 
Notwithstanding the fluidity of the relationship between the two countries, I seek to explore 
the Turkish motivation for investing in this relationship, and possible Albanian gains from 
strengthening their bilateral relations with Turkey over those with other Western Balkan 
neighbours. The chapter aims to discuss the research question of this thesis, namely, whether 
Albanians are escaping the Ottoman heritage, and how is the influence of Turkey pressuring 
Albania to abandon the Euro-Atlantic route and rather looking eastward for support.  
 
6.2 The Post-Ottoman Era: A Fresh Start in Bilateral Relations between Albania and 
Turkey?  
 
Scholarly research on post-Ottoman relations between Albania and Turkey is limited.628 The 
Albanian first post-communist military attaché in Ankara who served for the period from 1990-
2000, Hajro Limaj, published in 2012 his diary in Albanian.629 This excellent source of data-
                                                 
628 Tase, "Turkey and Albania establish a dynamic agenda of bilateral relations", 2 May 2014, 
http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/05/02/turkey-albania-establish-dynamic-agenda-bilateral-relations/; Tase, 
"Albania And Turkey: Two Nations With Common Vision To Strengthen Bilateral Cooperation, 1990-2000", 
25 January 2014, http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/01/25/albania-turkey-two-nations-common-vision-
strengthen-bilateral-cooperation-1990-2000/; Peter Tase, "Turkey and Albania, strategic partnership in a 
globalized world", Today’s Zaman on line, 2 August 2013, accessed 5 November 2015, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_turkey-and-albania-strategic-partnership-in-a-globalized-world-by-peter-
m-tase-_322611.html; Beshku, February 2015, 
https://www.academia.edu/17005495/_The_Albanian_relationship_with_Greece_and_Turkey._Perceptions_and
_Realities_in_the_framework_of_the_Foreign_Policy_Partnership_?auto=download; Sülkü; Pajaziti, 27-29 
May 2011, International Symposium, Skopje, Macedonia-Prishtinë, Kosovo. Ankara Center For Thought And 
Research and International Balkan University; Katarina Anđelković, "Turkey playing on the card of Islam in 
Albania?", Western European Balkans, 4 October 2017, accessed 11 May 2018, 
https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/10/04/turkey-playing-card-islam-albania/. 
629 Hajro M. Limaj, Midis Ankarasë dhe Tiranës: 1990-2000. Nga ditari i një atasheu ushtarak [Between 
Ankara and Tirana: 1990-2000. From the diary of a military attaché], author’s translation, Tirana: Emal, 2012. 
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analyses regarding bilateral relations between the post-Ottoman Albania and Turkey will be 
used for this study and examined for the first time in English.  
The collapse of the Ottoman Empire necessitated a new struggle for Albania to protect 
its territorial integrity. This situation continued during the two Balkan Wars and into World 
War One when Greek, Serbian, Montenegrin, Italian, French, Bulgarian and Austrian troops 
penetrated Albanian lands.630 This was a time when Turkey was dealing with its own internal 
and external struggles to maintain its territorial integrity and trying to replace the Ottoman 
Caliphate with a modern, Republican state. The name that has become synonymous with the 
end of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Republic of Turkey—Kemal Atatürk— has 
been described “for all intents and purposes, the moral and intellectual epitome of the Young 
Turk[s] movement.”631 Atatürk and other Turkish Republican leaders started to reject the 
Ottoman past as a backward and ‘non-Western’ society. This shift accommodated Albania’s 
needs, and thereby starting a new chapter in the relations between Turkey and Albania.632 
Cultural similarities, commonalities in dealing with oppressors, and the desire to create 
an independent state brought about new ties between Turkey and Albania at the end of WWI.633 
Despite Turkey’s domestic and international challenges, Atatürk assumed a friendly position 
towards Albania. He believed in a republican and modern Turkey, and he hoped for Albania to 
become a free and prosperous country.634 For example in 1920, Atatürk sent several scholars 
of Albanian origin back to Albania to help the establishment of the Albanian state.635 On 1 
March 1921, addressing the National Assembly of Turkey, Atatürk explained “sanctuary” links 
between Turks and “brother” Albanians stating that “we [Turks] are going to help as much as 
                                                 
630 Jelavich, in A History of East Central Europe, 297. 
631 Ryan Gingeras, Fall of the Sultanate: the Great War and the End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1922, New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2016, 5. 
632 Perparim Xhaferi, "The Post-Ottoman Era: A Fresh Start for Bilateral Relations between Albania and 
Turkey?", Australia and New Zealand Journal of European Studies, vol. 9, no. 1, 2017, 45. 
633 Limaj, 32-3. 
634 Ibid., 33. 
635 One of them, colonel Selaudin Shkoza, a man with Prizren heritage, was appointed as the defence minister in 
the Albanian government in 1920. Shkoza’s appointment started to lay foundations for new diplomatic relations 
between Turkey and Albania. See for instance ibid., 31. 
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we can” and provide whatever this brother nation-state needs.636 Therefore, on 15 December 
1923, nearly a month after the Declaration of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1923, a 
‘Memorandum of Friendship Agreement’ between the two states paved the way for another 
five years of increased diplomatic relations. This was now a post-colonial agreement between 
the Republic of Turkey and the Albanian government, led by the Muslim leader of Mati tribe, 
Ahmet Zogu. 
However, Zogu’s decision, in 1928, to turn Albania into a monarchy annoyed the 
Republican Atatürk who, despite his sympathy for Albania, terminated diplomatic relations by 
recalling the Turkish ambassador Tahir Lütfi from Tirana.637 In response, Zogu closed the 
Albanian embassy in Ankara, leaving the fate of many Albanians living in Turkey in the hands 
of the Italian Consulate in Ankara.638 The conflict lasted three years, until the second 
Conference of the Balkans on 20 October 1931. Later, on 14 May 1933, the new Albanian 
ambassador, Xhevat Leskoviku, met with Atatürk, who in response sent Ruşen Eşref as Turkish 
ambassador to Tirana on 15 April 1934.639 Upon his arrival in Albania, Eşref met King Zog, 
who then echoed Atatürk’s previous words in describing Turkey as the “big brother” of 
Albania.640 Despite Atatürk and Zogu having different beliefs—one a convinced republican 
and the other in favour of a monarchy—it seems what united them was more important. While 
Zogu’s Albania needed to secure Turkish support, Atatürk’s Turkey could not find a better 
friend than Muslim Albanians to help Turkey come back in to the Western Balkans. The 
excellent diplomatic relations between Albania and Turkey were again disrupted in April 1939, 
when fascist Italy occupied Albania. However, the Turkish government re-opened the Turkish 
Consulate in Tirana at the end of the Italian occupation in 1942; similarly, Nazi Germany’s 
occupation that seemed to restore “the formal independence of Albania and, to an extent, 
respected the country’s sovereignty”.641 
                                                 
636 Ibid., 29. 
637 For the republican Atatürk, the shift to an Albanian monarchy was an enormous step backward. 
638 Limaj, 34. 
639 Ibid. 
640 Ibid. 
641 Robert Elsie, "1945 Final Report of the German Wehrmacht in Albania", Texts and documents of Albanian 
history, Robert Elsie Website, http://www.albanianhistory.net/1945_German-Wehrmacht/index.html,. 
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The withdrawal of Nazi Germany from Albania in the winter of 1944 and the rise to 
power of the Albanian Communist Party in the early forties642 were momentous events, with 
the latter leading the complete severing of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Albania. 
On 16 July 1945, the Turkish Ambassador, Muzaffer Kamil Bayur, departed Albania.643 
Despite this, on 14 December 1955, Turkey voted for Albania to become a full member of the 
United Nations (UN).644 Turkey’s vote helped Albania to achieve an important goal, and thus 
was welcomed by Albanian authorities. As a result, Albanian-Turkish diplomatic relations 
resumed, culminating in the official re-establishment of diplomatic relations on 13 June 1958645 
and the re-opening of the Turkish embassy in Tirana on 27 June 1959. Following the Turkish 
coup, the next year, diplomatic relations remained formally in place, but without significant 
interaction. Albania returned Turkey’s favour on 18 December 1965 by siding with Turkey 
against the recognition of Cyprus in an important vote in the UN. Despite the fact that their 
vote was unsuccessful, and Cyprus was granted recognition (with the General Assembly 
resolution 2077 being approved),646 this vote not only boosted relations between the two 
countries, but also showed that Albania had no intention of abandoning its Turkish alliance.  
Relations between Albania and USSR were cut completely in 1961, and due to the 
difficult relations with its neighbours, Greece and Yugoslavia, Albania came to value Turkey 
as a strategic ally.647 However, Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, and thus was 
classified as a ‘Western country’ by the Albanian communist regime during the Cold War era. 
                                                 
642 The Albanian Communist Party, Partia Komuniste Shqiptare (PKSH), was founded in 1941, with the 
participation of Enver Hoxha; assisted by Yugoslav Communist Party delegates. After withdrawal of Nazi 
Germany from Albania in the winter of 1944, the PKSH came to power, persecuting the political alternative, 
Balli Kombëtar, as well as intellectual, political and religious figures. See Morgan, Ismail Kadare: The Writer 
and the Dictatorship 1957-1990. 
643 Political relations between the two countries remained static for a decade, until Albanian leaders requested to 
move diplomatic relations forward. 
644 "60 vjet Shqiperi ne OKB [Albania and the United Nations: 60 Years of Partnership]", author’s translation, 
Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015: 4, accessed 12 May 2018, 
http://www.punetejashtme.gov.al/files/userfiles/press_brochure_minfor_(2).pdf. 
645 Robert Elsie, Historical Dictionary of Albania, 2, Lanham, Toronto, Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 
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As a result, Albania and Turkey had “few noticeable direct political contacts”.648 As discussed, 
the Albanian-Turkish relationship has ebbed and flowed over the past century. However, even 
during the communist period there were no open hostilities between the two countries. On the 
contrary, the Turkish support for Albania in 1955 and the Albanian vote on the Cyprus issue 
in 1965 revealed that both Albania and Turkey agreed on crucial issues in the international 
arena.  
The political discussion so far in this chapter has overlooked the significant cultural 
exchanges between Turks and Albanians who may not have been aware of what was occurring 
at a political level. Before the arrival of Hoxha’s regime, Turks and Albanians were relatively-
free to trade and visit each-others country. Although Hoxha’s regime made restrictions for 
individual citizens to enter and exit Albania, the two countries maintained cultural exchanges 
in forms of organised folk-dance competitions, academic, sporting, agricultural, tourism and 
commercial interactions.649 While the average Albanian citizen faced restrictions on 
movement, with tight controls on exit and entry into the country, these organised groups were 
supported by the Albanian regime. However, all members of these groups were strictly-
scrutinised and controlled by the regime, as were any figures who enjoyed external contacts or 
travel, such as writers and cultural figures.650 Therefore, relations between Albania and Turkey 
at the grass roots level (ie. interactions between individuals) faced particular challenges, which 
have remained largely uncharted, but are beyond the scope of the present thesis.  
On the political level, interaction between the two countries was maintained. During 
his visit to Albania in 1968, the chairman of the Turkish National Assembly, Ferruh Bozbeyli, 
discussed ways to further improve “Ankara’s ties with the communist leadership of Tirana”651, 
at a time when, politically and economically, China was becoming important to Albania. After 
1968, for another decade, the entire Albanian economy, its health system, the industry, defence 
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and foreign policy relied on the support of Mao’s China, and as a result, ties with the rest of 
the world were slashed. Despite Turkey’s attitude towards Maoist China, even during this 
period, the political relations between Albania and Turkey were kept very cordial. By the time 
of the formal break with China in 1978, Albania had become isolated, with an economy on the 
verge of collapse. Once more, in difficult circumstances for Albania, trade with Turkey 
resumed. In December 1980, a Turkish delegation visited Tirana, and the visit was returned by 
an Albanian delegation led by Nedin Hoxha, a minister and cousin of Enver Hoxha almost 
exactly a year later.652 In 1988, after a historic meeting of the Albanian foreign minister Reis 
Malile with the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey and Romania in 
Belgrade653, Hoxha’s successor—the Albanian Chairman of the Presidium of the People's 
Assembly, Ramiz Alia—welcomed  the Turkish foreign minister Mesut Yilmaz to Tirana.654 
The visit was returned in 1990 by an Albanian delegation. Despite the political position of 
Hoxha, Turkey has helped Albania during the Cold War every time a request was made for 
help. The end of Hoxha’s regime in Albania ushered a new era of continuous and uninterrupted 
relations between Turkey and Albania. At the end of the Cold War, Albania’s economic needs 
were enormous, and Turkish authorities did not wait to help their ‘little sister’, Albania. 
 
6.3 The post-communist decade: the establishment of the bilateral relations 
 
In April 1991, Sali Berisha was elected Albanian President, after the Albanian Democratic 
Party (PD) won the first democratic elections. One of the main challenges for the new fragile 
Albanian “democracy” was a nearly-collapsed economy. According to Tase, Turkey stepped 
in when Albania’s need was at its greatest, taking advantage of Albania's weakness in order to 
potentially exploit the old imperial subject and subsequent Eastern Mediterranean ally:  
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Turkish Foreign Policy in the Balkans was significantly influenced by Turkish President Halil 
Turgut Özal who took tremendous advantage of Albania’s weak economy and its state of 
extreme poverty. 655 
 
Others interpret these circumstances differently. While for Tase Özal’s Turkey took 
advantage and thus used Albanian poverty to offer Turkish opportunistic help, according to 
Limaj, Turkey acted in generosity to help Albania through sincere help.656 If we look more 
closely at the situation we can establish that in 1991, through their President Özal, Turkey 
donated approximately USD14 million to Albania through Eksim Bank657—the first country to 
offer a post-communist donation of this scale to Albania. A number of visits from both Turkish 
and Albanian leaders in years to come brought about an increase in economic, political and 
defence support to Albania. Money donated to the Albanian government was followed by 
Turkish investments to restore mosques and religious buildings, ambulances and equipment 
for hospitals, motor vehicles for the Albanian police forces, along with scholarships for 
Albanian ‘civilian and military’ students to study in Turkey.658 In 1992, the Turkish 
government also granted “USD29 million in the form of food, technology and towards 
Albania’s economic revitalization efforts”.659  
Turkish authorities re-commenced their visits to now the ‘democratic’ Albania in 
November 1991 with the significant visit of the Turkish General Doğan Güreş. Six months 
later, in June 1992, the Turkish Prime Minister (PM) Süleyman Demirel visited Albania and 
signed an agreement of bilateral friendship and cooperation with Albanian government.660 
Demirel was elected as the Turkish PM in 1965, at the time when Albania voted in favour of 
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Turkey in the UN on the Cyprus issue.661 As a figure known for his pro-Albanian sympathies, 
Demirel reassured Albanian leaders in 1992 that “Turkey was committed to provide USD50 
million in humanitarian and logistical assistance to Albania”.662 This humanitarian assistance 
promised to Albania in difficult times further reinforced the perception of Albanians that 
Turkey was the best supporter of Albania in the region.  
The bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania intensified after the first ministerial 
meeting held in Ankara on 24 July 1992, which was followed by the visit of the Turkish 
President Özal in Albania on 18-21 February 1993. Özal, who addressed the Albanian National 
Assembly, agreed to sign “a fifteen-year economic agreement with Albania that would cover a 
wide area of cooperation from infrastructure projects to military assistance and growth of the 
tourism industry”.663 Two months later, in April 1993, the Albanian President, Sali Berisha 
returned the visit, followed by the Albanian PM Aleksander Meksi at the end of the same year. 
During meetings between the two presidents, sensitive issues were discussed. Özal tried to 
convince Berisha to recognize the new independent state of Macedonia (FYROM), as the only 
way to improve relations between the two countries, with a goal to make the Balkan region a 
more peaceful place. On the other hand, Berisha raised concerns regarding tensions with 
Albania’s neighbours, Greece and Serbia, and asked for total economic and defence support 
from Turkey.664 The term “total” used by Berisha is clear: at the end of the Cold War, Albanian 
authorities, once more, aimed to fully rely on Turkey. On the other hand, Albania’s position 
created perfect conditions for Turkish authorities to advance their influence strategy over 
Albania. As a result of the Turkish pressure, in December 1992, under the leadership of 
Berisha, Albanian delegates decided Albania would become a member of the Organisation of 
the Islamic Cooperation (OIC), without consulting the Albanian parliament.665 This shift 
triggered a fierce debate between Albanians who then questioned whether Albania’s identity 
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was shifting towards Islam and the East.666 At this time, Albania secured economic assistance 
in the form of donations from Turkey, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, to restore old and build new 
mosques and Islamic schools.667 While for Albania—the poorest communist country in the 
Balkans—this aid was critical, for Turkey, this was a step in the right direction, bolstering 
Turkey’s support for Muslim Albania, and thus re-establishing the official presence in the 
Balkan region. 
The collapse of the Albanian government in 1997 (due to failed pyramidal investment 
schemes) alongside the worsening situation in Kosovo, brought about another opportunity for 
Turkey to support ‘brother’ Albanians. For Albanians the wounds of the period between 1997 
and 1999 will need a long time to heal.668 Pyramid schemes caused political crises and a quasi-
civil war669 leading to around 2000 deaths in Albania.670 The Albanian government lost its 
legitimacy, creating again another opportunity for the Serbian and Greek nationalistic-
irredentism. During this revolt the state even lost control of some parts of Albania, and 
according to Limaj, there were, once more, international plans to divide Albania, with both 
Serbian and Greek nationalisms resurrected.671 Turkey stepped in to protect the territorial 
integrity of Albania during the political turmoil in 1997 and following the advice by the Turkish 
General Karadaj, on 29 March 1997, the Turkish PM Tansu Çiller stated: 
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Turkey will protect the territorial integrity of Albania and cannot stay passive in the face of 
events that threaten to divide Albania.672 
 
The second president of Albania, Rexhep Meidani welcomed the two-day visit of the 
Turkish President Demirel in April 1998. This visit was not a simple meeting between the two 
presidents as Demirel was accompanied by many high ministerial figures, leaders of different 
Turkish institutions and members of the business community, with the visit receiving wide 
coverage from the Turkish media.673 The stated aim of this visit was again to assist Albania in 
difficult times. President Demirel stood before the Albanian parliament and claimed that “65 
million Turks are close to the Albanian people”, anytime they need help.674 Demirel’s strong 
words were in line with Atatürk's historic sentiments, and Özal and reaffirmed Turkish support 
for Albanians, calling also for an immediate stop of Serbian atrocities in Kosovo.675 After 
warning the international community that Turkey could not “allow the terrible tragedy of 
Bosnia [to] happen again”, in his speech to the Albanian parliament, president Demirel argued 
that it was necessary to:  
immediately halt the bloodshed in Kosovo; restore the fundamental human rights and grant full 
freedom to Albanians in Kosovo; start a dialogue between all parties immediately and ensure 
people who were forcefully chased and driven out of Kosovo return to their respective 
lands.676  
On the other side of the Albanian border, Kosovar Albanians were facing ethnic 
violence and ultimately ethnic cleansing as a result of the activities of Slobodan Milošević and 
his supporters. Therefore, Demirel’s visit was historically highly significant in re-confirming 
Turkish support for the Albanian people during the most difficult period since the end of the 
communist regime. Turkish support was noted by the Albanian President Rexhep Meidani, 
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who emphasized the importance of Albanian-Turkish relations, adding that “Turkey 
particularly in the decade of the 90s, has extended a hand of hospitality like no other nation to 
Albania”, as did the Albanian Assembly Speaker, Skender Gjinushi, who re-affirmed that the 
“Albanian Assembly and all political parties, despite their program differences, […] all want 
to strengthen bilateral ties with [the] Turkish government”.677 Demirel’s visit was completed 
with the signing of a bilateral agreement on social policy and labour reforms, reviews of the 
migration policy, employment monitoring and analysis, media and research on the impact of 
social policies in Albanian communities.678 These agreements ensured that at the end of the 
twentieth century, relations between Turkey and Albania finished on a high, and suggested a 
promising start to the twenty-first century.  
 
6.4 Continuity of the Turkish-Albanian political relations in the twenty-first century 
 
Early in the new century two major events took place for Albania: The Kosovar parliament 
declared independence from Serbia in 2008, and Albania became a NATO member in 2009. In 
both cases, Turkey was in the front line, recognising the Republic of Kosovo from day one and 
lobbying for Albania to become a NATO member. Turkish support for Kosovar-Albanians was 
not welcomed by Albania’s neighbours Serbia and Greece. Greece, in line with Serbia, 
considers Kosovo part of Serbia; cut off by NATO in 1999. The situation is different when it 
comes to the security issue. Greece is a NATO member, but what united both Serbia and Greece 
against Albania was the ghost of the ‘Greater Albania’.679 As a result, for Albanian authorities, 
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Turkey’s foreign policy become even more closely aligned with the Albanian foreign policy. 
Visits from politicians and higher officials from both governments intensified the tradition of 
maintaining periodic meetings. The visit of the Albanian President, Alfred Moisiu, in May 
2003, was returned a week later by the Turkish PM Erdoğan who returned again to Albania as 
President in 2013 and 2015. The next Albanian President, Bamir Topi, and the Albanian PM 
Sali Berisha visited Turkey in April 2012, followed in October of the same year, by the 
Albanian foreign minister, Edmond Panariti who held talks with the then Turkish foreign 
minister Ahmet Davutoğlu. Since his election as Prime Minister, on 23 June 2013, Edi Rama 
highlighted the need for Albania’s “strategic relations with Turkey”, which were to be given 
an immediate and “special priority”.680 This decision moulded a new momentum for bilateral 
relations and Turkish foreign minister Davutoğlu, visited Albania two months later, on 4-5 
October 2013. During his visit, Davutoğlu aimed to establish high-level strategic cooperation 
mechanisms, and create sustainable political, economic and trade relations between the two 
countries. The Albanian Defence Minister, Mimi Kodheli and the foreign minister Ditmir 
Bushati returned the visit to Turkey on 18-19 April 2014. While Kodheli signed a secret 
treaty681 with her Turkish counterpart, Bushati’s first visit as the Albanian foreign minister to 
Turkey aimed to further extend bilateral cooperation, bringing these relations to a new level in 
the twenty-first century. According to Davutoğlu, Albania and Turkey are endeavouring to 
work together to achieve common goals through the ‘High Level Cooperation Council’ that 
was immediately established.682  This Council was established as a bilateral body of two 
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foreign ministries that would maintain close relationships between the two governments in 
order to discuss pending items of the mutually beneficial agenda.683  
Davutoğlu’s statement about “common goals” for Albania and Turkey needs to be 
explored as motivations for Albanian-Turkish political relations are still contested. One might 
easily raise some pertinent questions: Has Turkey’s motivation been solely humanitarian with 
no hidden agenda? Is Albania being forced to rely on Turkey in tough times? What are the 
advantages of Turkish intervention? According to the Albanian foreign affairs ministry Albania 
has signed 74 bilateral agreements with Turkey between 1992 and 2013; more than with any 
other country, except Italy and Germany.684 It is significant to note that 29 of these agreements 
(or 39 per cent) concern military and defence matters. The majority of these agreements—71—
were signed in the twenty-first century, indicating a sharp increase in defence and military 
agreements, but also an intensification of Turkish diplomatic relations with Albania. The 
influence of Turkey seems to be a mysterious agenda in Albania, but on the other hand, the 
Albanian government is welcoming new agreements, rather than distancing itself from 
Erdoğan’s Turkey in the twenty-first century.  
Historically, Albanian post-Ottoman leaders and politicians from all sides of politics 
have welcomed relations with Turkey, as they perceive Turkey to be an economic, political 
and security guarantor. Cultural ties are another reason that consolidates this relationship. The 
population of Turkish citizens with Albanian heritage is estimated to be five million according 
to the former Albanian Ambassador in Turkey, Genci Muçaj.685 This is a significant number, 
comparable to the number of Albanians living in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia combined. 
Although the majority of them are assimilated and are not a large source of financial 
remittances for Albania, the cultural bridge between the two countries is consolidated through 
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their existence and the basis laid for the development of further areas of mutual interest 
described by Muçaj as “bilateral relations, economic and cultural diplomacy”.686 
While the aim of both Turkish and Albanian governments in the twenty-first century 
has being to bring these two countries closer, it is unclear whether the majority of Albanian 
people supports the idea of increased proximity with Turkey and the MiddleEast. There have 
been indications that some Albanian citizens are not happy with the increased Turkish 
influence. An example is the open discussion in April 2018 between the Albanian foreign 
minister Ditmir Bushati and the Albanian diaspora in the United States where he was asked to 
explain why the Albanian government is flirting with Turkey, while awaiting to become a 
European member state.687 Another example was the vandalization of Hasan Pasha’s memorial 
at the city of Shkodër on 16 July 2016688, where  the Turkish flag was removed, after Turkish 
commentator Talha Uğurluel called Skenderbeg a “bandit” who came down from the 
mountains attacking women and children, in the same way that terrorist Kurds attack Turkey 
today.689 On another occasion, the removal of all Turkish flags placed at Prishtinë streets during 
Independence Day celebrations of Kosovo on 17 February 2017690, is an indication that not all 
Albanians approve the Kosovar and Albanian government decisions to look to Turkey for 
increased international support. However, it is less clear whether these are isolated acts of a 
small number of people, or part of a growing popular sentiment. 
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6.5 Turkey’s twenty-first century ‘zero problems with neighbours’ foreign policy 
 
Despite its claims of being a ‘secular’ and ‘democratic’ state, Mango describes Turkey as a 
“non-Western country” that is attempting to organise “its society on Western lines”.691 Turkish 
society is no more homogenous than Albanian society. Taspinar describes Turkish society as 
“…deeply polarized over its Muslim, secular, and national identities”.692 The Turkish people 
have been divided for a long time into two main political factions: those who are sympathetic 
to secular republicans known as “Kemalists”, and others who side with the “Islamic neo-
Ottomanists”.693 However, both sides of Turkish politics support the Turkish foreign policy in 
the Balkans, especially relations with Albanian people.  
Taspinar claims that Turkey’s foreign policy in the twenty-first  century is trapped 
between “secular Kemalists” and “Islamic neo-Ottomanists”.694 Hence, according to Taspinar, 
Ankara will be careful to “balance its neo-Ottoman and Kemalist instincts”.695 Taspinar, 
Petrović and Reljić believe that Turkey is shifting its foreign policy focus to the Western 
Balkans as “relations between Turkey and the Western Balkans have never been more intensive 
since the foundation of the Turkish republic”.696 Davutoğlu’s speech on 16 October 2009 at the 
“Ottoman legacy and Balkan Muslim Communities” conference in Sarajevo ” is described as 
a shift in Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans.697 By 2009, Turkish political initiatives in the 
Western Balkans went far beyond the “bandwagon” approach with the US policies in the 
Balkans.698 For Petrović and Reljić, Turkey “has leverage and increasingly capacities in the 
Western Balkans” which must be accepted and recognized by the EU.699 For others such as 
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Erickson, there is no doubt that Turkey is working to become the main power of the region, 
and it is merely a question of when it will happen.700  
Turkey uses its influence in the Balkans as an example of its geopolitical importance and 
Ankara wants to demonstrate that a permanent peace in the Balkans is unattainable without 
Turkey’s help701  
In his speech at the end of the Turkish elections in July 2011, Erdoğan claimed that 
AKP’s victory aimed to serve not only the Turkish people, but maintained further that “The 
Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans have won as much as Turkey”.702 A year before, 
Turkey’s former foreign minister Davutoğlu revealed the country’s twenty-first century foreign 
policy. Its slogan “zero problems with neighbours” encapsulated the policy, known as the 
“Davutoğlu doctrine”.703 In this foreign policy Davutoğlu states that:  
 
Turkey has multiple goals over the next decade: First, it aims to achieve all EU membership 
conditions and become an influential EU member state by 2023. Second, it will continue to 
strive for regional integration, in the form of security and economic cooperation. Third, it will 
seek to play an influential role in regional conflict resolution. Fourth, it will vigorously 
participate in all global arenas. Fifth, it will play a determining role in international 
organizations and become one of the top 10 largest economies in the world.704 
 
This quote is a strong evidence of Turkey’s desire to step forward onto the global stage. 
Davutoğlu’s tone and the strength of his language shows Turkey’s aim to play an influential 
role in regional conflict resolution. While it is not clear whether Turkey’s ‘influential’ role is 
referring to the Balkans, the second and third goals of Turkish foreign policy are a direct 
involvement with regards to security, economic cooperation and conflict resolution in the 
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region. However, “Turkey’s region” needs to be clearly identified. Is it the geographical 
territory of the old Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, Asia and Balkans, which comprises 
modern nation-states that have in their composition people of the Muslim religion? According 
to Davutoğlu, “Turkey’s actions are motivated by a great sense of responsibility, entrusted to 
it by its rich historical and geographic heritage, and by a profound consciousness of the 
importance of global stability and peace”.705 However, historical facts of the Ottoman 
engagement in the Balkans are different. As discussed in this thesis, from their first 
involvement in the region, the Ottomans who conquered and ruled Albanian speaking lands 
and the entire Balkan Peninsula for centuries were not interested in investing and developing 
the region, but rather in benefitting from it as a military and an imperial conquest. Although 
the situation in the twenty-first century is different, the re-emergence of Turkey in Albania is 
again challenging the Western Balkans. It seems that in 2018, Davutoğlu’s previous dogmas 
regarding the revival of the Ottoman glory in the Western Balkans is not just media speculation, 
but, according to Parllaku, has been transformed into a neo-Ottoman Platform based on 
“religious nationalism”.706 It has been observed that politically, the Albanian and Kosovar 
governments have quietly bowed to Turkish pressure.707  
In the last few decades, Turkish foreign policy has shown variations and has been what 
Cornell describes as a “less predictable force than it used to be and one whose policies will 
occasionally clash with those of the West”.708 In reality, Turkey and the West “cooperate when 
their interests align rather than as a result of shared values”.709 The absence of common values 
between the West and Turkey makes Turkish foreign policy unpredictable and unique, but it 
also poses a further challenge for the Albanian and Kosovar governments to align with Turkey. 
However, as discussed, Albanian needs seem to be endless, and this creates the perfect 
environment for Turkey to intervene. 
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6.6 The rise of the Turkish-Albanian post-Cold War economic relations  
 
An increase of economic relations with Turkey is another area of hope for the weak Albanian 
economy. The economic situation in Turkey started to improve after the mid-1980 acceleration 
policies of the Prime Minister, then President, Özal. As a result, both agricultural and industrial 
production rose by 38 to 41 per cent respectively between 1980 and 1998710; proving Özal’s 
economic reforms to be successful. According to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, Turkey’s economic future is brilliant, and his government’s ambitious plan is to 
become “one of the top 10 largest economies in the world”711 by 2023. Although the Turkish 
economy has enjoyed growth over the past decades, in 2016, it showed signs of declining “from 
17th to 19th place in the rankings of the biggest economies” in the world.712 In the first month 
of 2016, Turkish exports to Western partners, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and the USA, 
declined by 14.4 per cent, whereas exports to Saudi Arabia and Egypt rose by 30.5 and 15.1 
per cent respectively.713 The Turkish government is working hard to finalise free trade 
agreements with Iran, and improve its relations with Israel, which will bolster Turkey’s 
ambition to become a regional leader. Shifts by the Turkish government from the West to its 
‘comfort zone’—the Middle East are not unknown; rather they show fluctuations in Turkey’s 
foreign policy and its international reputation, which according to the former Canadian defence 
attaché to Turkey, Chris Kilford, is “in free-fall”.714  
However, Turkey is a much bigger, richer and more powerful country than Albania and, 
therefore, an important strategic partner for Albania. Turkey’s population of approximately 80 
million is 27 times bigger than the number of Albanians who still live in Albania; the Turkish 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has passed 850 billion US dollars, which is circa 60 times 
higher than the Albanian GDP. More importantly, Albanian import from Turkey is crucial for 
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the Albanian economy. According to the European Commission, at the end of 2017, Albania’s 
export to Turkey had an insignificant value of 0.8 percent of total Albanian exports, whereas 
the import from Turkey is in second place (after the European Union 28 countries) with 8.1 
percent.715 The import-export relationship between the two countries places Turkey in a more 
favourable economic situation than Albania, and thus, increases the Turkish leverage in 
bilateral relations with Albania. 
Albania is central to the new Turkish engagement policy in the Balkans. According to 
Turkey’s commercial attaché for Albania, Muharrem Can, in 2013, Turkish businesses invested 
“1.5 billion [US] dollars, or about 10.5% of the Albanian GDP”, whereas Albania’s Turkish 
Ambassador Hidayet Bayraktar stated in 2015 that the Turkish foreign direct investments (FDI) 
in Albania increased to two billion Euros.716 The Turkish foreign ministry website states that 
“Turkey is the second major trade partner of Albania” with a value of investments “over 1 
billion Euros”.717 However, on 19 June 2017, in an interview for the Albanian Top Channel, 
Erdoğan proudly announced that Turkey had already invested three billion euros in Albania, 
stating: “I don’t know how many investments have arrived from the EU, but ours will not 
stop.”718 The economic connections between the two countries are rapidly strengthening.  
In the first quarter of 2018, nearly 270 licenced Turkish companies operated in Albania. 
In September 2018, Turkish workers residing in Albania remain 32 percent of the total foreign 
workers—the first place, followed by Chinese workers.719 Leading Turkish companies have 
invested and operate in crucial sectors of the Albanian economy.720 Large Turkish companies 
such as ENKA, Gintaş, Armada, Metal Yapı, Aldemir, and Servomatik are involved in 
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construction and the building industry in Albania. Others such as Çalık Holding, Türk 
Telekom, Makro-Tel and Hes Kablo are involved in telecommunications. The only Albanian 
national telephone company, Albtelecom, along with Eagle Mobile, are owned by BKT, a 
Turkish company. Similarly, the Turkish Çalık Group owns Albania’s second biggest bank – 
Banka Kombëtare Tregtare [The National-Commercial Bank].721 Şekerbank-BKT is present in 
banking and telecommunications. Kürüm has invested in the iron and steel industry, managing 
a steel factory, the only functional part of the previous backbone of the Albanian mineral 
industry—the Elbasan metallurgic factory. 
Turkish investments are also very present in other sectors of the Albanian economy 
such as health with Universal Hospital Group; mining with Ber-Oner and Dedeman; 
manufacturing and consumer goods retail with Yilmaz Cable, Merinos, Everest, Pino and RM 
Kocak. Education is another sector influenced by Turkish organisations: Turkish Gülistan and 
Istanbul Foundations have invested heavily in all stages of education from primary schools to 
tertiary education. Turkish companies manage four medium-sized hydropower plants, the 
largest port of Albania—Durrës goods terminal, and important parts of the Albanian 
infrastructure, such as the construction of the North-South freeway Rruga e Kombit, which 
connects Albania with Kosovo. To support these companies, the number of Turkish citizens 
who reside in Albania on work permits is bigger than Italian and Greek citizens.722  
While the Albanian media has described Turkish economic involvement as “the second 
invasion”723 of Albania, Can argues that the Turkish government does not seek to economically 
dominate the region. According to Can, the increase in import-export with Albania is a result 
of the Turkish economy growing rapidly in the region.724 Can’s diplomatic statement does not 
negate the increase of Turkish influence over Albania. In reality, the Turkish Ambassador, 
Bayraktar, was “not satisfied with these [economic] figures, when comparing the excellent 
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level of our [Turkish and Albanian] political relations”.725 This was also confirmed by the new 
Turkish Ambassador, Murat Ahmet Yörük, who in February 2018, stated that Turkish 
investments in Albania although having reached 2.7 billion Euros, needs to increase.726 
Strengthening bilateral economic ties in the future will help the Albanian economy, whilst 
bringing Turkey closer to the Western Balkans.  
However, it has been argued that Erdoğan is using Turkish businesses as leverage to 
heavily invest in religious institutions.727 The Turkish government is facilitating economic and 
cultural ties with Albania through its Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA) and the 
Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in Albania. Following requests from the Albanian 
government, TIKA is investing to restore “mosques, bazars and historical houses” in 
Albania.728 As has been described, a significant proportion of that contribution has been 
dedicated to cultural and religious restoration, with an aim to increase the support for Albanian 
Muslims.729 For example the Grand Mosque ‘Namazgja’, which is the largest mosque in 
Albania, cost around 30 million euros and was fully financed by Turkey’s Presidency of 
Religious Affairs (Diyanet).730 However, meeting the Albanian diaspora in the USA, Bushati 
denied Turkey’s influence on Albania; and claimed that the Grand Mosque was built to satisfy 
needs of Albanian Muslims.731 This shows that Turkey is indeed seeking to gain influence in 
Albania through religion, while the Albanian government, when questioned, is denying Turkish 
interference in Albania’s cultural and religious matters. The Albanian government is covering 
the reality of at least another dozen mosques in Albania, which are fully financed and 
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inaugurated by Erdoğan.732 This is not economic help for Albanians, but rather a continuation 
of the Ottoman policy; investing on Islam as a permanent-long-term-strategy for Albania.733  
 
6.7 Turkey: a NATO ally and Albania’s guarantor 
 
The defence sector has been seen the strongest cooperation between Turkey and Albania. The 
post-Cold War era has been a period of reformation in the Turkish armed forces. This brought 
about a modern and capable Turkish army, operating within NATO since 1990 in missions in 
places such as Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.734 Erickson believes that factors such 
as ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ are both ‘potential triggers’ for the rise of Turkish 
power.735  
Under the NATO mandate, Albania had a unit of soldiers operating in Afghanistan, 
“serving within the Turkish command deployed in Kabul”.736 Although Albania became a 
NATO member in 2009, since the end of the Cold War, Albania has depended heavily on 
Turkish “assistance in training and supply of cutting edge defence technology, as well as the 
reconstruction of Albania’s military bases and their maintenance”.737 According to Limaj, a 
new era of military partnership between the two countries started on 19 November 1992, with 
the signing of a partnership agreement to educate and train the Albanian forces.738 For the 
former Turkish Defence Minister, Nevzat Ayaz, the “agreement focused on broadening 
bilateral cooperation in the areas of military education and technology.”739 As part of this 
agreement, Turkish military personnel of “infantry, land, naval and Air Force bases have 
trained Albanian Armed Forces”; providing technological equipment and helping to “rebuild 
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its military infrastructure”.740 There has been an increasing number of high-level military visits 
between Albania and Turkey since then. For example, between 19 January and 20 November 
1992, the Albanian Army General Kristaq Karoli, Defence Minister Safet Zhulali and General 
Ilia Vasho visited Turkey. The Turkish General Doğan Güreş and the Defence minister Nevzat 
Ayaz returned their visit in the same year. During his visit to Albania, the Turkish defence 
minister, Ayaz stated that it is Turkey’s ‘obligation’ to help its little ‘sister’, Albania. The 
Albanian defence minister Safet Zhulali visited Turkish military bases and factories; sharing 
sensitive information when no other defence minister from a country that was not a NATO 
member had done before.741 A month later, after the Albanian delegation returned from Turkey 
on 28 August 1992, “the Turkish Gearing Class destroyer, TCG Mareşal Fevzi Çakmak,” 
visited the Albanian port of Durrës.742 Both of these episodes can be interpreted as an indication 
of the high level of trust between the two countries, but they also demonstrate Albania’s and 
Turkey’s need to demonstrate Turkey’s power in the Western Balkans. The collaboration 
between Albania and Turkey in economic and defence matters seems not only to bolster 
political relations between the two countries, but also to reassure the Albanian government. 
More recent evidence of this military demonstration and strong ties between the two countries 
includes high Albanian military officials proudly welcoming the visit to Durrës of the Turkish 
submarine “TCG Sakarya” on 10 November 2014743 and "TCG I. INONU ‘S 360’” on 30 
March 2017.744 
Analysing some official statistics, Limaj claims that Turkey has spent more than any 
other country in training all levels of the Albanian military forces thus far.745 Turkey has 
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equipped the Albanian Guard of the Republic, trained the Albanian special troops, 
reconstructed the Albanian military base at Pashaliman, the Marine Academy of Vlorë and the 
Air Force Academy of Kuçovë; it has also modernised the munitions factories at Poliçan and 
Gramsh. Between 1992 and 2000, more than 1000 Albanian students and military officials 
were educated at the Turkish academies, and Turkish military officials trained 3491 Albanian 
troops in Albania.746 In the last two decades, “many Albanian military students [graduated or 
are] studying in the Turkish War Academies”, and “from 1998 onwards, over 100 Albanian 
students graduated from the National Police Academy”.747 It has been argued that as a result 
of this involvement, Turkey has an intimate and detailed knowledge of Albanian security 
matters.  
While these indicators show Turkey as a trustworthy strategic partner for the Albanian 
government, considering the history of relations between the two countries, Albania’s trust in 
Turkey on security matters seems puzzling. However, at the end of the nineteenth and the 
beginning of the twentieth century, Turkey was considered by some Albanian leaders as the 
only hope to protect Albania from being partitioned by its neighbours—the same way Albanian 
leaders felt at the end of the twentieth century. It seems that Albania’s need for Turkish military 
muscle at the beginning of the twenty-first century is similar to that of the previous century. 
On the other hand, as Sugar mentions, “the Ottoman political legacy must be considered the 
greatest problem faced by peoples who, once again, had become masters of their own 
destiny”.748  
 
6.8 Geopolitics and energy security drivers in the Albanian-Turkish relations 
 
In the twenty-first century, Albania is hoping to strengthen its geopolitical position in the 
region with two main projects: The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Pan-European 
Corridor VIII— Via Egnatia, which has remained a cultural and archaeological site of what 
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was once considered as “the biggest nexus between East and West”.749 While the Corridor VIII 
is still waiting to be classified as a priority by the EU, TAP project is currently going through 
its implementation stage.   
In February 2013, after ten years of negotiation and assessments750, TAP was selected 
as the best project to bring Caspian natural gas from the Shah Deniz gas field to Italy and from 
there to Europe. The pipeline will be connected to the Turkish Trans Anatolian Pipeline 
(TANAP) at the Greek-Turkish border. TANAP will then connect to the South Caucasus 
Pipeline Expansion (SCPX) that runs across Georgia and Azerbaijan. TAP will be 870 km long 
and will cross Greece, Albania and the Adriatic Sea to deliver the gas to Santa Foca (Italy).  
The aim of TAP is to diversify Europe’s energy sources, which at the moment are 
heavily dependent on Russia. TAP’s significance was amplified after Russia annexed Crimea 
on 18 March 2014. After this event, the conflict between a number of EU countries and Russia 
deepened, and consequently, American and European sanctions were placed on Russia. All 
countries involved in this project: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Italy, Turkey, Greece and Albania hope 
to advance their relations with the EU, as TAP will place them in a favourable position 
compared to other regional neighbours. It remains to be seen whether bilateral relations 
between the not-yet EU members—Turkey and Albania—may bear fruit as a result of energy 
and security matters.  
Nevertheless, TAP offers an economic win-win situation for all countries the gas 
pipeline runs through. Turkey, Greece and Albania—all NATO members- are countries that 
will generate income for their economies. For Albania, TAP is currently the biggest 
international investment751, placing Albania, Turkey and Greece at the centre of energy security 
policies within the EU. TAP may also improve trilateral relations between Turkey, Greece and 
Albania after centuries of extremely troubled relations.752  
                                                 
749 Bulut and Idriz, 9. 
750 "TAP project millestones", Trans Adriatic Pipeline, accessed 27 January 2018, http://www.tap-ag.com/the-
pipeline/project-timeline/tap-project-milestones. 
751 "Building the pipeline in Albania", Trans Adriatic Pipeline, accessed 27 January 2016, http://www.tap-
ag.com/the-pipeline/building-the-pipeline/in-albania. 
752 Olga Demetriou, Capricious Borders: Minority, Population, and Counter-Conduct Between Greece and 
Turkey, United States: Berghahnbooks, 2013, 2. 
 172 
Nevertheless, the latest shifts of Turkey’s foreign policy designed to develop a closer 
relationship with Moscow753, allow Russia to deliver its gas to Turkey through the ‘Turkish 
Stream’ pipeline situated only 10 km from TAP.754 This project will challenge TAP—the first 
pipeline that delivers gas to Europe that does not originate from Russia. Turkey will be a key 
player here as both TANAP and Turkish Stream are running through its territory, and Albania 
can only hope that TAP will be the preferred pipeline for European countries.  
On the other hand, while Putin is getting closer to Erdoğan, the anxiety of Kosovar 
Albanians is increasing, as they see the US and Turkey as their protectors against Serbian plans 
to regain Kosovo. They believe that Putin will return Kosovo to Serbia.755 Therefore, Turkey’s 
‘regional integration’ role in the Western Balkans is confusing. While Albanians welcome 
Turkey to soften Russian ambitions in the Western Balkans, on the other hand, they still hope 
Turkey to be the barrier for historical encroachment against Albanians in the region. 
 
6.9 Islamic revival during Albania’s post-Cold War period 
 
After WWII, Albanians followed two forms of Islam: Sunni and Bektashi. Hoxha’s Cultural 
Revolution in 1967 affirmed Albania to be an atheist state, but the religious concepts survived 
and started to flourish after the restoration of religious freedom by the Albanian parliament in 
December 1990. Between 1991 and 1996, Young writes that “120 new sects and faiths” were 
formally registered as entities into a legal register under the Albanian State Secretariat of 
Religious created in 1991.756 Albania’s official religions, Sunni Islam, and Orthodox and 
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Catholic Christianity, along with the “traditional community”757 of Bektashism, began to re-
emerge. While there are significant divisions between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the two 
religions are united by the cross. Similarly, Sunni and Bektashi Muslims are united by the 
crescent moon, and thus, Islam. Clayer finds it “striking” that administratively, Bektashi and 
Sunni-Islamic institutions are separated, while on the other hand, their “Islamicization” can be 
interpreted as the “affirmation of a Muslim identity”.758  
As a result of a disastrous economic situation inherited from the Communist regime in 
the early years after the Cold War, atheism and religious concepts were superseded by people’s 
needs for basic commodities such as food, shelter, and employment. In 1992, both Europe and 
the USA were reluctant to invest in Albania, and as a result, the slogan: “Toward Europe or 
Islam” became part of Albanian media and politics.759 On the other hand, Islam became a 
powerful tool for the Albanian government when Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya and 
Turkey started to funnel money to re-build Islam in Albania.760 In contrast to other ex-
communist countries in eastern Europe, the post-Cold War era in Albania triggered a bigger 
challenge with regards to religious orientation not only for the Albanian government, but also 
for the entire Albanian society. Although the Albanian government is secular, it seems that 
lack of a clear platform has created issues for Albanian politicians in the last two and a half 
decades. Vickers and Pettifer observe that: 
 
the intellectual disorientation being caused by the religions struggle in terms of the traditional 
national identity is considerable, and has been an important factor in the difficulties the 
government has faced761  
 
In fact, after a long participation as a full member of the OIC, the Albanian head of 
Parliament and the current President, Ilir Meta, refused to participate in the OIC’s ninth 
Parliamentary Assembly held on 18-19 February 2014 in Tehran. His predecessor, Josefina 
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Topalli, on the other hand, had been part of the Albanian delegation to the OIC’s seventh 
Parliamentary Assembly in Indonesia.762 Meta downplayed his absence, blaming his 
government’s budget, but it is commonly accepted that Albania’s Euro-Atlantic commitments 
are the major driver; preventing the participation of the Albanian delegation in further OIC 
forums.763 Albanian authorities also blamed the short notice given by the organising country, 
Turkey, for the countries inability to participate in an urgent OIC meeting in December 2017, 
which had the objective to counteract the decision of the President Donald Trump, to recognise 
Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. However, the Albanian pro-Turkish and OIC vote not only 
shows clear signs of hesitancy or more appropriately ambiguities, but it rather explains that it 
is hard for the Albanian government to disassociate itself from Turkey and OIC. 
 
6.10 The continuation of Turkish-Islamic policy in Albania 
 
Although in the twenty-first century, there is little tension between the Turkish government’s 
way of supporting Islam and the Albanian multi-religious approach, the effect of Islam in 
Albania is provocative, and scholars are divided in two camps. One camp agrees that the 
‘Islamization’ of Albanian-speaking people enriched the Albanian culture; creating ‘a new 
identity’764 that was more dynamic than the previous Christian religion. Others, such as Kadare, 
think that the Ottoman Empire and Islam negatively influenced Albanian culture and identity. 
Religious matters have been instrumental in bringing Albania closer to Turkey after the Cold 
War. Since 1992 the number of Turkish primary and secondary, religious and secular schools 
in Albania started to emerge. In 1994, a secondary school for four hundred students was built 
in South Albania, with a curriculum to be delivered in both Turkish and English.765 As 
Krauthamer mentions, not only the Turkish government but also a “Turkish-based Islamic 
movement committed to interfaith dialogue, globalization, and making money is changing the 
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face of the country’s school system”.766 Vickers and Pettifer believe that at a cultural level, 
relations are still close for many Albanians and “a major growth of Islamic influence in Turkey 
would certainly have effects in Albania”.767 According to Vickers and Pettifer, these cultural 
similarities mainly explain the traditional white Albanian fez, which seems to be “a glimpse 
back to the Ottoman world in the centre of a small European city”.768 Thus, Turkey’s 
government’s religious politics towards Albania, in the last decades deserve more attention.  
Religion may play a role in the future of bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania, 
as it did when the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan pressured the former Albanian 
Prime Minister Sali Berisha to vote pro Palestine at the UN General Assembly resolution 67/19 
on 29 November 2012. The Albanian media, Top Channel, in paraphrasing the Turkish 
Hürriyet, described the Albanian vote as “conditioned by Erdoğan”.769 Erdoğan used his 
political power to support The Palestinians over Israel, castigating the Albanian leader for 
following the same line. Albania’s abstention vote shows once more difficulty of the Albanian 
position and the pull between West or East, acknowledging the complications of Turkish 
influence over Albania.  
The Turkish government is trying to express its sympathy for other ‘Muslim brother’ 
states. Well known for his defence of the International Muslim community, Erdoğan is warning 
the West to avoid Islamophobia, which, according to him “has become a serious problem”.770 
After the terrorist attack on the French journal Charlie Hebdo on 9 January, 2015, Erdoğan 
agreed with the Turkish Parliamentary speaker Cemil Çiçek, who thinks that the international 
community must “stand together against Islamophobic incidents which would create clashes 
among religions, civilizations and sects”.771 While the Turkish government, including its 
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president, are using Turkish influence to protect Muslim rights and fight stereotypes against 
Islam, some think there is now a slow drift towards Islam. For others, the Turkish government’s 
reactions can also be interpreted as an “increasingly punitive and xenophobic” approach 
embraced by President Erdoğan of recent, doing more harm to the fight against 
Islamophobia.772  
The question whether Islam is rising in Turkey is not the purpose of this paper.  
Nevertheless, the controversial “religious democracy” of bringing back the headscarf for 9-10-
year-old girls, and also the idea of building a mosque for every University in Turkey cannot go 
unnoticed.773 These are indications of Turkey’s religious policy shifts. On this controversial 
topic Kemal secularists are concerned with “creeping Islamization” as a hidden agenda by the 
AKP aiming “to Islamize Turkish society”.774 The concern with developments of Turkish Islam 
that could influence the Albanian position towards religion, at a time when the Albanian 
government and religious communities are promoting Albanian religious harmony775 remains.  
 
6.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter analysed increasing bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania with regard 
to economy, foreign policy, energy and security matters since the creation of both nation-states. 
These bilateral relations have been very friendly, although intermittent during the communist 
period. A poor Albania at the end of the Cold War provided a ‘golden’ opportunity for Turkey 
to develop closer ties. Albania, on the other hand, needs Turkey’s military power in the region. 
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In the twenty-first century, political relations between Albania and Turkey have reached a new 
importance. Although Turkey is Albania’s strategic partner, trade between the two countries 
has not yet reached its full potential. While exports to Turkey are insignificant, Albanian 
economy depends on imports from Turkey that are rising. Things are different when it comes 
to defence and security matters. The Albanian government favours Turkey compared to other 
neighbours in the Western Balkans. The excellent political relations between the two countries 
will improve even further after the implementation of energy and infrastructure projects such 
as TAP. It remains to be seen how these developments will affect the Euro-Atlantic vision of 
both countries. 
Turkey has indeed helped the weaker Albania in difficult times when Albania 
desperately needed Turkish support. After the Cold War, along with donations in areas such as 
the economy, religion, health, education and security, Turkey stepped forward to reassure 
protection of Albanian territorial integrity in 1997, and in 1999, actively participated in 
NATO’s war against the regime of Milošević. However, despite the generosity, Turkish 
support also aims to achieve closer links to the Western Balkans. This has implications for 
Albanian foreign policy. Erdoğan’s latest policies are pushing Turkey onto a different path 
from that of the West, at a time when the EU is dealing with a number of crises:  Brexit, 
Russia’s occupation of the Ukraine, refugees arriving in large numbers from African and 
Middle-Eastern countries, the Catalonia crisis, and the rise of extreme right and left-wing 
parties, threatening Europe’s internal unity. Along with these crises, the lack of a clear 
perspective from EU regarding the membership of Western Balkan countries, and more 
importantly, the reluctance of the EU and the USA to increase their presence in the region, 
create a fertile environment for Erdoğan to revive the narrative of the Ottoman Empire in the 
Western Balkans. Islam is always a strong element used by Erdoğan’s Turkey in Albania. 
Erdoğan’s statement during his visit in Prizren in 2013 that “Turkey is Kosovo and Kosovo is 
Turkey” very well encapsulates his future plans for Albanians and the Western Balkans.776 
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CHAPTER 7. ESCAPING THE OTTOMAN HERITAGE UNDER THE TURKISH 
INFLUENCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY? 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
So far, we have outlined the main factors determining and defining Albanian ethno-national 
identity, in which the period of Ottoman occupation played such a major role. Without such 
detailed analysis it would not be possible to adequately address the central research question, 
namely in what ways Albanians and the Albanian state are dealing with the Ottoman heritage 
in the new global environment? Is Albania moving away from its Ottoman past, or does Turkish 
influence continue to play a role in the twenty-first century, specifically in aligning Albania 
strategically back towards its traditional Eastern imperial centre and newly powerful player in 
the Eastern Mediterranean, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey? 
The aim of the current chapter is to address the questions whether Albania is trying to escape 
from the Ottoman heritage, or whether the rejection of Turkish influence is merely a claim, 
made to achieve political ends. Is Albania seeking to escape its Ottoman heritage, re-orient 
itself towards the West and “restore” its pre-Ottoman “European identity”, reviving its pre-
Ottoman roots and reclaiming a Western-Christian aspect? Or, if the former case is true, and 
Albania is still deeply linked to Turkey, will the nation continue to quietly accommodate the 
pressures, requirements, and outright requests of the Turkish state? My findings and 
conclusions to these questions are organized under the headings of regional and energy security 
areas, politics, and traditional understandings of historical, cultural, religious and linguistic 
identity factors. 
 
7.2 Escaping the Ottoman heritage under the pressure of Turkish influence 
 
Modern Turkey is facing its own challenges in the twenty-first century. As discussed in the 
second chapter, Turkey is politically divided between the two broad-based affiliations, the 
governing and the opposition alliances. The ruling alliance is led by Erdoğan’s Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) in alliance with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi, MHP). On the other hand, the fragmented opposition group was led by the 
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centre-left wing of secular Kemalists or the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk 
Partisi, CHP) up until the last June 2018 elections, a time when CHP officials considered the 
agreement with the Iyi Parti (Iyi Party), and the Sunni far-right-conservative—Saadet Partisi 
(Saadet Party) outdated.777 The pro-Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP), a political Party 
that represented 11.7 percent of Turkish voters in the last elections, was not part of any 
alliance.778 In 2016, the Turkish military attempted another coup, which according to the 
Turkish government, was organised by Gülen’s movement. Fethullah Gülen who spent the first 
part of his life as an Imam is influential in the Turkish civil society, a reputation that started to 
rise in 80-90’s, while he was promoting in his Islamic organisations people who were educated 
in his movement schools; making them feel a personal debt to the divisive preacher.779 Since 
1999, Gülen who was under investigation for overthrowing the Turkish government, is living 
in his self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania, from where he is still running his religious popular 
movement called Hizmet (in Turkish Service). In 2000, he was convicted in absentia by the 
Turkish tribunal, but the common Islamic agenda aligned him with Erdoğan’s values, after the 
AKP won Turkish elections in 2002.780 Gülen had the tools to serve Erdoğan and up until 2011, 
they were allies, to then become enemies of each other. Since 2013, Erdoğan is blaming the 
scapegoat781—Gülen for troubling Turkey through planning and organising the 2016 Turkish 
coup.782   
  We have seen in the previous chapter that in 2018, Turkish economy and its currency 
are far from achieving what Davutoğlu projected Turkey to be in 2023. In the international 
arena, the foreign policy of Erdoğan’s Turkey is a mixture of requests to ally with Europe and 
the West, while shifting eastern-ward to Middle East and Russia. However, the increasing 
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military power of Turkey in the twenty-first century is notable. Erdoğan’s decision to purchase 
armaments from Russia is jeopardising Turkey’s relations with NATO; making 
unpredictability one of the main features of the Turkish foreign policy in the twenty-first 
century. Despite these challenges, as outlined in chapter six, Erdoğan’s Turkey is attempting 
to become a regional power, and thus, revive the past Ottoman ‘glory’ in the Western Balkans, 
where Muslim populations such as Albanians became crucial players.  
Turkish power, proximity and Eastern Mediterranean influence impacts on Albanian 
domestic and international affairs, and offers Turkey the potential specifically to return to the 
Western Balkans as a major partner. So far, in chapter six, we have established that the "new" 
Turkey is intentionally influencing Albania and its nation identity in areas such as regional and 
energy security, politics, economy, religion and culture. Chapter five outlined debates that 
thesis of the Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare has created. In his thesis, Kadare claims that 
Albanian identity is European as Albania is geographically and spiritually ‘attached’ to Europe. 
Kadare goes back in history to establish similarities between Albanian and European identity, 
which according to him, was interrupted by the Ottoman-Turks at the end of the fourteenth 
century. He argues that before the Ottoman arrival Albanians were mostly Christian-
Europeans. Thus, for Kadare, Albania belongs to Europe, and it was the Ottoman ‘barbarians’ 
that separated Albania from its European heritage and identity. Isolated and individual political 
voices in politics, scholarship and the media have been heard in support of Kadare's argument 
that the Ottoman heritage does not reflect "true" Albanian identity, and that the residues and 
remnants of the Ottoman heritage must therefore be repudiated. Other powerful voices led by 
another Albanian scholar, Rexhep Qosja strongly oppose European identity of Albanians, 
whom, he believes, are more Easterners than Westerners and more Muslims than Christians. 
We also have discussed in chapter five that some Albanian politicians, scholars, media and 
individuals view modern Turkey as the best role model for Albanians in the region. In their 
reticence, even silence, on these issues, both current Albanian and Kosovar governments give 
the impression that they too are oriented toward Turkey rather than the European Union.  
In conclusion of the chapter five we have claimed that in the twenty-first century, the 
Albanian government’s policies that distance Albanians and thus Albanian identity from that 
of the Ottoman-Turks are missing. We will ultimately examine whether both the Albanian and 
Kosovar governments have the political will to escape the Ottoman heritage? Governments are 
indeed elected by people, so the first point of this analysis is the perception that Albanians have 
for Turkey in the twenty-first century. 
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7.3 Blaming the Ottomans and aligning with Turks in the twenty-first century    
 
The Albanian-Turkish relationship is multi-dimensional and complex in historical, cultural, 
political and other terms.783 As we have seen in chapter five, not all Albanians have negative 
views about the Ottoman era. Along with Qosja, another Albanian scholar, Pajaziti has 
demonstrated that the negative perception of the Ottomans represents Albanian elitist views, 
whereas in reality, Albanian people living in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia have generally 
positive sentiments towards Turkey.784 A study in this field conducted by GENAR in 2008-
2009, and summarised by Pajaziti, suggests that Albanians of Macedonia are closely tied to the 
Ottoman-Turkish culture and language. According to Pajaziti's figures analyses, the Albanians 
of Macedonia speak more Turkish than the Albanians of Kosovo and Albania, and 41.2 percent 
of Albanian-Macedonians interviewed called Turkey “fatherland” compared to 0.6 percent of 
Kosovars and zero percent of Albanians. According to Pajaziti, the majority, 60.6 percent of 
Albanians and 53.8 percent of Kosovar Albanians think Turkey is a friendly country, but 
Kosovar-Albanians seem to be closer “to the Turkish cultural code”.785 Moreover almost a third 
of Albanians considered Istanbul as the most beautiful city in the Balkans to spend their 
vacations—better than Tirana or Athens.786  Debates on social media show a clear division 
between those Albanians who perceive themselves as having an Albanian-Western-European 
identity and others who are more sympathetic with Turkish-Oriental identity. If Turkey were a 
major source of influence, power and employment, we could have expected that the majority 
of Albanian emigrants head to Turkey. This is not, however, the case as, since 1991, the main 
destinations for Albanian migrants are rather two European countries: Italy and Greece. While 
this may in part be due to geographic proximity, the perceived cultural ties with Turkey are 
clearly not strong enough to attract large numbers of Albanian migrants. However, acording to 
Mejdini, in the last ten years, Turkey remains the top touristic destination for Albanians.787 It 
                                                 
783 Pajaziti, 27-29 May 2011, International Symposium, Skopje, Macedonia-Prishtinë, Kosovo. Ankara Center 
For Thought And Research and International Balkan University, 2. 
784 Ibid., 9. 
785 Ibid., 12. 
786 Ibid., 10. 
787 Fatjona Mejdini, "Turqia mbetet në krye të destinacioneve të preferuara të shqiptarëve për pushime [Turkey 
remains the favourite top turistic destination for Albanians]", author’s translation, 3 July 2017, accessed 27 
 182 
is safe to claim that at the popular level, modern Turkey is considered as a close-culturally-
related country for many Albanians, but not a major player in terms of employment or offering 
a 'better future.'788 
Communication, sport and culture exchange with Turkey are also areas of interest for 
Albanians. The best examples are Turkish TV series, which, according to Pajaziti, 95.1 percent 
of Albanians in Macedonia watch between one to four hours per day. Although Kosovar and 
Albanian viewer numbers are lower (61.2 and 38.7 percent respectively)789, the empathy for 
Turkish culture is nonetheless evident. Turkish television series are aiming to portray a new 
Turkish society that can be identified as a role model for Balkan countries. According to Lami, 
Turkish influence in the Western Balkans, and especially in Albania, reveals geopolitical, geo-
economic and geo-cultural doctrines.790 While Albanians enthusiastically watch Turkish TV 
programs and thus absorb Turkish culture, on the other hand, significant Albanian media 
pundits and public intellectuals identify Ottoman characters with negative traits of  
promiscuity, polygamy, and other Turkish cultural characteristics.791 This is the point where 
the opinions of Albanians differ. Unlike the Ottoman Empire, modern Turkey is considered by 
everyday Albanians to be a country with a compatible friendly culture.  
 
7.4 Restoring five centuries of historical humiliation 
 
Albanians blame the Ottoman Empire, not modern Turkey, for halting Albania’s historical 
development. The Albanian rilindja writers started the process of distancing Albanian identity 
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from Ottoman culture.792  In today’s Albanian history schoolbooks, rilindja writers are 
identified as fighting for the Albanian cause with everything they had at their disposal, ‘me 
pushkë dhe me penë’ [through guns and pens]. This begins with an early rilindja illuminist: 
Naum Veqilharxhi who wrote the first Albanian language school book (Abetare) in 1846. He 
warned that “nations need a written language as the only way of surviving”.793 Other rilindja 
leaders who had a significant impact in Albanian identity formation were the Frashëri brothers. 
Sami Frashëri, (1850 – 1904)  (known in Turkey as Şemseddin) Sami, was a writer, linguist 
and playwright who played a major role not only in the creation of the Albanian alphabet in 
1886, but he was also instrumental in founding the Turkish alphabet.794 In 1879 Sami Frashëri 
founded a cultural and educational organisation called the “Printing of Albanian Writings” in 
Constantinople.795  He wrote the grammar of the Albanian language in 1890, but also 
illuminated the future of Albania; revealing, in line with Veqilharxhi, that Albania one day 
must be an independent nation.796 His older brother, Naim (1846 – 1900) labelled the Ottomans 
as “a big beast” that came from Asia and with “cruelty in their eyes” and “a satanic heart”, 
“killed, severed and impoverished” in a way that “grass wouldn’t grow” wherever the beast 
stepped on the Albanian soil which had previously “flourished”.797 Their oldest brother Abdyl 
(1839-1892) was also known as one of the first political ideologues of the Albanian Awakening 
who played a crucial role in the League of Prizren. Abdul was captured by Turkish troops and 
sentenced to jail for his anti-Turkish propaganda.798 Therefore, Albanian rilindja leaders forged 
the Albanian anti-Turkish sentiment, a concept that is present in today’s Albanian history 
textbooks in Primary and Secondary schools. For example, The History of the Albanian People 
published by the Albanian Science Academy describes Ottoman Sultans as invaders of the 
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Albanian lands; bringing ruin and destruction and taking the Albanian royal children 
hostage.799   
This fact has not gone unnoticed by Turkish authorities who refuse to describe the 
Ottoman occupation of Albania with the term “invasion”. Turkish authorities are extremely 
careful about how they describe the Ottoman occupation. According to the Turkish narrative, 
the Ottomans came to Albania to administer and protect it instead. Recent requests from 
Turkish authorities to the Albanian and Kosovar governments to alter the presentation of 
Ottoman history in Albanian schoolbooks, and to portray Ottomans as “friendly 
administrators”800 or, preferably, “protectors” who brought about political stability on the 
Albanian speaking lands highlight this belief, and show that this is a complex issue, which 
continues to cause trouble in bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania.  
During his visit to Tirana in October 2009, Turkey’s foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
observed that Balkan countries and Turkey share “a common history, destiny and future”.801 
This sparked debate in the Albanian media, and the Albanian government authorities were 
hesitant to admit whether Davutoğlu and Turkish authorities had also requested amendments 
of Albanian history schoolbooks.802 In 2011, the Turkish Prime Minister, the Minister of 
Education and the Turkish Embassy in Prishtina officially requested Kosovar authorities to 
review all history texts that are related to the Ottoman ruling of Kosovo and remove words 
such as “‘barbaric’, ‘wild’, ‘invasion’, ‘violence’, ‘murder’, ‘blood tribute’ and ‘slavery’”.803 
As a result, a commission led by Kosovo’s Ministry of Education reviewed all history 
textbooks. The commission found that the text books used loaded language that portrayed the 
Ottomans as “severe conquerors” and thus, they removed ninety percent of these words and 
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phrases.804 This ignited a real debate. The Kosovar-Albanian historian, Frashër Demaj, 
expressed his disappointment with both Albanian and Kosovar governments that according to 
him, are interfering with historians and specialists in the field.805 Demaj openly refused to 
recognise decisions made by the commission that, he thinks, interfere in scholarly issues and 
ignore the copyright policies.806 In March 2013, Ismail Kadare led a petition signed by 100 
Albanian intellectuals807, which was sent to the Albanian and Kosovar Presidents Bujar Nishani 
and Ahtifete Jahjaga. In this petition, Albanian intellectuals required that amendments of the 
Albanian history be analysed and implemented according to methodological principals of 
historical science and not the interests of the Turkish government.808 The petition reminded the 
government authorities that the Ottomans “occupied” Albanian speaking lands not in a 
“friendly” way, but rather by force; disconnecting Albania from Europe and causing indelible 
drama and tragedy to the historical memory of the Albanian nation. As it continues: 
The Turkish occupation for five-centuries was violent, and within this period there were 
continued acts of violence, killings and exterminations, whilst Albanians were the most 
persecuted people of the Empire…Let’s remember the fact that unlike other languages of the 
Empire, the Albanian language was forcibly prohibited. This fact alone reveals the genocide of 
the Ottoman Empire against Albanians, their culture and identity…We cannot hide historical 
truths…The changing of history by Turkish experts represents cultural aggression, striking at 
the backbone of the nation; unacceptable insults for Albanians with consequences for their 
future and identity.809  
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However, this petition does not represent views of the Albanian and Kosovar 
governments, but rather independent voices of Albanian writers, academics and artists who 
live in Albania and abroad. In the twenty-first century, the Turkish government is using its 
political influence against Albanian and Kosovar government authorities and constraining 
them to re-interpret the history in a way they want to. Others such as the Turkish scholar, 
Türbedar, maintain that Turkey has not done enough to halt prejudices that associate Turks 
with the Ottomans. For example, Türbedar believes that Albanians are rewriting their history 
and portraying Turks as enemies of Albanians, despite culture similarities and their love for 
Turkish television series.810 Türbedar stresses that even the Albanian Academy of Sciences 
portrays the Ottomans as “fanatic, backward and intolerant rulers, who oppressed Albanians 
with heavy taxes, political discrimination and the absence of the most elementary human rights, 
and would even resort to the massacre of the Albanian population”811; all issues discussed in 
this thesis. While Türbedar is convinced of the Albanian-Western Orientation, in the twenty-
first century, this topic remains a thorn in bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania. 
Certainly, on its way towards Euro-Atlantic orientation, the Albanian government is not aiming 
to distance Albania from their best friend in the region, Turkey. Nonetheless, it is easier to 
blame their ancestors, the Ottomans.  
 
7.5 Political interference in Albania’s domestic affairs 
 
The effects of the Ottoman cultural and historical legacy in Albania are still controversial and 
are also reflected at the political level in the twenty-first century. In a recent interview for Top 
Channel, in June 2017, Erdoğan stated that “we [Turks and Albanians] have been strong 
together for five centuries”812; avoiding words such as ‘occupation’ and ‘invasion’. The next 
day, the Kosovar-Albanian journalist and politician Arbana Xharra wrote a letter to the Turkish 
Ambassador in Prishtina; to dispute the statement issued by the Turkish President. She stated 
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that the reason for Erdoğan’s comment is to “convince us that we were not occupied [by the 
Ottoman-Turks], but rather we were lovers”.813  As Xharra continues: 
 
We do not share the same culture. However, we do share the history of being part of the 
Ottoman Empire. You must take on your shoulders occupation and crimes against the Albanian 
language, culture and humanity, which you exercised for five centuries in Albanian speaking 
lands… we learn from facts and history, except that of Turkey and neo-Ottomanism that you 
are trying to impose.814 
In a similar way, Shala, thinks that the physical occupation of Albanian lands by the 
Ottoman Empire is replaced in the twenty-first century by a spiritual, moral and cultural 
invasion of Turkey—a model that offers an alternative to Europe—the neo-Ottomanism, which 
is based in the superiority of the “Islamic moral”.815   
Erdoğan’s Turkey has sent repeated political requests to close all those Turkish schools 
in Albania, which according to Erdoğan has been financed by the Turkish religious leader in 
exile, Gülen, who he accuses of trying to break down the Albanian culture and religious 
pluralism. Erdoğan’s controversial request also included the closure of the Turgut Özal 
College, the elementary school that he himself inaugurated on 17 February 2005, a time that 
AKP and the movement of Gülen were allies.816 It is argued that Turkish authorities are 
persecuting those organisations and individuals who uncovered the corruption of Erdoğan’s 
cabinet in December 2013817, and therefore,  the same request that in 2014 was rejected by 
some African countries, was renewed to Albania.818 In an article published on 14 May 2015, 
Zaman noticed that the request of Erdoğan to close Turkish schools in Albania disappointed 
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some Albanian politicians.819  The same article cited the Albanian Socialist deputy, Ben Blushi, 
who stated that “Albania is not a Turkish colony” and then “our father is not Erdoğan, but 
Ismail Qemali”. According to the Albanian former finance and economy minister, Arben 
Malaj, the request to close Turkish schools, although seems to offer more Turkish investments, 
is done with an aim to transfer Turkish domestic issues to Albania, and despite the importance 
of investments in Albania, these requests are politically driven and contain danger for Albanian 
democracy. Zaman also cites an Albanian media analyst, Mero Baze, who thinks that Turkey 
as the Oriental partner of Albania, will need more Albania; its Western partner.820 However, 
all these attempts of Xharra, Blushi, Baze, and indeed Kadare, are individual opinions. The 
Albanian government never supported, nor denied these authoritative voices, but rather is 
keeping a neutral position on this issue, or better said, is working hard to not jeopardise the 
bilateral relations with Turkey—its strategical ally in the region. Not only Albania’s ambiguous 
position on these issues can have ramifications with its Euro-Atlantic partners, it may also 
encourage Erdoğan to go a step further; increasing the Turkish pressure on Albania’s decision 
to join the Europe and the West.   
In his attempt to renew his request to close schools ‘financed’ by Gülen in Albania, 
Erdoğan and the Turkish Ambassador in Albania, ‘suggested’ Albanian parents to send their 
children to the ‘safe’ Turkish schools; managed by the Maarif Foundation that is financed by 
the Turkish government. It is the Maarif Foundation that in a secret deal with the Albanian 
government bought in August 2018 the first Albanian private University—the New York 
University of Albania and all its sister institutions.821 Although existing Turkish schools in 
Albania have a good reputation in preparing quality students, on the other hand, using its 
influence, the Turkish government is interfering in domestic affairs of Albania on issues such 
as education of future generations that for a small and poor country such as Albania is crucial. 
What is more important, is the fact that Albanian government is allowing Turkey to do so. 
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After the end of the Cold War, bilateral relations between Turkey and Albania have 
increased and Turkish government has tried to influence, if not manipulate, decisions made by 
the Albanian government in the international arena. An example of this was in forcing 
Berisha’s government to join the OIC in 1992822, a decision that sparked a real debate in 
Albania.823 In addition, Erdoğan pressured the same Berisha to vote pro Palestine at the UN 
General Assembly resolution 67/19 in November 2012. The Albanian abstention vote was 
described by the Albanian media as “conditioned by Erdoğan”.824 Despite these two episodes, 
Vickers and Pettifer think there is lack of a great political influence of Turkey over Albania.825 
However, the Albanian government in 2017 offered a different view; siding with Palestine, and 
thus, voting at the UN resolution against the US decision to recognise Jerusalem as the capital 
of Israel—a project sponsored by Turkey.826 The reaction of the Albanian President Ilir Meta 
was immediate. He wrote a letter of regret to US President Trump; promising he will require 
explanation and clarification from the Albanian government for this disappointing vote.827 In 
his letter, Meta reassured Trump that this vote does not reflect the will of the Albanian nation. 
In concert with Meta, opposition political parties such as the Democratic Party (PD) and the 
Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) and different leaders from both sides of Albanian 
politics disagreed with this vote, which not only questions Albania’s strategic Partnership with 
USA, but on the other hand, shows once more the influence of Erdoğan over the Albanian 
government. In fact, both PD and LSI acted similarly when they were in power; joining the 
OIC and voting pro-Palestine, thus, waning under the pressure of Turkey. 
Under the present conditions, then, it seems that Albania is unlikely to abandon the 
links to Turkey and the East. These periodical returns to Turkey, will have ramifications for 
the Albanian government in the twenty-first century, as clearly mentioned by Phillips, an expert 
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in Albanian foreign policy. Interviewed by the Voice of America in April 2018, he highlighted 
the aim of Turkey to use Albania in order to impose its neo-Ottoman platform in the Western 
Balkans.828 Phillips asked Albanian government authorities to clarify whether they are 
choosing to side with West or with the East, as the current level of support for Erdoğan’s 
Turkey orients Albania strongly toward the Islamic East.829  The silence of the Albanian 
government on this issue speaks more than words and shows how resilient the Ottoman heritage 
is in Albania. 
  
7.6 Regional security  
As discussed in chapter four, territorial ambitions of both Serbia and Greece at the end of the 
nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century were, according to Limaj, again repeated 
in 1997. For this reason, Albanians did not trust their neighbours, Serbia and Greece any more 
than Turkey. This trust continued after the Cold War, as Turkey has been allowed to train the 
Albanian Army, police forces and the Guard of Republic. However, defining Turkey as more 
friendly than other Western Balkan states is controversial and problematic. Perhaps one 
explanation for this is the fact that the Ottoman occupation officially ended at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, a time when Albanian speaking territories were divided by the Great 
Powers, and Albania’s neighbours advanced their ambitious-military-plans to carve parts of 
Albania, a struggle that continued during two Balkan Wars and WWI. Thus, we see that the 
precariousness of security for the Albanian speaking lands is the driver for this trust and makes 
it indispensable for Albanians. In the twenty-first century, Albanians have not placed their 
security fears to rest, despite NATO, EU and Turkish involvement in Albania and Kosovo.  
However, in the twenty-first century, Turkish military engagement in the region needs 
careful attention. In September 2017, Erdoğan announced a deal to purchase surface-to-air 
missile systems—S-400s from Russia— “in the clearest sign of his pivot toward Russia and 
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away from NATO and the West”.830 This is not the first time that Turkey has attempted to buy 
arms from countries that are not NATO members. Earlier plans to buy missiles from China, 
were abandoned under pressure from the United States.831 According to Gall and Higgins, the 
last move of Erdoğan displays a:  
preference for the Russian model, with its sense of restoring a lost empire, returning Turkey to 
a more independent place in the world and rejecting Western democracy.832 
Russia also sold weapons to Greece, another NATO member and to Cyprus, however, Turkey 
is a ‘regional power’ and this deal may change the balance of power in the region. Along with 
Russia and some NATO countries such as Germany and United States, Turkey is also 
competing in the Balkans.833 After the Cold War, it is often argued that the disengagement of 
NATO and EU in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia will be quickly 
replaced by Russia, a military superpower that want to dominate the region. Turkey’s 
advancement in the Balkans as pro-Russian and anti-European, may shift the geo-political 
agendas of Western Balkan countries; challenging self-perception identities of countries with 
large Muslim populations such as Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Macedonia. 
Turkey’s latest foreign and military policy shifts create more concerns for Albanians. The main 
concern is that of losing the best military ally—Turkey who is now getting closer to Russia and 
perhaps, Serbia. There are also fears in Kosovo, as it waits to be recognised by both Serbia and 
Russia. In the twenty-first century, Serbia is getting new armaments from Russia834, while 
Serbian media is claiming that Kosovo is receiving armaments and training from Turkey.835 
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Albanians of Macedonia are not less concerned about Turkey’s latest shifts, after Russia has 
openly accused the West for supporting a pro-Albanian agenda in FYROM, which for Russia 
means nurturing the Greater Albania concept.836 Ultimately, Albanians don’t want to see 
Turkey’s military presence diminished in the region, but they fear Russo-Turkish alliance. 
However, it is unclear whether Albanian politicians are worried about the collaboration 
between Turkey and Russia as allegations about Russian money and interference in 2017 
Albanian elections remain current in political debates of Albania.837 On the other hand, 
Erdoğan’s Turkey is exercising the new alliance with Russia to thwart the West, the EU, and 
of course, maintaining its pressure on Albania; aiming to halt its Euro-Atlantic march.  
 
7.7 Energy and economic security 
 
Energy security will be another ‘tool’ at hands of Erdoğan to exercise its influence over 
Albania. The latest agreements between Erdoğan and Putin regarding energy security838, allow 
Russia to deliver its gas to Turkey through the ‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline.839 Although this 
project will compete with TAP—the first pipeline that delivers gas to Europe that does not 
originate from Russia, Turkey will be a key player here as both TANAP and Turkish Stream 
are running through its territory. While Europe becomes more dependent on Turkey regarding 
both pipelines, Albania can only hope that TAP will be the preferred pipeline for European 
countries. Turkey, on the other hand, holds the key to gas delivery through Albania, a country 
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that does not have a domestic gas distribution system, and thus, is hoping its economy and 
population will benefit from these pipelines. 
Although the European Union is Albania’s main trade partner, the Albanian 
government cannot afford to ignore economic relations with Turkey. Turkey has already 
invested 3 billion Euros in Albania, which is nearly one fourth of the Albanian GDP. As seen 
in chapter six, the level of imports from Turkey is considerable for the Albanian economy. 
Albania’s economy would struggle without the import from Turkey. Turkey has made generous 
economic donations to Albania between 1991-1997; both crucial points when the Albanian 
economy faced potential collapse. Albania’s trade relationship with Turkey are growing and a 
further alignment will bring more support to the Albanian economy. Only recently the Albanian 
government decided to build a second civil airport—the Vlorë Airport which will exceed the 
size of the only other airport in Albania—the Mother Teresa airport in Tirana. The 2.7 billion 
USD project was recently promoted by the Turkish Ambassador who stated that Turkey is the 
second biggest investor in Albania, and economic help is more important than words in 
changing the perception of Turkey in Albania.840 The Albanian authorities cannot ignore these 
vital projects. Inevitably, increasing involvement of Turkey in the Albanian economy will have 
political implications for Albania. If, in the twenty-first century, any help from Turkey comes 
to Albania with a price tag, this might merely be the case of Albanian government authorities 
siding more with Turkey in order to secure the so needed economic and energy support from 
Turkey.  
 
7.8 Culture resistance in preserving Turkish loanwords  
 
Although at the end of the nineteenth century rilindja writers started the process of purging of 
Turkish words from the Albanian language, the presence of these words in spoken and written 
Albanian continues to be another controversial topic. It can be argued that the tendency of 
escaping from the Ottoman heritage in Albania started at the turn of the twentieth century841, a 
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time when the Albanian rilindja leaders realised that religious divisions would be problematic 
for the establishment of national identity, and thus, “drew on language as a source of national 
unity”.842 Therefore, as discussed, the Albanian language has been one of the strongest 
elements representing the unification of Albanians. However, as with any other language, the 
Albanian language has not been immune from the phenomenon of borrowing words from other 
languages. The Albanian language analyses require more attention regarding the Turkish-main 
source of loanwords. Dizdari found that in the current time, the Albanian language contains 
4406843 Turkish words, and most of these words entered the Albanian spoken and written 
language during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.844 There are various reasons to explain 
why these words became part of the Albanian spoken and written language. Turkish loanwords 
entered the Albanian language through the Ottoman bureaucracy, military and religious 
services, the philosophic and religious education, economic links with trade centres in Turkey 
and other areas of the Empire and short and long-term immigration of Albanian speaking 
people that happened for economic, education and political reasons.845 The Ottoman 
bureaucracy forced Albanians846 to learn Turkish as the only language of administration, 
education, religious and trade activities in the Albanian-speaking lands. Privileged Albanians 
who benefitted from concessions of the Porte used more and more “Osmanlica” as the official 
language, whilst many Albanian intellectuals who were educated in Turkey absorbed elements 
of Turkish language, which were then inevitably added to the Albanian language and culture. 
Another factor that brought about more Turkish words in the Albanian-speaking language was 
the role of bejtexhinj writings that started at the end of the seventeenth and ended at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. This long period of bejtexhinj writings is believed to have 
been constituted in two parts: The first period ended at the end of the eighteenth century, and 
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in a form of ‘Oriental poems’, emphasised beauties of nature, human spirit, and some social 
phenomena such as love, gender and morals; criticizing Albanian poverty, whereas the second 
period criticised the Ottoman oppressors, while having more religious content.847 Writings of 
some bejtexhinj authors such as Nezim Frakulla, Sulejman Naibi, Dalip and Shahin Frashëri, 
Zyko Kamberi, Zenel Bastari and Tahir Gjakova spread through hand written copies and oral 
tradition to then penetrate the Albanian spoken language and establish their “Orientalisms”.848 
There are conflicting opinions regarding the role of bejtexhinj in Albania. Although these 
writings were an infusion of moralities and philosophy, they were full of ‘Turkish-
Orientalisms’– elements that according to Kadare, damaged the development of written 
Albanian. Others such as Derjaj, think that bejtexhinj activism saved the Albanian folk 
language.849 The high influence of the Turkish language also affected (in a different way) 
rilindja writers.850 An example is Naim Frashëri’s poem “Qerbelaja” where religious and moral 
motives are similar to those of bejtexhinj poems; painted by the influence of the Turkish culture 
at the time. However, the difference from the bejtexhinj period is that rilindja created its own 
linguistic style based on traditions and Albanian oral spoken language that had survived in 
centuries, rather than overusing Turkish words to express the Albanian culture and tradition.851 
Therefore, rilindja writers distanced themselves from the Turkish language used by bejtexhinj 
writers. In fact, Naim Frashëri criticised all those writers who “mixed” and “disfigured” the 
“beautiful-Albanian” language with that of Turkish.852 In short, at the end of the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the twentieth century, Albanian rilindja leaders accentuated in Albanian 
language myths, traditions and culture; all elements that following Smith are necessary to form 
a nation and its identity.853 
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The process of clearing Turkish loanwords from the Albanian language intensified at 
the beginning of the twentieth century. Acording to Derjaj, in 1908, the Albanian language 
dictionary created by the Albanian ‘Bashkimi’ association contained one Turkish word for 
every eight Albanian words, whereas in 1954, an Albanian dictionary (Fjalori gjuhës shqipe), 
reduced Turkish words by half, or one in sixteen. By 1980, when the Albanian contemporary 
dictionary (Fjalorin e gjuhës së sotme Shqipe) was published, the number of Turkish loanwords 
was reduced again to one in every twenty-three words, constituting a total number of 1800 
words.854 However, although some Turkish words are removed by the Albanian dictionary, 
confusion surrounds this topic as many Turkish words remain part of the Albanian lexicon. 
This is an excellent example of how changes to language take time to come into use in the 
vernacular, despite being adopted at a higher, bureaucratic level. 
Proper research from Albanian sociolinguistic scholars exploring real effects of Turkish 
loanwords is limited.855 While some scholars argue that borrowing loanwords from another 
language is enriching, others argue that borrowing only causes damage to a language, and 
therefore, loanwords should be removed.856 Whatever the scholarly arguments might be, in 
Albania, there “is no doubt that the language purification process … from the Turkish 
borrowings in particular has been a long and complicated process”.857 In fact, some Turkish-
based words have remained in spoken Albanian even though they have a synonym, which is 
part of the Albanian standard language.858 The controversy of completely banning Turkish 
words from the Albanian language has not ended. 
Along with Turkish loanwords borrowed by Albanian speakers to interconnect with the 
Ottoman bureaucracy, other elements of the Turkish lexicon and morphology are also present 
in the Albanian spoken language. An example is the use of the suffix – çe in words such as 
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vendçe “in the manner of the local natives; calmly; very hard” or kosovarçe “in the manner of 
natives from Kosovo”.859 Bufli discusses how Albanians added their own prefix such as 
“madh” (big) or “keq” (bad), to then create new Albanian adjectives such as gazepmadh, 
qametmadh and adetkeq; words that all originate from Turkish words such as gazap (anger, 
hate, exasperation), kiyamet (catastrophe, disorder, tumult) and adet (traditional custom, 
tradition).860 However, I argue that words such as gazep, qamet and adet are replaced in 
Albanian language with words such as problem, fatkeqësi and qokë (in geg) or shkuarje (in 
tosk), and therefore the usage of Turkish words can be avoided, if Albanians want to do so. 
The process of using Turkish words by Albanian speakers is not a neat and tidy philological 
phenomenon, but rather evidence of a long and complicated cultural exchange between Turks 
and Albanians. Similarly, Balaban and Çağlayan think that the process of borrowing words 
carries marks of cultural layers.861 Bufli mentions that, according to Gusmani, “borrowing” of 
morphemes is not simply a process of imitation, but rather requires “active behaviour on the 
part of the speaker”862. Therefore, the process of cleansing the Albanian dictionary of Turkish 
words, which started during the Albanian rilindja period in the mid-nineteenth century863 (and 
is perhaps still underway)864, is not a simple exclusion of Turkish loanwords. Thus, purifying 
the Albanian language from Turkish loanwords may also mean ‘cleaning’ the Albanian culture 
from ‘Oriental elements’ left in Albania as a result of the Ottoman legacy. However, this is not 
a simple academic process. For example, as we have discussed, there is a great love in Albania 
for Turkish TV programmes and their serial movies which are bringing back more Turkish 
words and cultural elements to Albania—developments that while showing the Turkish 
influence over Albanian identity, are not welcomed by Kadare and his supporters. While 
Albanians seem reluctant to replace all Turkish remaining words with those of the Albanian 
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language, the case of Islam is more challenging for Albanian identity. 
 
7.9 Islam—the main ally of Erdoğan in Albania 
 
In the twenty-first century, Erdoğan and the Turkish government are trying to ‘play the 
religious card’ and fill the gap created by the communist regime.865 An example is the money 
donated by the Turkish government to build the biggest Mosque in Europe at the central 
Skenderbeg square in Tirana—the Ethem Beu Mosque, which before it’s closure in February 
2018, had a capacity of no more than 60 people to now enable four and a half thousand people 
to pray at the same time once its finished.866 Next to this Mosque, in 2017, during the 
celebration of Kurban Bajram, at the Skenderbeg square, the monument of Skenderbeg was 
fenced by large screen panels provided by the Albanian Islamic Community. The 
disappointment culminated with comments of the Albanian Imam Armand Aliu on the media; 
stating that Albanian Muslims should not be proud of Skenderbeg who ruthlessly fought 
Islam867, and therefore Albanians should choose between their national hero and religious 
pluralism. This sparked a debate in Albanian society and social media; going as far as a call to 
arrest the Imam for placing Albanian identity second to Islam. Nevertheless, this episode and 
the fact that Albanian Bektashism has developed its own way beyond Sunni Islam indicates 
that, in the short-term, Albanians have no intention of abandoning Islam.  
While ‘religious harmony” is an added value to the Albanian national identity, 
preserving Islam by a majority of the Albanian population makes it easier for Turkey to 
influence Albanian identity, and thus, get closer to the Western Balkans and indeed Albania’s 
Muslims. As discussed in this thesis, religion has played a positive role in building the Albanian 
national identity and this fact has been noticed by Turkish authorities, who in the twenty-first 
century are emphasising their support to their brother ‘Muslims’ in Western Balkans. Although 
Albanians place their Albanian national identity before religion, until Islam will continue to 
                                                 
865 Anđelković, 4 October 2017, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/10/04/turkey-playing-card-islam-
albania/. 
866 "Turkey to build Balkans’ largest mosque in Tirana", Hürriyet Daily News, 24 October 2014, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-to-build-balkans-largest-mosque-in-tirana-73512. 
867 Anđelković, 4 October 2017, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/10/04/turkey-playing-card-islam-
albania/. 
 199 
remain the majority religion in Albania, it will be easier for Erdoğan’s Turkey to interfere, if 
not manipulate Albanian identity. In the meantime, Islam will continue to represent the 
majority of Albanians in religious terms. 
 
7.10 Erdoğan’s political pressure through political deals with Russia and Serbia  
 
The Albanian Euro-Atlantic Orientation is overarching for Albanian politics in the twenty-first 
century. Albania’s strategic partnership with Europe and the US is unquestionable. However, 
Turkey is also a strategic partner for Albania. Erdoğan has continuously threatened the 
European Union to scrap the refugee agreement signed in March 2016, and it seems that Turkey 
has tried to “say goodbye”868 to Europe since then. Not only is Turkey’s optimism to join 
Europe coming to an end, Erdoğan is now threatening the EU. In July 2017, he stated that 
Turkey can do without the EU869—a statement that in October 2017 was strengthened even 
more, mentioning that Turkey does not need Europe anymore, but rather it will soon be the 
other way around. According to him, “Europe has died in Bosnia and buried in Syria”.870 The 
more the Turkish government distances its position from the EU, the more complicated the 
Albanian position becomes with regard to relations with both Europe and Turkey. 
Erdoğan’s Turkey decision to get closer to Putin’s Russia in the twenty-first century, 
generate challenges, if not threats for the EU, Balkan’s and Albania’s region and energy 
security. The tip of the iceberg was seen in 2015, when Russia decided to deviate the South 
Stream natural gas pipeline from Bulgaria to now deliver gas to Turkey.871 Since then, despite 
different opinions regarding the Syrian regime, Istanbul and Moscow have become closer. 
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Turkey is also strengthening ties with Russia’s main partner in the Balkans, Serbia. On 10 and 
11 October 2017, Erdoğan visited Serbia with a large delegation of 180 businessmen. Twelve 
new trade agreements signed showed a win-win situation for Serbia and Turkey, but also hinted 
that Turkey is becoming more closely aligned with the Western Balkans in a way that Bechev 
defines as “a neo-Ottoman quest”.872 This move of Erdoğan is in line with his decision to 
strengthen ties with Russia. Serbian Minister of Commerce, Rasim Lajic, believes that while 
this is positive for Serbia, it also represents a shift of Turkey’s foreign policy regarding 
relations with Kosovo and Albania.873  According to Lajic, relations between Turkey and 
Albania are not the same as two years ago and the shift is due to the last Turkish coup in 2015. 
Lajic’s optimism stating that “now Erdoğan is with us” was complemented by Serbian foreign 
minister Ivica Dačić who entertained Erdoğan; singing a Turkish-Balkan-known-old-song that 
relates to the Ottoman era: the “Osman Aga”.874  
These recent shifts in Turkish foreign policy constitute a challenge, especially for 
Kosovar Albanians who are eagerly hoping for Serbia to recognise the Republic of Kosovo. 
Under pressure from Erdoğan, on 28 March 2018, the Kosovar intelligence in coordination 
with Turkish intelligence arrested six Turkish citizens—five of them were teachers—who were 
residing and working in Kosovo. The Turkish government claimed that all of them were 
members of the Gülistan Educational Institution in Gjakova and Prizren, and arrested them 
over their alleged links to the Gülen movement.875 They were all immediately deported to 
Turkey in a secret operation that was praised by Erdoğan. Under the US pressure, Kosovar 
President Hashim Thaci, the Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj and the Head of Parlament 
Kadri Veseli, all stated they had no information about this secret operation and denied the 
deportation of six Turkish citizens. Nevertheless, this is a clear sign that the political influence 
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of Turkey in Kosovo is as strong as leading military actions within the territory of Kosovo.  
The next day, the Turkish Ambassador in Albania reinforced his position that Albanian 
authorities must do the same and collaborate with Turkish intelligence to deport all Turkish 
citizens acused by the Turkish government. Previously, Greek authorities had halted the 
deportation of Turkish soldiers, amidst doubts that deported Turkish citizens would face unfair 
trials in Turkey. However, it seems the Kosovar authorities are siding with Turkish authorities 
rather than with European values that respect human rights of all individuals. One of Kadare’s 
greatest fears is that the Albanian political elites may decide to ally themselves with Turkey, 
as this case of the Kosovar government clearly shows. In line with Kadare and his supporters, 
Yzeiri also thinks that both political elites of Kosovo and Albania are not pushing enough to 
restore European-Albanian-identity, but rather they downplay the Turkish cultural and 
religious influences; allowing, for example, Turkish TV programmes and activities of “…black 
mosques where jihad is preached…”876 to be free in Albania and Kosovo. As a result, Yzeiri 
thinks, both elites of Albania and Kosovo are showing their way to Istanbul.877 Motivations for 
this are clear: in the last decades they have seen Turkey as a ‘big brother’ not only to finalise 
the unfinished business of recognising the Republic of Kosovo, but also to protect rights of all 
Albanians in the region. Therefore, security implications are paramount and will determine the 
future foreign policies and political shifts of both Kosovar and Albanian governments. Unless 
the USA and EU will seriously engage politically and militarily in the Western Balkans, the 
fate of Albanians will depend on Turkey’s foreign policy and commitments of protecting 
Albanians in the region. On the other hand, getting closer to Moscow and Belgrade, Ankara is 
only increasing pressure over Tirana and Prishtina; promising them the renaissance of 
Albanians within the new pan-Islamic Empire run by its new Sultan, Erdoğan.878 In the twenty-
first century, economic, security, energy and  political challenges, combined with divisions 
between Albanians regarding their culture, religion and identity are all tools at hands of 
Erdoğan’s Turkey to halt Albanians abandoning the East, but also their marsh through the 
Western rocky road. Therefore, the ultimate finding of this thesis is that, in the twenty-first 
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century, both Albanian and Kosovar governments are lacking the will, policies and a structured 
approach in order to escape the Ottoman heritage, while aligning with the modern Turkey. 
 
7.11 Summary of key findings 
 
This chapter addresses the research question, which probes how Albania is bidding farewell to 
its Ottoman heritage and whether and to what extent Turkish influence is influencing Albanian 
strategic alignment with the East in the twenty-first century. This study has found that both 
Albanian and Kosovar governments are blaming the Ottoman past, while on the other hand, 
modern Turkey is considered as Albania’s best and closest friend in the region. While 
governments rely on the legitimacy of people, they are also instrumental to certain ways they 
govern and influence their own people. It is not a coincidence that the majority of the Albanian 
and Kosovar channel televisions, which are licenced by respective governments, continue to 
propagate the Turkish culture and the way of life as a role-model for Albanians. In addition, 
both Albanian and Kosovar governments show their weaknesses in front of Turkish requests, 
and thus, trying to accommodate their wishes in a puzzeled platform that explains the Turkish 
influence and leverage, but also the willingness to continue supporting Erdoğan’s Turkey in 
the twenty-first century. Therefore, Albanian people are confused by the ambiguous position 
of the Albanian and Kosovar governments to quietly ally with Turkey. For example, the 
decision of the Albanian government authorities to hide the statue of Skenderbeg every time a 
meeting with Turkish officials takes place is surely sending perplexing messages to Albanian 
people. Kosovar government went a step further; allowing Turkish services to operate in 
Kosovo without any type of permission. It seems that at a political level, both Kosovar and 
Albanian governments show no will to craft policies that will distance Albanians  from the 
Ottoman legacy. Albanian culture is also resisting these changes. In the twenty-first century, 
the Albanian government is accepting, rather than rejecting, Erdoğan’s decision to revive the 
Ottoman ‘glory’ and propagate it through religion, language, history, culture and politics in 
Albania. As a result, both Albanian and Kosovar governments are missing  the political will to 
distance Albanian identity from the Ottoman heritage.  
Albanian people are also relaxed in their atitude to abandon the Ottoman heritage. Culture 
similarities create resisting forces to escape from the Ottoman heritage and its legacy as we 
have seen with the case of language and religion. Albania has been an independent nation-state 
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for more than a century, however, Albanian language is not free from Turkish loanwords. 
Turkish words are often used in spoken Albanian, even when an Albanian word can be used 
instead. The presence of Turkish words show difficulties in distancing the Albanian language, 
but also its culture and religion from the Ottoman heritage. Bektashi-Islamic religion in Albania 
is another example of the Ottoman heritage in the twenty-first century. Culture is indeed 
resistant to rapid changes. This cultural continuity is supported by both governments of Albania 
and Kosovo. On the other hand, a small group of scholars, artists, politicians and media in 
Albania have been active in their quest to distance Albanian identity from the Ottoman-Turks. 
The spiritual leader of this group—Kadare, has no doubt about the demage the Ottoman-Turks 
have caused to Albanian-speaking lands. According to Kadare, Albania belongs to the 
European-Western-Christian civilisation and was injustly ‘removed’ by the Ottoman-Turks 
who must be blamed for restraining the Albanian language to develop and making the Albanian 
culture murky with elements of the Turkish culture. As a result, Kadare believes that any 
attempt to side with Erdoğan’s Turkey must be ended. Others align their beliefs with Qosja 
who contemplates that Albanian identity reflects more Turkish-Oriental elements, and thereby, 
it is a mixture of majority-“Islamic” and minority-“Christian” civilizations.879 However, all 
these reactions are rather spontaneous and impulsive, whereas this topic needs to systematically 
and naturally be debated by all Albanians.880 
In the twenty-first century, the influence from the Erdoğan’s Turkey will have ramifications 
for Albanian identity. Firstly, a further realignment with Turkey will controvert attempts of 
Albanians to portray themselves as Europeans and thus, ‘more’ Westerners than Easterners. 
Therefore, it will have a direct impact on the way the EU sees and conceives Albanian identity. 
Disagreements between Turkey and the EU are known, and the more Albanian identity will 
realign with the Ottoman-Turks, the more difficult, if not impossible, will be for Albanian 
identity to portray itself as Western-European. Kadare, and his supporters, would likely have 
interpreted the Albanian realignment with Turkey as an unnatural path and contrary to the 
direction Albanian identity should take. Secondly, this realignment will have political 
implications for the Albanian government. Although Albanian support for NATO and the EU 
is unquestionable, Turkey’s role as a regional power that support both NATO and Russia is 
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crucial for the future of Albania, Kosovo, and other Western Balkan states. On the other hand, 
if the scenario of Turkey’s reluctance to progress on democratic reforms continues, while 
getting closer to Russia, Albania’s political challenges will only increase. This might directly 
affect Albania’s efforts to join the EU. Furthermore, another reason for Albania to ally with 
Turkey will be that of the energy security. As discussed in chapter six, TAP will bring the 
natural gas from Azerbaijan to Europe through Turkey. The other gas pipeline, the South 
Stream will also run through Turkey; placing it at the centre of the energy security dilemma.  
Due to these issues, the possibility for Albania to say ‘yes’ to any Turkish requests in the 
twenty-first century will be high, whereas the choice of turning its shoulders to Turkey will 
become a greater challenge.  
Finally, Albania needs Turkey’s military muscles in the region; however, things are 
complicated after Turkey’s decision to side with Russia and perhaps Serbia. The developments 
of Albanian identity in the future will also depend on the fate of Kosovar and Macedonian-
Albanians. This is not a justification for a Greater Albania, however, the struggle of the 
Albanian-speaking people in the twenty-first century, has not ended. Difficulties of Albania 
becoming an EU member can only increase frustrations and further force Albania to look at 
alternative routes. Erdoğan’s Turkey knows Albania’s challenges and continues to use them in 
its favour.  
This chapter addresses the research question. In analysing the Turkish legacy in Albania in 
terms of religion, language, history, culture and politics, it is concluded that, despite some 
strong individual voices of Albanian scholars, politicians and media, the Albanian government 
is less eager to distance Albanian identity from the Ottoman heritage. Humiliation due to five 
centuries of Turkish occupation and the loss of the Albanian territories at the beginning of the 
twentieth century seem not to be enough reasons for Albanians to escape the Ottoman heritage. 
The Albanian government is very ambivalent under the pressure from Erdoğan’s Turkey. 
Albanian people are confused with Albanian and Kosovar governments’ actions and their 
missing policies of how to deal with Turkey’s influence. Therefore, the lack of structured 
actions is caused by the absence of the political will from Albanian government and society to 
abandon the Ottoman heritage. In the twenty-first century, premises for Albania to follow 
Turkey, and thus go East are becoming real. 
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Personal reflections 
 
When I started this research in 2012, it was for personal interest. I was excited to further my 
own knowledge about the country where I was born. It turned out that I learned more about 
Albanian identity in the ‘West’ throughout this research than through all my studies and life in 
Albania. The research question for this thesis consumed me for the entire period of this 
research, and I believe, it will continue to remain with me for some time. The themes of this 
thesis, such as Albanian identity, the role and the influence of Turkey, ‘Greater Albania’, 
energy and security developments in Western Balkans never stopped being contested during 
the time of this research. This thesis has been an interesting journey for me. Despite the 
loneliness of a PhD candidate, I was privileged to discuss the Albanian identity question with 
various scholars in Australia and abroad. I am very thankful to these people for allowing me to 
discuss with them such an important topic and also to shape my thoughts regarding Albanian 
identity. 
I was struck by two scholars I met in October 2016 during a conference on language 
and culture at Beder University in Tirana. This university is part of the ‘black list’ that Ergogan 
has asked the Albanian PM, Edi Rama to close down.881 Discussing with them Albanian 
identity, I was surprised with their deep knowledge, but more importantly, knowing they were 
both Turkish citizens who were lecturing and contributing in Albania for more than twenty 
years, opened my eyes to better understand culture similarities. Their Albanian was perfect. I 
opened my presentation with a provocative question for the audience: Would I call myself 
‘more Albanian’ than these two Turkish scholars who were contributing to the Albanian 
economy and Albanian education for more than two decades? This was another reason for me 
to think deeply about historical and cultural links between Albania and Turkey, which are 
stronger than we hear on the media. I have critically examined Albanian identity and the 
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influence of Turkey at different levels. Even though I did not set out to scatter myths about 
Albanian identity and the role of Turkey to influence it, I found that this relationship is vastly 
different to common representations offered by politicians and media.  
 
8.2 Reflections on the methodological and theoretical foundations of this thesis 
 
This thesis wrestles with many theoretical concepts such as nations, nation-building 
approaches, ethnicity, nationalism, religion, civilization, power, influence and the discourse of 
legacy. There was a significant amount of theoretical groundwork to cover in order to 
realistically present the findings in a comprehensible way. While much of the theoretical 
groundwork is fused in discussions and analyses of all chapters, the methodological 
considerations require some further elucidation. Primarily, I want to offer some reflections on 
the way I employed these theoretical notions throughout the study. 
 I initially did focus on modernist nation-building theories of Gellner, Anderson and 
Hobsbawm. I then soon realised that although Albanian nation was indeed modern, it was 
created before modernity reached the Albanian speaking lands. Thus, in order to deeper probe 
Albanian belonging, I turned my eye to earlier nation-building theories of primordialism and 
perennialism. However, I realised these notions are also unable to explain Albanian identity. I 
then shifted my analyses to focus on Smith’s ‘ethno-symbolism’ approach. The main element 
to unite Albanians was (and still is) the Albanian language, which makes the Albanian case 
unique, and I found that Smith’s ‘ethno-symbolism’ was getting closer to explaining Albanian 
national identity compared to other approaches. However, his approach is not flawless. Smith 
contemplates that “ethnicity in pre-modern periods was not normally the basis of alternative 
polity formation, except where it combined with religion”.882 In Smith’s terms, lack of strong 
links between Albanians and religion delayed the creation of the Albanian nation. Nonetheless, 
Smith agrees that more research in the field is required “to determine how far earlier forms of 
ethnic sentiment and later forms of nationalism were similarly imbued with religious beliefs 
and sentiments … in various ethnic cultures and in successive periods of history”.883 It was the 
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religion issue that forced me to also abandon Smith’s ‘ethno-symbolism’ theory, and instead 
focus on the approach of Hastings, who after scrutinizing the main nation-building theories, 
suggests that all scholars in the field should historically analyse interactions between nation, 
ethnicity, nationalism and religion. This then became the new theoretical framework that 
satisfied the starting point of my research in exploring the Albanian national identity. 
The theoretical groundwork required to interrogate Turkish influence over Albanian 
identity, which was more difficult as analyses in this field are very limited. In a way, this 
opened the opportunity to bring Todorova’s seminal work on Balkans and the Ottoman legacy 
into the discussion, and then narrowing that concept down to Albania.  
I would like to acknowledge that this research experience infused in me an 
overpowering admiration for the country I was born (Albania) after realising that such a small 
country has always been able to survive through difficult historical periods, stereotypes, and 
regional interests. It was a privilege to write about Albanian identity, which is almost 
completely unknown in the Australian context.   
 
8.3 Unexpected findings 
 
While the findings detailed above were the deliberate focus of the research questions, there is 
a point to which I wish to draw attention, as it came as a surprise to me: agreements between 
Putin’s Russia and Erdoğan’s Turkey in the twenty-first century. The long war-campaigns 
between the Ottoman and Russian Empires commenced in the second half of the sixteenth 
century and ended with the victory of Russians in the nineteenth century. A strong competition 
between these two Empires, also shaped Balkan identities. This fact was painted with religious 
colours by Balkan nationalism; creating a sort of historical competition between Orthodox-
Christians and Muslims. This approach of religious categorisation directly affected Albanians 
who were considered as Muslims and thus, enemies of Orthodox neighbours. I have shown in 
this thesis that at the end of the Ottoman Empire, Albanians fought Turks, but were left out of 
the Balkan allies that were supported by Russia. Towards the end of 2015, signs of a new era 
in bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia started to become clear after the decision that 
a Russian company will build a 20 billion USD nuclear power plant in southern Turkey—a 
project officially initiated by both Erdoğan and Putin in April 2018. In addition, the decision 
of Erdoğan to buy the S-400 surface-to-air missile defence equipment from Russia in 
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September 2017 was another surprise for NATO allies and the EU; knowing that Turkey is one 
of the biggest military countries of NATO in the region. The EU is a strong economic partner 
of Turkey. However, Erdoğan’s frustration with the EU due to the endless decision to reject 
Turkey’s membership is evident. He is using this fact to achieve his ends in becoming a 
powerful authoritarian leader in the region, a new Caliph, or Sultan who is aiming to rule a new 
Turkish-Islamic Empire. Agreements with another authoritarian leader, Putin, can help him to 
use this relationship as leverage vis-à-vis to its European and NATO partners in the region, and 
thus, achieve his political ends. 
These latest developments while contradicting historical disagreements between Russia 
and Turkey, are creating a better opportunity for both Turkey and Russia to extend their 
influence in the Western Balkans, and thus, halt the Euro-Atlantic perspective of these 
countries. Although it is not clear whether these new agreements with Putin are a façade for 
Erdoğan, the reality is that Turkey is moving away from Europe and the West. Turkey’s latest 
shift is a bigger challenge for the Albanian diplomacy and its national identity in the twenty-
first century. Albania is committed to its Euro-Atlantic path, which means Europe, United 
States, NATO and Western civilization, but as discussed, doesn’t want to lose its regional 
strategic partner, Turkey that it is now getting closer to Russia. As Turkey is moving further 
from the West, NATO and Europe, Albania’s paranoia that Turkey will be getting on the 
Orthodox-axis of Russia and Serbia will increase. In the twenty-first century, Turkey’s role in 
the Western Balkans is becoming crucial and its new involvement is changing the 
reconfiguration of Western Balkans. 
 
8.4 Avenues for further research 
 
As emphasised in this thesis, Albanian identity is considered both as a cohesive entity and a 
contested concept. In the last century, ethnic Albanians who were forced to live in Montenegro, 
Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and Greece have developed their own identities, and it would be 
clearly superficial, if not disingenuous to consider Albanian identity as a unit of analyses that 
includes all Albanians. Perhaps, the same research question applied separately to each of those 
Albanian ethnic communities who live in various Balkan countries may provide different 
findings. It has been argued, for example, that religious orientations of Kosovars and Albanians 
who live in Macedonia are stronger than Albanians who live in Albania. However, proper 
research to scrutinise whether this is due to Hoxha’s atheist legacy in Albania, and perhaps 
 209 
exploring whether Kosovar and Macedonian Albanians used Islam as a vehicle to protect 
themselves from Slavic assimilation, is missing. Another unexplored area might be to analyse 
why Bektashi is largely diffused in Albania compared to other Albanians living in other 
Western Balkan states. Therefore, a deeper analysis of identity similarities and differences 
between Albanians would complement this research. 
 
8.5 Concluding remarks 
 
This study has offered some findings. Firstly, it is worth noting that the Albanian national 
identity is constructed in the context of many ideological influences, while defined as a product 
of interaction between domestic and international forces such as Albanian and Balkan 
nationalism, ethnicity, religion, language, interests of regional and Great Powers, and 
domestic-political competition for leadership. None of these factors can be underrated, and 
only a holistic analysis in historical context will fully explain the Albanian national identity. 
Most of the above elements are contested, along with the Ottoman influence and legacy that 
have impacted Albanian identity. This thesis has shown that the Ottomans affected Albanian-
speaking lands; allowing a further deterioration and keeping them underdeveloped. However, 
it is correct to claim that the Ottoman legacy has influenced Albanian identity, rather than 
emphasising the negative impacts of the Ottomans in the Albanian speaking lands. During the 
Ottoman rule, Albanian identity inevitably absorbed elements of Turkish culture, which are 
mirrored in Albanian political culture, language, music, cuisine and religion, just to mention a 
few. Therefore, it is not a question of whether Albanian identity contains elements of Turkish 
culture, but rather, the question is whether Albanian identity will continue to reflect Ottoman 
features in the future?  
Secondly, the thesis finds that the claim that Albanians are attempting to restore the 
humiliation caused by the Ottomans who conquered Albanian-speaking lands for more than 
five centuries and did not protect Albanian-speaking territories from their partition, following 
the collapse of the Empire is not accurate. Although little attempts to exclude from the Albanian 
language Turkish loanwords have started since the rilindja period, claiming that Albanians are 
‘escaping’ from the Ottoman legacy cannot be substantiated. Culture shifts need more time to 
occur. A structured and methodological approach from the Albanian government is missing, 
and more importantly, the willingness to do so is questionable. On the other hand, Turkish 
government is using its influence over Albania with projects such as TİKA, Maarif Fundation 
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and activities of Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Centres not only to provide economic help, but 
to promote the Turkish culture, language and Islam in Albania. The advancement of Turkish 
policies in Albania is portraying the ‘Turkish way of life’ as a role model for Albanians, who 
are considering Turkey a friendlier country than their direct neighbours, Serbia and Greece. As 
a result, Turkish policies in the twenty-first century, are aiming to bring closer to Albania and 
Western Balkans new Turkish cultural elements, which for example, are astutely disseminated 
through Turkish TV serial movies and culture centres. 
  Albania continues to be one of the poorest countries in the Balkans and this is a good 
reason to welcome any kind of help in economy, education and especially regional security. 
Not only are Albanians still closely linked to the Turkish culture, religion, language and 
history, many (including the Albanian government) believe Turkish military power will protect 
them from ‘others’ in the region. The reluctance of Albanian political elite to implement 
democratic reforms, and also delays of the EU in accepting Albania as a member state, are in 
line with the Turkish interests.  
Ultimately, the Albanian government has made the Euro-Atlantic orientation its 
strategic priority in the twenty-first century. This trajectory is not without difficulty for 
Albanian speaking people who live in the region. The majority of Albanians are hoping that 
Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia will all become EU member states, and thus, Albanians can 
all unite under the EU banner. In the absence of an EU army, NATO then becomes Albania’s 
protector, but the USA will need to craft a more active foreign policy engagement in Western 
Balkans in order to balance the influence of Turkey and Russia in the region. The second option 
will be for the Albanian government to maintain the Euro-Atlantic orientation while not 
abandoning Turkey and thus, the East, which is the current Albanian foreign policy in the 
twenty-first century. And there is a third option in case Albania decides to abandon the Euro-
Atlantic way and side with Turkey. This decision will have bigger ramifications for Albanian 
identity in both the short and long-term. This may place Albania in a direct disagreement with 
the USA, which will cause considerable difficulty, as the last thing Kosovar Albanians want to 
do is to abandon their shield, the USA. The Republic of Kosovo could not have existed without 
the NATO military campaign led by the US. On the other hand, the American government has 
invested a significant amount of money and energy in Albanian democratic process and cannot 
afford to abandon their best ally in the Western Balkans. In reality, in the first two decades of 
the twenty-first century, the Albanian government is continuing to dream the West, while 
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mutatis mutandis is not abandoning their old friend, Turkey. Erdoğan’s Turkey, on the other 
hand, is using all of its influence and legacy to halt Albania’s Western road and thus, pull 
Albania once more, back to the Eastern civilization.  
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